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SECONDDORDER REASONS? 
UNCERTAINTY AND LEGAL 
THEORY 
STEPHEN R. PERRY* 
INTRODUCTION 
It is an obvious and banal fact that reasons for action often conflict, 
which is simply to say that they often call for different and incompatible 
courses of action. Ordinarily we resolve such conflicts by assessing the 
relative weight or strength of all the relevant reasons and then deciding 
in favor of that action which has the greatest overall support. This pro-
cess, which Professor Joseph Raz calls determining what ought to be 
done on the balance of reasons, 1 is clearly a fundamental and commonly 
employed mode of practical reasoning. T he reasons which we take into 
account when relying on this mode are, in Raz's terminology, first- order 
reasons; they are reasons for action that have been drawn directly from 
considerations of interest, desire or morality. 2 
I t is one of Raz's most important philosophical insights to have 
noticed that determining what ought to be done on the balance of first-
order reasons is not the only mode of practical reasoning upon which 
people rely. Sometimes we decide what to do on the basis of what Raz 
calls second-order reasons, which he defines as "reason[s] to act on or 
refrain from acting on a reason. " 3 The most important category of sec-
ond- order reasons recognized by Raz is that of exclusionary or peremp-
tory reasons. These are reasons to refrain from acting on a reason. 
Exclusionary reasons give rise to the possibility of another type of con-
flict between reasons in addition to first- order conflicts, namely, confl icts 
between a firs t- order reason and an exclusionary reason for not acting on 
the first- order reason. When such a conflict occurs, according to Raz, 
'' Assistant Professor of Law, McGi ll U ni versity. I am indebted to Ken Kress and Joseph 
Raz for comments on ear lier drafts. I would also like to thank Ronald Dworkin and Jeremy 
Waldron fo r he lpful disc ussions on topics which a re dealt with in this paper. 
I. J. RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 36 ( 1975). 
2. !d. at 34. 
3. Jd. a t 39; see a/so J. RA Z, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 16-17 (1979). 
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the exclusionary reason always prevails just by virtue of being a reason of 
a higher order. 4 The exclusionary reason does not override or outweigh 
the first- order reason but simply excludes it from consideration by the 
agent. 
Raz's distinction between first- and second-order reasons is a major 
contribution to the philosophy of practical reason and the foundation 
upon which much of his work in legal and political as well as in practical 
philosophy is built. He has used it, for example, to analyze the concept 
of a ru le in a more precise and fruitful manner than had previously been 
possible, namely as an exclusionary reason of general application which 
is also a first- order reason for action. 5 This analysis has permitted him to 
show how rules are able to provide an intermediate level of practical rea-
soning which is capable of mediating between concrete decisions and ulti-
mate reasons or values. 6 The idea of rules as mediating devices in 
practical reasoning figures in turn as an important element in Raz's anal-
ysis of practical and political authority, an analysis which he then draws 
upon in his formulation and defense of legal positivism. The distinction 
between first- and second- order reasons is thus the heart of a comprehen-
sive and powerful system of thought in which legal and political philoso-
phy are shown to be deeply rooted in the soil of a subtle and carefully 
worked-out practical philosophy. 
As Raz has correctly observed, "[p]hilosophers have tended too 
often to avoid facing the complexities of practical reasoning with its 
multi-level assessments .... Many ... pessimistic conclusions are based 
upon a confusion between the epistemological difficulties in establishing 
the validity of ultimate values and the logical difficulties in explaining the 
considerations often found in practical reasoning. " 7 This Paper will 
attempt to show that Raz himself has underestimated the complexities of 
multi-level assessments in practical reasoning because he circumscribes 
the possible categories of second-order reasons too narrowly. Raz's own 
definition and theoretical utilization of second-order reasons emphasize 
the possibility of isolating a level of practical reasoning from the consid-
erations and values which ultimately justify the decisions being taken. 
The notion of a second-order reason is in fact far richer than Raz allmvs, 
4. J. RAZ, supra note I, at 46. 
5. !d. at 73; see also Raz, Promises and Obligations, in LAw, MORALITY AND SociETY 210. 
221-22 (P.M.S. Hacker & J. Raz eds. 1977). 
6. See, e.g., J. RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 58 (1986). 
7. J. RAZ, supra note I, at 94-95. 
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and there exist second-order reasons for action upon which people com-
monly rely, mainly in institutional contexts, that do not have the isolat-
ing effect he describes. Reliance on these reasons requires at least some 
fam iliari ty, and often a great deal, with the ultimate values and other 
justifying reasons which figure in first- order practical reasoning. The 
most important context in which second- order reasons of this non-isolat-
ing type are to be found is legal reasoning. T heir prominence in common 
Jaw reasoning in particular casts doubt upon at least certain aspects of 
Raz's posi tivism and lends support to what is essentially a Dworkinian 
theory of law. 
The Paper is divided into two main Parts. The first is concerned 
with certain aspects of practica l philosophy generally, while the second 
focuses on the philosophy of law. The first Part begins with a brief over-
view of Raz's account of how exclusionary reasons figure in practical 
reasoning. This is followed by a discussion of the general nature of rea-
sons and of the forms which practical reasoning can take when agents are 
uncertain about what right reason requires. While this may seem at first 
to constitute something of a detour away from the main concerns of the 
Paper, it will lead to the clarification of some basic notions and the for-
mulation of certain distinctions which will facilitate the development of 
the argument to follow. A critical examination of Raz's account of the 
concept of authority is then undertaken. After it has first been shown 
that Raz's notion of an exclusionary reason is ambiguous, it is argued 
that reliance on the type of exclusionary reason that figures in his analy-
sis of authority, which will be referred to as a subjective exclusionary 
reason, represents a rational strategy that agents can or should adopt in 
order to deal with uncertainty about what action right reason demands. 
Once this is understood, it becomes possible to define two new types of 
subjective second- order reasons that allow agents to formulate strategies 
for dealing with uncertainty which, unlike the exclusionary approach, 
enable them to continue to take the underlying first- order reasons into 
consideration. 
The second Part of the Paper, which deals with the philosophy of 
law, begins by outlining how Raz makes use of the idea of a (subjective) 
exclusionary reason in order to defend a particularly powerful and proba-
bly definitive version of positivism. It is then shown that the two newly-
defined categories of second- order reasons can be utilized to formulate 
an interpretation of the common law process of decisionmaking which is 
superior to Raz's own positivist interpretation. This offers strong sup-
port for the conclusion that positivism cannot provide a complete 
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account of the foundations of law, and that at the very least it has to be 
supplemented by a theory which in its most fundamental respects resem-
bles that of R onald Dworkin. 
I. PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 
A. RAZ ON EXCLUSIONARY REASONS IN PRACT ICAL R EASONING 
It has already been mentioned that Raz defines a second- order rea-
son as a reason to act for a reason or to refrain from acting for a reason. 
He pays very little attention, however, to positive second- order reasons, 
which are reasons to act for a reason. It is negative second- order reasons, 
which are reasons to refrain from acting for a reason, that figure most 
prominently in his theoretical work. 8 He also calls negative second-
order reasons exclusionary or peremptory reasons. 9 Raz defends the the-
sis that determining what ought to be done on the basis of an exclusion-
ary reason is a distinct mode of practical reasoning by pointing to the 
ways in which people actually do deliberate about what they ought to do. 
For example, a soldier who has been given an order to do an action 
which he thinks cannot be justified on the balance of reasons will ordina-
rily regard the order as a reason for him not to act on his view of the 
merits of the case rather than as simply another reason which is to be 
added to the balance of reasons. As Raz says, "we would be disregarding 
[the soldier's] own conception of the situation if we were to say that he 
regards the order as an overriding first-order reason." 10 The soldier con-
ceives of the order as an exclusionary reason which is also a first-order 
reason to do the action that he was ordered to perform. Suppose that the 
soldier nonetheless disregards the order and acts on his own, correct 
assessment of the balance of reasons. H is superior offi cer will now, says 
Raz, "be torn between conflicting feelings," since he is faced with con-
duct which he concedes was right on the merits but which he nonetheless 
thinks was wrong in disregarding an exclusionary reason. 1 1 The conflict 
felt by the superior officer is an indication that he is aware that the sol-
dier's action can be assessed in two different and incompatible ways. It is 
an indication, that is to say, that he recognizes that there are two distinct 
modes of practical reasoning, one of which demands that a person act on 
8. Raz discusses negative and positive second-order reasons in j. RAZ, supra note 3, at 17. 
9. For criticism of Raz's notion of an exclusionary reason see Gans, lWandatory Rules and 
Exclusionary Reasons, 15 PHILOSOPHIA 373 ( 1986). 
10. J. RAZ, supra note 1, at 42; cf id. at 74-75; J. RAZ, supra note 3, at 22-23. 
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his own assessment of the balance of reasons and the other of which 
demands that he disregard that assessment. 
Raz argues that such practical phenomena as promising, complying 
with an order, acting on advice, taking a decision and following a rule 
must all be analyzed in terms of the acceptance of an exclusionary reason 
for action. 12 But his concern is not just with the phenomenology of prac-
tical reasoning. H e wishes to establish more than that people do, in fact , 
sometimes determine what they ough t to do by reasoning in an exclu -
sionary rr1ann.:r. H e also maintains that there can be valid exclusionary 
reasons, i.e., there can be exclusionary reasons upon which people are 
justified in acting. It has already been mentioned that Raz analyzes the 
notion of a ru le as a general exclusionary reason which is also a first-
order reason for some particular course of act ion. As he points out, it is 
quite plausible to suppose that individuals will sometimes be better off in 
their everyday lives if they follo\v rules of thumb which have this logical 
structure than they would be if they were to decide what to do in each 
relevant situation by assessing the balance of reasons on a case by case 
basis. Following a predetermined course of action could well reduce 
overall error when one has to act in circumstances of impaired rational-
ity, for example. 13 I t is also obvious that following a rule which one has 
adopted in advance in order to deal with a particular type of situation 
that is expected to recur could in principle be justified by the time and 
effort which would be saved in not having to reassess the balance of rea-
sons on every relevant occasion. 14 
R az further argues that it can be rational not simply to follow an 
exclusionary reason which one has formulated for oneself, at a time 
before the rel evant situation or series of situations has arisen, but also to 
treat the utterances of another person as exclusionary reasons for action. 
To treat another person (or an institution) as a practical authority, for 
example, means that one accepts the directives of that person (or institu-
tion) as exclusionary reasons applicable to oneself. 15 When one person 
has authority over another the former possesses a type of normative 
power which enables him or her to change the latter's protected reasons, 
these being exclusionary reasons which are also first-order reasons .16 
12. See id. at 49-84; see also J. RAZ, supra note 3, at 21-25, 30. On promises see Raz, supra 
note 5, at 210-2 8. 
13. J. RAZ, supra note I, a t 37-38 , 59-60. 
14. !d. at 59-60; see also Raz, supra note 5, a t 224. 
15 . J. RA Z, supra note 3, at 26. 
16. !d. at 21; cf 1. RAZ, supra note 6, at 24. Raz defines protected reasons in J. RAZ, supra 
note 3, at 18. 
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Raz defends what he calls the " service conception" of authority, which 
regards authorities as "mediating between people and the right reasons 
which apply to them, so that the autho rity judges and pronounces what 
they ought to do acco rding to right reason." 17 The normal and primary 
way of justifying the legitimacy of an authori ty is to show that the person 
over ·whom authority is claimed "is likely better to com ply with reasons 
which apply to him (other than the alleged d irectives) if he accepts the 
directives of the alleged authority as aut horitatively binding and tries to 
follow them, rather than by t rying to follovv the reasons which apply to 
him directly." 16 Raz refers to this claim as the normal justification thesis . 
According to the service conception, authorities should base their direc-
tives on reasons which apply to their subjects. (Raz calls both reasons 
which apply to the subjects and reasons which are meant to reflect such 
reasons dependent reasons. 19 ) But a legitimate authority cannot carry 
out its mediating role unless its subjects treat its directives as reasons for 
action which replace some of the reasons which would otherwise be rele-
vant in assessing what they ought to do and not simply as reasons that 
are to be added to those original reasons. 20 Subjects should, in other 
words, treat the authority's directives as exclusionary reasons for action. 
Raz's analysis of the concept of legitimate authority effectively 
rebuts the anarchist claim that the concept is necessarily incompatible 
with rationality, since he shows that the directives of an authori ty could 
in principle be valid exclusionary reasons which it would be rational for a 
person to follow .2 1 He also outlines a number of ways in which the legiti-
macy of a practical authority, including a political authority such as the 
government of a state, could in fact be established. 22 One way is to show 
the authority to be wiser than the individual in determining what ought 
to be done in a particular type of situation. Another requires a demon-
stration that the authority is in a better position than the individual to 
achieve what the latter has reason to achieve but cannot, such as soiving 
coordination problems or changing the structure of prisoner's dilemma-
type situations. 23 Raz is of the opinion that such considerations are in 
fact capable of justifying political authority, but only on a piecemeal 
basis and only up to a point. The extent of a government's authority is 
17. Raz, A u1hori1y. Law and Mora!iry, 68 THE MONiST 295 , 299 ( 1985); see also J. RAZ, supra 
note 6, at 55-56. 
18. J. RAZ, supra note 6, at 53; see also Raz, supra note 17 , at 299. 
!9. J. RA Z, supra note 6, at 41. 
20. !d. at 57-59 . 
21. J. RAZ, supra note 3, at 27 ; J. RAZ, supra note 6, a t 57 , 68. 
22. J. RAZ, supra note 6, at 75; cf J. RAZ, supra no te I , at 63-64. 
23. J. RAZ, supra no te 6, a t 49-51. 
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likely to vary from individual to individual, and will in the case of most 
persons be more limited than the unrestricted authority which govern-
ments actually claim for themselves.24 
There are three other points about Raz's conception of an exclusion-
ary second- order reason which are worth mentioning here. The first is 
that exclusionary reasons can differ in scope. This simply means that an 
excl usionary reason may exclude only some of the reasons which would 
otherwise be applicable in a given situation, and that the range of 
excluded reasons can vary. 2 5 Thus an authority, for example, can be lim-
ited not just by the kinds of acts which it is justified !n regulating but also 
by the kinds of reasons upon which it may rely and which its decisions 
will preempt. 26 The second point is that Raz uses the notion of an exclu-
sionary reason to explain the concept of an obligation or duty. This is 
accomplished in the following way: "An action is obligatory if it is 
required by a categorical rule, i.e. [an exclusionary] rule which applies to 
its subjects not merely because adherence to it facilitates achievement of 
their goals.'m , The third point is that being subject to the authority of 
another and therefore, according to Raz, possessing a duty to treat that 
other's directives as exclusionary reasons, does not entail that one is not 
permitted to form a judgment of what ought to be done on the balance of 
reasons. Authority does not require a "surrender of judgment" in this 
strong sense; the only thing which is necessarily excluded is action on 
one's judgment of what ought to be done. 28 
B. PRACTICAL REASON ING AN D UNCERTAINTY 
Section C undertakes a critical inquiry into the nature of exclusion-
ary reasons as these figure in R az's analysis of the concept of authority. 
This will enable us to see that there are in fact more types of second-
order reasons than Raz acknowledges. First, however, it will be helpful 
to say something about the general nature of reasons for action, paying 
particular attention to the fact that practical reasoning must often take 
place under conditions of uncertainty. This will clarify certain matters 
24. !d. at 80. 
25 . J. RAZ, supra no te I , at 40; J. RAZ, supra note 3, a t 22. 
26. J. RAZ, supra note 6, at 46- 47. 
27. Raz, supra note 5, a t 223; cf J. RAZ, supra note 3, at 234-35. See also J. RAZ, supra note 
6, at 186, 195; J. RAZ, supra note I, at 76 (moral duties are exc lusionary in nature). Donald Regan 
argues pe rsuasively tha t R az's account o f authority, while broad ly co rrec t, cannot sus tain the con-
clusion that the subjects of even a legitima te autho rity have a duty to obey the autho rity's direc tives. 
See Regan, Au1hori1y and Value: Refieaing on R az 's 1l,foralily of Freedom, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 995 
( 1989) . T his is not an issue which will be discussed in this Paper. 
28. J. R AZ, supra note 6, at 29; J. R AZ, supra note 3, a t 26 n.25 . 
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and yield certain di stinctions which will be of use in the disc ussion to 
follow. 
1. Raz on the Na ture of Reasons 
In Practica l R eason and Norms an d other rel a ti vely early works Raz 
dravvs a distinction between two different ·;;.;ays that we commonly talk 
b " · '9 H , . · 1 .c a out reasons ror actJOn .- :· e notes tna{ sometimes we speaK 01 reasons 
as facts, while at other times we speak of them as beliefs . (The concept of 
a "fact" is to be understood here as incl uding values and moral principles 
as well as events and processes. 30 ) Thus we refer both to the fact that it 
wi ll rain and to a belief that ii will rs.in as reasons for carrying an 
umbrella. Raz acknowledges that one could distinguish in this way 
between two distinct notions of reason, but he goes on to say this : 
Only reasons understood as facts are normatively significant; only they 
determine what ought to be done. To decide what we should do we 
must find what the world is like, and not what our thoughts are like. 
The other notion of reasons is relevant exclusively for explanatory pur-
poses and not at all for guiding purposes. 3 1 
In thus maintaining that only reasons understood as fac ts are nor-
matively significant it would appear that Raz is not simply stating the 
obvious truth that it is only facts about the physical world, morality, and 
one's desires and interests that ultimately determine what ought to be 
done. He seems to be saying in addition that practical reasoning can be 
adequately characterized without reference to the beliefs which agents 
hold about their reasons, so that a theory of practical reasoning need 
only refer to the idea of reasons as facts . A gents are to be regarded as 
deliberating about what to do on the assumption that certain facts which 
could serve as reasons obtain (or that they do not obtain). Sometimes 
they will discover after they have acted that this assumption did not 
hold, and it is in this situation that the ;dea of reasons understood as 
beliefs serves its explanatory fun ction: "It is mostly when we come to 
believe that the reason on which we relied does not obtain that we cite 
our belief in it as a reason." 32 But for ex ante guiding purposes, as 
opposed to ex post explanatory purposes, the assumption is to be 
29. J. RAZ, supra no te 1, a t 16-19: see also Raz. Inlroduction, in P RACTICAL REASONING 1, 2-
4 (J. Raz ed. 1978). 
30. J. RAZ, supra note 1, at 17-18. 
31. !d. at 18. 
32 . !d. According to Raz, ta lk of reasons as beliefs could be replaced even in explana tory 
con texts by a mode o f speaking wh ich conformed wit h his own analysis if we were to sa y after the 
fact that we did no t have a reaso n but that we had a reason fo r thinking we had a reason. 
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regarded as sound; practical reasoning is essentially just a matter of 
manipulating statements about states of affairs which, if they obtained, 
would be both facts and reasons, where the agent's belief in the truth of 
those statements is taken as given. T hus Raz defines an atomic complete 
reason as "the fact(s) stated by the premises of a sound practical infer-
r:nce ·with no redundant premises. " 33 (Of the different reasons that can 
comprise a complete reason, those which state valid goals are operative; 
o. 1l ~;fners are refe rred to as auxilimy. 3-+) Raz then defines practi ca l rea-
soning as ''the transition (not necessarily conscious) from belief in the 
pcerrdses to acceptance of the putative conclusion of a practical infer -
enr: t::. " 35 (The conclusion of a practical inference is always, according to 
'-' ,.) ..., " r1 ,o.o,... t;c st"'~em<"n L 36) i ' .':: .. -:.. :: ~J -..-.., 1l .•. ,_, v.- __ .... L. 
-r hat Raz holds a view of practical reasoning along the lines just 
sketched is confirmed by his discussion of a certain type of reason which 
he says does not fit easily into his basic analysis of reasons understood as 
facts . He has in mind such reasons as "the probability that p," " the 
prospect that p," "the danger that p," etc., all of which, he says, "com·· 
bine assertion or presupposition of a reason for belief with the assertion 
of a reason for action." 37 For example, Raz analyzes the statement "The 
probability that it will rain is a reason for taking an umbrella" as assert-
ing the following: "There is a reason to believe that it will rain and that 
it will rain is a reason for taking an umbrella." 38 T his analysis seems to 
eliminate the need to refer to epistemic notions in the characterization of 
practica l reasoning proper: the reasons upon which agents understand 
themselves to be acting are facts (in the example, the fact that it will 
rain). where the reasons for believing that the facts obtain fall outside the 
scope of practical (as opposed to theoretical) reason; as explained above, 
belief in the premises which state the relevant facts is assumed. Raz thus 
seerns to be putting forward a view of practical reasoning which presup-
pos~s a pre-practica l stage at which the agent determines, by means of 
theoreticai reason, what beliefs about the world it is justifiable to main-
tain . The second stage is the stage of practical reasoning proper, where 
the agent decides what to do on the assumption that he or she holds true 
beliefs about which facts capable of serving as reasons for action do or do 
33 . Raz, supra note 29, at 5; see also J. RAZ, supra note I, at 22-25 (discussing the concept of 
complete reasons). 
34. Raz, supra note 29 , at 15; see also J. RAZ, supra note I, at 33-35 ("Most operat ive reason s 
are either va lues or desires or interests•'). !d. at 34. 
35. Raz. supra note 29, at 5 (emphasis added). 
36. J. RAZ, supra note I, a t 28; see also Raz, supra note 29, a t 5-8. 
37. J. R;,z, supra note I, at 21. 
38. !d. 
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not obtain. At this second stage epistemic notions essentially drop out of 
the picture, since they are not taken into account by the agent in deter-
mining vvhat to do. 
2. :The Objective Balance of Reasons 
This picture of practical reasoning IS at best a misleading and 
incomplete one. To see how and why this is so, it will be helpful to begin 
by adopting the following terminology. The balance of reasons under -
stood as facts will be referred to as the objective balance of reasons. The 
objective balance of reasons consists of all practical inferences and weigh-
ing processes that would be carried out by an agent who, when deciding 
what ought to be done in a particular situation, possessed true informa-
tion about all relevant facts and who in addition reasoned validly at every 
stage of his or her practical deliberations. (Raz sometimes uses the 
expression "right reason" to refer to what seems to be essentially the 
same idea.) A single complete reason which figures in the objective bal-
ance of reasons will be referred to as an objective reason, or a reason in 
the objective sense. Finally, a given person's process of reasoning about 
what ought to be done in a particular situation, where it is now possible 
that the person might not possess all relevant information and that he or 
she might make mistakes, will be referred to as that person's subjective 
(practical) determination of what ought to be done. The view of practical 
reasoning defended by Raz maintains, in effect, that an agent always 
assumes that his or her subjective practical determination coincides with 
the objective balance of reasons. 39 This assumption might be mistaken in 
a particular case, and the agent might come to discover that mistake after 
the fac t, but the agent is nonetheless to be regarded as always relying on 
the assumption at the time of deliberation and action. 
Consider the fo llowing example. Assume that it is going to rain 
today, and also that the only operative reason I have for carrying an 
umbrella is my desire to avoid getting wet. From the perspective of the 
objective balance of reasons I then have, in Raz's terminology, a com-
plete reason to carry an umbrella which is made up of this operative 
reason together with an auxiliary reason, namely the fact that it will rain 
today. The weight of this complete reason, again from the perspective of 
the objective balance of reasons, is wholly determined by the strength of 
my desire not to get wet. Assume further that my only reason not to 
39. For the moment I am assuming that on ly first-order reasons a re in play. W hat happens 
when second- order reasons enter the pict ure wil l be discussed infra in text accompanying notes 44-
5!. 
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carry an umbrella is the inconvenience of doing so, but that my desires 
and interests are such that this reason is outweighed by the complete 
reason just described. According to the objective balance of reasons, 
then, I should carry an umbrella today. Now, on Raz's understanding of 
practical reasoning I wiil , in deciding what to do, either assume that it 
will rain today or I will assume that it will not. If I assume that it will 
r.ain, my subjective deterrnination of v;hat ought to be don~ will simr: ly 
track the inferential steps and 'Neighing processes of the objective bai2nc.:: 
of reasons (supposing, that is, that I make no mistakes, which in this case 
seems unlikely) and I \vill tb.erefore reach the correct practical conch;.-
sion that I should carry an umbrella. If I assume that it will not rain 
today, then I will decide what to do on the basis of a belief that I have no 
reason to carry an umbrella, and the inconvenience of carrying an 
umbrella will prevail in my subjective practical determination. I will 
conclude (wrongly as it happens) that I should not carry an umbrella. 
Later in the day, when the skies open and I am drenched to the skin, I 
might cite my mistaken belief as the explanation for why I acted contrary 
to the objective balance of reasons. 
3. Subjective Practical Determinations and Uncertainty 
Let me now develop the example described in the preceding section 
further by supposing that the meteorology service has announced on the 
radio that there is a 20% chance that it will rain today. Notice first that 
the statement "The chance that it will rain today (which is 20%) is a 
reason to carry an umbrella" could well be true. It cannot, however, be 
analyzed in the same way that Raz analyzes the statement "The 
probability that it will rain is a reason to carry an umbrella," namely as 
asserting that there is a reason to believe that it will rain and that the fact 
that it will rain is a reason to carry an umbrella, since a 20% chance of 
rain is not a reason to believe that it will rain. It may, however, still be a 
reason to carry an umbrella. lt is not part of the argument here that the 
statement "There is a 20% chance of rain today" cannot be unpacked 
into a complex factual statement which does not mention things li ke 
"chances." Nor is it part of the argument to claim that the compiex fact 
associated with that unpacked statement, which will be referred to as fact 
A, cannot be regarded as a reason for carrying an umbrella. (Fact A 
would be something like the fact that it will rain on about 20 out of 100 
days with weather conditions that are similar in certain specified respects 
to those prevailing today.) But nothing very important seems to turn on 
whether we refer to my belief that there is a 20% chance of rain, to the 
fact that there is a 20% chance of rain, or to fact A as my reason to carry 
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an umbrella. Consider that our meteorological theory migh t not have 
been capable of specifying a numerically precise probabili ty of rain , but 
only that there is, say, a relatively low chance of rain. h would then be 
much more difficult to come up with an analogue to fac t A , and in an y 
event the reason which most people would natura lly cite for carrying an 
umbrella would be their belief that there is a chance of Ta in, or t.he "fa.ct" 
that it "might" rain. 
The point to be emphasized about this example is uv:: foliowing: 
although from the perspective of the objective baiance of re21.3ons it is 
only th~;; fact that it wil l rain today which gives m e a reason to carry an 
umbrella/'0 I do not decide what to do by first assuming that it will rain 
today or else fi rst assuming that it will not. The fact of the n1atter is tha t 
I do not know whether it will rain today, and I take tha t uncertainty 
d irectly into account in determining what I ought to do . I t reat some 
other fact or belief as a kind of surrogate reason, even though I know 
that fact A, say, could never figure in the objective balance of reasons. If 
I definitely knew, for example, that it is going to rain today , then the fact 
that it will rain would be my reason for carrying an umbrella, not fact A . 
If, on the other hand, I knew that it is not going to rain today then 
neither A nor any other fact would be a reason for m e to carry an 
umbrella. As it happens, though, I do not know whether it will rain, 
although I have reason to believe that a dry day is more likely than a wet 
one. My strategy in the face of this uncertainty is to act as though I have 
a reason to carry an umbrella, although I will probably discount its 
weight to reflect the perceived likelihood that it will not rain . In other 
words, I will probably treat fact A as having a lower weigh t than I v;ou1d 
assign to the fact that it is going to rain today, if I knew that it was 
indeed going to rain. T he reason for carrying an umbrella which I shall 
in fact take into consideration will thus be more easily outweighed by the 
inconvenience of carry ing an umbrella than would the fact that it will 
rain, were 1 in a position to treat that fact as a reason . 
This rather laboriously developed example illustrates that under 
conditions of uncertainty, i.e., in circumstances where we have reason in 
advance to think that we do not know what the objective ba lance of rea-
sons requires, we consciously depart in our practica l reasoni ng from the 
way that we know we would reason if the objective balance of reasons 
were accessible. Our subjective determination of what ought to be done 
takes into direct account, and our practical conclusions a re par tially 
40. I am assuming that the sen tence "It will rain today" can never be neither true nor false. 
Either it is true on a given day , or the sentence "It will not rain today" is true. 
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determined by, the fact and extent of our uncertainty about the truth of 
propositions which state that the facts which could figure in the objective 
balance of reasons obtain (or do not obtain). T his is exactly what Raz's 
conception of practical reasoning seems to deny. We reason about what 
ought to be done relative to a set of beliefs-in the example, a general 
meteorological theory- which we sometimes know, at the time that we 
are delib.::rating, to be incomplete or only partially accurate. It is the 
incompleteness or possible inaccuracy of our beliefs about meteorology 
that creates uncertainty about the truth of such propositions as "It will 
rain today. " h is , moreover, only relative to this set of beliefs that I 
could be said in the example to treat fac t A as a reason for action. If we 
held a rnore accurate or more complete set of beliefs about meteorology 
then I could not be regarded as treating fact A but only some other com-
plex fact as my reason for action. 4 1 The point here is not that I would 
necessarily come to think that this new fact obtains and A does not, since 
it is possible that both might obtain. The point is, rather, that it is only 
because we hold the beliefs that we do, and because we know that those 
beliefs are incomplete or only partially accurate, that I could be said to 
treat either of these facts as a reason at all, since I know that neither of 
them is a reason which could figure in the objective balance of reasons. 
There is thus a sense in which, even for what Raz calls guiding pur-
poses as opposed to explanatory purposes, beliefs have priority over facts 
in practical reasoning. This is so, moreover, even though Raz is 
undoubtedly correct when he says that the notion of a reason understood 
as a fact is more fundamental than the notion of a reason understood as a 
belief, since it is only reasons in the former sense which can provide the 
ultimate justification for any action. I t is also the case, of course, that 
our subjective determination of what ought to be done always strives (or 
at least should strive) to reproduce the result, if not necessarily the sup-
porting reasoning, of the objective balance of reasons. However, it does 
not follov; from the premise that the idea of a reason understood as a fact 
is the most fundamental notion of a reason that only such reasons are 
" normatively significant," or that only they "determine what ought to be 
4 1. A more accurate meterological theory would tell us that on days with weather conditions 
si milar to those prevai lin g today, where wha t constitutes "similar conditi ons" would now be deter-
mined diffe rent ly from before, the chance of rain is somethin g other than 20%; it would tell us that 
the chance of rain is higher if today is in fact a day when it will ra in, o r that it is lower if today wi ll 
turn out to be rai n-free. A different compl ex fact from A would be associated with this new s ta te-
ment of probability, and it is only that different fact and not A which I could be sa id to be treating as 
a reason fo r ac tion. I would of course now weight m y reason for carrying an umbrella differently 
from the way that I wou ld have weighted A, in order to reflect the different view concerning the 
probability of rain. 
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done. " 42 Beliefs come to take on a certain life of their own in practical 
reasoning, since not only do we not always know -;,vhat the objective bal-
ance of reasons requires, but often we knovv that we do not know this at 
the very time that we must decide what to do. An adequate theory of 
practical reason ing must therefore not suppose that agents always delib-
erate about what to do on the assumption that their reasoning is tracking 
the objective balance of reasons, but must also have something to say 
about those situations where agents know that this is not the case. 
Raz's conception of practical reasoning, according to vvhich reasons 
are to be understood only as facts and agents are to be regarded as reach-
ing their practical conclusions on the basis of definite assumptions about 
whether those facts obtain, is thus inadequate. Contrary to what Raz's 
conception implies, agents often consider in their subjective practical 
determinations the fact and extent of their own uncertainty about the 
truth of propositions which state that facts of the type that could serve as 
objective reasons obtain (or do not obtain). Sometimes, as in the example 
discussed above, this involves acting as though one has a reason to do 
something even though on balance there are insufficient grounds to 
believe that one has a reason in the objective sense, since one is not cer-
tain that one does not have such a reason. Sometimes, by contrast, 
agents take account of the fact that they couid be mistaken about the 
state of affairs in question even where they have sufficient grounds to 
believe: that the fact that could serve as an objective reason does obtain. 
In a criminal trial, for example, the court only has reason, so far as the 
objective balance of reasons is concerned, to convict and punish the 
accused if the person in fact committed the offense with which he or she 
has been charged. A preponderance of evidence that falls short of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt may well be enough to justify a belief that the 
accused is guilty, but because of the possibility of mistake, together with 
a moral judgment that it is better to acquit guilty persons than to convict 
innocent ones, the court will not convict unless the evidence proffered by 
the state meets the stricter standard. This higher burden of persuasion is 
one aspect of the presumption of innocence, and, as Raz himself notes, it 
is a feature of many presumptions that they serve to sever what he calls 
"the normal connection between belief and action. " 43 
It is obvious that there are many ways in which agents might take 
account in their practical reasoning of uncertainty about what the objec-
tive balance of reasons requires. It will not be possible to explore this 
42. J. RAZ, supra note I, at 18. 
4J. J. RAZ, supra note 6, at 10. 
J 
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topic in its full generality here. Instead, Raz's analysis of the concept of 
legitimate authority will be examined . As the following discussion will 
establish, his explanation of why it could ever be rational to act on an 
authoritative directive is, in effect, an exposition of one possible strategy 
for dealing with the sort of uncertainty that has just been considered. 
This fact is somewhat obscured, however, by an ambiguity in his notion 
of an exclusionary reason. 
PRACTICAL REASONING AND UNCERTAINTY: 
THE EXAM PLE OF AUTHOR ITY 
1. Two Conceptions of an Exclusionary Reason 
Raz maintains, as we have seen, that to fo llow an authoritative 
directive is to act on an exclusionary reason. If this is true, then the 
nature of the exclusionary reason involved is very different from that of 
some of the reasons he refers to as exclusionary in other contexts. To see 
how and why this is so, it will be helpful to contrast his analysis of the 
concept of promising with his analysis of legitimate authority. Raz says 
that any promising principle which looks upon a promise as an expres-
sion of an intention to undertake an obligation should be thought of as an 
exclusionary rule that is justified only if the creation of a certain kind of 
special relationship between persons is held to be valuable: 
[Such] principles present promises as creating a relation between the 
promisor and promisee-which is taken out of the general competition 
of conflicting reasons. It creates a special bond, binding the promisor 
to be, in the matter of the promise, partial to the promisee. It obliges 
the promisor to regard the claim of the promisee as not just one of 
many claims that every person has for his respect and help but as hav-
ing peremptory force. Hence [such] principles can only be justified if 
the creation of such special relationships between people is held to be 
valuable.44 
Raz thinks that this kind of promising rule, together with the fact of 
having made a promise, gives rise to a reason for not acting on one or 
more first- order reasons that the promisor does in fac t have. What a 
promise does, in other words, is to preempt at least some of the reasons 
that figure in (or at least would otherwise figure in) the objective balance 
of reasons. The effect of an exclusionary reason of the sort exemplified 
by a promise is to alter the topography of one's objective reasons, so to 
speak. There will be at least some situations, therefore, in which one 
44. Raz. supra note 5, at 227-28. 
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should behave differently from how one ought to have behaved if one had 
not made the promise. 
Contrast this with Raz's analysis of authority , -.,,vhich says th?,L a 
person who is subject to a directive issued by a legi tim ate authority ought 
not to act on his or her judgment of what the objective balance of reasons 
requires (or, as Raz sometimes puts it, on his or her judgment of 1ahat 
ought to be done according to right reason). This of co11 rse entails that 
the person does not in any direct sense act on the objective reasons them-
selves, bu t those "excluded" reasons nonetheless do not simply drop out 
of the practical picture in the way that supposedly happens in the prom~ 
ising case. Authoritati ve directives are meant to be based upon and to 
reflect dependent reasons, i.e., reasons which apply to the subjecr in the 
circumstances in question. According to Raz's normal justification the-
sis, a subject is justified in accepting directives from a legitimate author-
ity precisely because the subject is " likely better to comply v.;ith" those 
reasons than if he or she tried to follow them "directly . " 45 Thus a person 
who follows a directive which does successfully reflect dependent reasons 
is complying with the supposedly excluded reasons even though not 
" directly" acting upon them. Once one accepts a directive, one ought 
not in addition to attempt to take direct account of the underlying depen-
dent reasons for the simple and obvious reason that that would be 
double-counting. 46 Those reasons have already been taken into consider-
ation , albeit indirectly , just by virtue of the directive having been fol-
lowed. (This is true even if the directive, which we are assuming was 
issued by a legitimate authority, does not in fact reflect the dependent 
reasons, so long as it was intended to do so.47 ) A uthoritative directives 
thus do not in any ultimate sense exclude acting upon reasons which 
figure in the objective balance of reasons, and indeed their very role is to 
try to bring about a greater degree of compliance with those reasons. 
The point of Raz's analysis of authority is simply to determine whose 
judgment about what the objective balance of reasons requires should 
prevail in a given type of situation. 
Raz thus has two different conceptions of an exclusionary reason. 
The first, which will be referred to as the objective conception, is con-
cerned with reasons not to act on a reason that figures (or at least would 
otherwise figure) in the objective balance of reasons. 48 The second, 
45. J. RAZ, supra note 6, at 53. 
46. !d. at 58. 
47. !d. at 61. 
48 . Should we say that the "excluded" reason still figures in the objec tive balance of reasons, 
but th a t the agent is not to act upon it? Or should we say, rather, that th e: objecti ve balance of 
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·which will be referred to as the subjective conception, is concerned with 
reasons not to act on one's (present) judgment of what an objective rea-
son requires (i.e., on one's judgment of what action the reason calls for 
and vvhat weight it shou ld be treated as having). 4 9 The first kind of rea-
son has an effect on what one ought to do (that is to say, it has an effect 
on right r,~ason itself), while the second simply affects how one ought to 
go about ensuring that one does what one ought to do. In the context of 
R az's analysis of authority it only makes sense to rely on a subjective 
exclusionary reason if there exists anoth er person (who might in fact be 
oneself at an r:;arlier time) whose practical judgment is more dependable 
than one's own. Agents can thus only appreciate that they have this sort 
of reason if they knmv that their own judgment about what the objective 
balance of reasons requires is, compared to the judgment of that other 
person, relat ively untrustwor thy. They might be aware, for example, 
that the other is wiser than they are, that the other is less likely to be 
influenced by irrelevant considerations, or that the other's actions are 
capable of affecting the objective balance of reasons itself.5° But 
whatever the basis of their knowledge might be, agents can only regard it 
as rational to follow another's directives if they realize that they them-
selves might not know what the objective balance of reasons requires in a 
particular type of situation. This phenomenon can be termed practical 
uncertainty. From the point of view of the agent, then, reliance on sub-
jective exclusionary reasons can only be justified, at least so far as Raz's 
normal m ethod of justifying authority is concerned, if it constitutes a 
sensible strategy for dealing with the agent 's own practical uncertainty. 
An agent who acts on an objective exclusionary reason can sensibly 
assume that his subjective practical determination is directly tracking the 
reasons has been altered. in the sense that the supposedly excluded reason is now no longer an 
objective reason a t a!J? The second formula tion has the greater intuitive appeal , and indeed it is not 
obvious that the firs t even makes much sense. It is only if the first formu lation is accepted, however, 
that it seems plausib le to speak of mora l dut ies as excl usionary reasons. (On the stat us of moral 
du ties as r-oasons, see infra note 49.) Taken toge ther , these points suggest that the objective concep-
tion of an exclusionary reason may not be coherent. Since, however, I shall be concerned almost 
exclusively in this Paper with subject ive second- order reasons, I shall not pursue this line of argu-
ment further. 
49. I shall not a tt empt to d raw up a n exhausti ve classification which sorts all of the reasons 
that Raz labels as ··exc lusiona ry"' into one or the o ther of those two categories. A few furth er 
exam ples may be he lpful, however. Raz says that mora l duties are exclusionary reasons, supra note 
27, and if this is so then they clearly fall under the objec tive concept ion . F ollowing advice and actin g 
on a decis ion , on the other hand, must be understood in terms of the subjective conception. T he 
latter example is an instance of a reason to ac t on one's previous assessment of the bala nce of reasons 
rather than on one"s presen! assessment. 
SO. See supra notes 22 . 23; see also infra note 5 I and accompanyi ng text (concern ing the poss i-
bil ity that authorities can affect the object ive balance of reasons). 
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objective balance of reasons, as that balance has been modified by the 
existence of the exclusionary reason itself. But an agent who acts on an 
authoritative directive, which is a subj ecti ve exclusionary reason, cannot 
make this assumption. He will no doubt hope that his conduct will com-
ply with the objective balance of reasons, but he will be aware that he is 
fo llowing an indirect strategy to achieve that end. Now it is of course 
true that the issuing of an authoritative directive is a fact. Further, if the 
authority is legitimate then it is also a fact that agents are likely better to 
comply with the object ive balance of reasons by acting on the directive 
instead of on their own judgment. But these are not facts which enter 
into the objective balance of reasons; neither are they facts which, in the 
manner of an objective exclus ionary reason, affect it. An agent treats 
these facts as reasons, but does so in the way that the agent in our earlier 
example treated fact A as a reason to carry an umbrella; they are a kind 
of surrogate reason, only to be treated as reasons because the agent is in a 
situation of practical uncertainty. 
Raz says that an authoritative directive is a first-order reason as well 
as an exclusionary reason, but because it is not a reason which figures in 
the objective balance of reasons this is somewhat misleading. It is prefer-
able simply to speak of the agent as having a reason, arising out of practi-
cal uncertainty, to make his or her subjective determination of what to 
do by deferring to another's judgment about what the objective balance 
of reasons requires. It should also be noted that while subjective exclu-
sionary reasons differ from objective exclusionary reasons in that they do 
not by their nature automatically affect the objective balance of reasons, 
it is sometimes the case that other features of an authoritative directive, 
or of the circumstances under which the directive is issued, can have this 
consequence. This is the case, for example, with respect to authoritative 
directives which resolve prisoner's dilemma-type situations. 51 
There is th us a certain tension between Raz's analysis of the concept 
of authority and the understanding of practical reasoning that he 
advanced in Practical Reason and Norms. This tension does not under-
mine his analysis of authority, which is essentially sound, although it 
does provide further evidence that the understanding of practical reason-
ing which he defended in his earlier work is inadequate, or at least 
incomplete. The main object in bringing this tension to light is not to 
51. Raz discusses this and mher examples of situations in which a utho rities affec t what I ha ve 
been c:tllin g the objecti ve balance of reasons in J. R AZ, supra note 6, a t 48-51. It is because such 
cases ex is t that he concludes that the no difference thesis . which asserts that "the exercise of author-
ity sho uld make no difference to what its subjects ought to do,'" is false. !d. at 48. 
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cnticlze Raz's analysis of authority, but rather to clarify it. Once it is 
realized that the analysis utilizes the subjective conception of an exclu-
sionary reason and that at its heart lies a stra tegy fo r dealing with practi-
cai uncertainty , then several refinements to the anal ysis begin to suggest 
themselves. T he nature of these refi nements , w hich are concerned with 
certain ways in which even legi t imate authority can be limited, is the 
subject of Sec tions 3-6 below. 
2. The Bounds of Authority: Ju risdictional and Scope Limitations 
Raz's analysis of authority builds upon one particular form of justifi-
cation for the conclusion that one person or instituti on ough t to defer to 
the judgment of another person or institut ion about what the former 
ought to do. 52 It will hardly be disputed that deferring to the judgm ent 
of another person is at least sometimes the most rational course, and, as 
wi ll be shown later, there is more than one way in which deference to the 
judgment of another can be justified. T he difficult questions, to be dealt 
with initially in this and the immediately following sections, concern the 
determination of the limits of deference . For the time being attention 
will be focused mainly on deference that is taken to be justified in the 
manner indicated by Raz's normal justification thesis. Before consider-
ing the possible refinements on the ways that authority can be limited 
tha t were m entioned above, it will be helpful to outline briefly the two 
forms of limitation on legitimate authority w hich are unequivocally 
accepted by Raz . 
Raz says correctly that the directives of legitimate authorities must 
at least sometimes be binding even when mistaken, since otherwise "the 
ad vantage gained by accepting the authori ty as a more rel iable and suc-
cessful guide to r ight reason would d isappear. " 5 3 But, as was noted ear-
lier , Raz also accepts that authority can be limi ted in at least two ways . 54 
F irst of all , an authority can be limited by the kinds of acts or situations 
which it can or cannot regulate. This is simpiy to say that its jurisdiction 
can be circumscribed. · Secondly, authori t ies can be limited by the kinds 
of reasons u pon which they m ay or may not re ly and which thei r deci-
sions wi ll preempt. T o put this point in the special terminology devel-
oped by Raz, exclusionary reasons may be limited in scope-they may 
exclude some reasons only. I t is of course the subjective conception of an 
52. For the sake of con venience I sha ll henceforth use th e word "person·· to refer to bo th 
persons and institutions. 
53. J . RA Z., supra note 6, at 6 1; see also id. at 47-48. 
54. See supra note 26. 
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exclusionary reason which concerns us here. Thus the point could be 
expressed more precisely by saying that an authoritative directive may 
provide a reason not to act on one's judgment of what is required by only 
some, and not necessarily all, of the reasons that fi gure in the objective 
balance of reasons. 
3. The Bou nds of Authority: .Reweighting L im itations 
There are at least two other ways in which defe ren c.::; i:o an authority 
could in principle be limited . T hese will be discussed in tum in this and 
th.e fo llowing section . T he first is the possibility th c:t t I rn ight take the 
judgment of the authority in to account only to the extent of introducing 
an element of systematic bias into my practical reasoning; l would treat 
the case for the conclusion which is favored by the authority as being 
stronger to some specified degree than it actually appears to me to be. I 
would thus be deferring to the judgment of the authority only partially, 
in the sense that I would never permit my own judgment to be preempted 
completely by that of the authority. Raz discusses the possibi lity of this 
kind of partial deference but rejects it as not being compatible with the 
general thrust of the normal justification thesis: the reason for deferring 
to an authority is to increase the extent to which one complies with the 
reasons that apply to oneself, and one will always do better if one defers 
to the authority's judgment completely (within the bounds, of course, 
that are set by those other limitations on authority which Raz does 
accept). 55 
I t is not absolutely obvious that Raz's observation about this kind of 
part ial deference is true, but for present purposes it will be a.ssumed that 
he is right. It is nonetheless worth taking note of two further poin ts. 
F irst , the idea of such partial deference implicitly presupposes a general-
ization of the subjective conception of an exclusionary reason. Accord-
ing to this generalization, a subjective second- order reason is a reason to 
treat a reason as having a greater or lesser weight than the agent would 
otherwise judge it to possess in his or her subjective determination of 
what the objective balance of reasons requires. 56 (An exclusionary rea-
son is then just the special case of a reason to treat a reason as having 
zero weight. ) Second-order reasons as thus defined will be referred to as 
reweigh ting reasons. Notice that the idea of a reweighting reason only 
55. J. R AZ , supra note 6, at 67-69. 
56. I d iscuss th is genera lized conception of a second- order reason in P erry. Judicia! Ob!iga -
lion. Precedent and 1he Common Law, 7 OX FO RD J . LEGA L STUD. 2 15, 222-23 ( 1987). I did no t, 
however , d isti nguish t he re between subjective and objecti ve second- order reasons. 
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seems to make sense if it is regarded as a possible strategy upon which 
agents might rely in their subjective practical determinations about what 
ought to be done. (Whether following such a strategy could ever be justi-
fied is, of course, another matter.) The idea that reweighting could take 
place at the level of the objective balance of reasons does not even seem 
to be coherent, so that a generalization of the sort being discussed is pos-
sible with respect only to the subjective and not the objective conception 
Orl an "' YC1US1,0" ;-H'\ .' ~ .o ;l 0 0·n 57 ..__ ~ .;\ -- J.t --·· } .._ ,_.. _J I... - • 
The second point is that while Raz may be correct to say that the 
idea of reweigh'iing has no possible application where deference to the 
practical judgrnerrt of another is to be justified by means of the normal 
justification thesi:;, the idea is nonetheless coherent in its own terms, at 
least if it is understood in the way just outlined. Quite possibly it could 
have an application in other contexts. It might well be of assistance, for 
example, in elucidating the role in practical reasoning of certain kinds of 
presumptions, such as the presumption of innocence and the presump-
tion of death, which call for an increase (or decrease) in the strength of 
the evidence that will be deemed necessary (or sufficient) to justify cer-
tain actions. As mentioned earlier, reliance on this kind of presumption 
represents one possible strategy for dealing with uncertainty about what 
the objective balance of reasons requires, and it is conceivable that that 
strategy is most appropriately characterized by reference to the idea of 
reweighting. 58 The analysis of such presumptions will not be undertaken 
here. It will be suggested below, however, that reweighting reasons have 
a role to play in the explication of the common law doctrine of precedent, 
which is itself a judicial response to uncertainty about what the objective 
balance of reasons requi res. 
4. The Bounds of A uthority: Epistemic L imitations 
There is another way in which deference to the practical judgment 
of an authority can be limited in addition to the ways that have already 
been discussed. This kind of limitation is not completely distinct from 
jurisdictional limitations, since it provides what amounts to a means by 
which these can be implemented. But it is also capable of limiting defer-
ence to the judgment of an authority even where the latter has not 
57. The objective conception of an exclusionary reason may not itself be coherent See supra 
note 48. 
58. There is a brief discussion of presumptions in J. RAZ, supra note 6, at 8-11. The analysis 
suggested in the text appears to be consistent with what Raz says there, as well with the account of 
presumptions advanced in Ullmann-Margalit, On Presumption, 80 J. PHIL 143 (1983). 
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exceeded the constraints of jurisdiction or scope. The key to this particu-
lar variety of limitation is the fact that Raz's analysis of legitimate 
authority dfectively treats the practice of following authoritative direc-
tives as a strategy for dealing with practical uncertainty. While it is true 
that an authority's directives must sometimes be binding even when 
wrong if the authority is effectively to serve its purpose, there will ordina-
rily be no reason, frorn. the perspective of the strategy just described, to 
follmv a d irective in a particular case if one is certain beyond doubt that 
the authority has made a mistake. (This is not to say that there might 
not be other reasons to foll ow the directive, but a person who acted on 
any of those reasons V/Ol.lld not be treating the directive as authoritative 
in Raz 's sense.) Uncertainty is a matter of degree, however. If it is con-
ceded that an authority 's directive might not bind an individual who is 
certain beyond doubt tha t the authority is wrong, then the possibility 
emerges of drawing the epistemic line which is associated with this kind 
of limitation at a different point. For example, a person might defer to 
the judgment of an authority only where she was so uncertain about the 
practical question in hand that she had no opinion one way or the other 
on what the appropriate solution should be. Alternatively, she might 
defer no matter how strongly she felt that the authority had made a mis-
take. Between these two extremes lies a range of further possibilities 
which are defined by the strength of the person's conviction that she is 
right and the authority wrong. 
Limitations of the sort just described will be referred to as epistemic 
limitations on the deference which one person should show to the practi-
cal judgment of another. The point at which the former should (for 
whatever reason or combination of reasons) cease to defer to the judg-
ment of the latter wi th respect to a given type of practical situation, 
·where that point is to be defined by the strength of the former's convic-
tion that the latter has made a mistake, will be termed the epistemic 
threshold for those persons and that ty pe of situation . Raz recognizes the 
possibility of ep istemic limitations when he says, in response to a possible 
objection to his account of authority, that even if legitimate authority is 
limited by the condition that its directives are not binding if clearly 
wrong, it will still be possible for it to play its mediating role because a 
demonstration that something is clearly wrong " does not require going 
through the underlying reasoning . " 59 
N ow the central case of a clear mistake has two features: (1) its 
nature is such that it is relatively easy to di scover that a mistake has 
59. J. RAZ, supra note 6, at 62 . 
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possibly been made; and (2) once that possibility has come to light the 
alleged mistake will be known to be a mistake with some degree of cer-
tainty. I t is because of the second feature that the type of limitation 
which Raz is discussing is an epistemic limitation, or at least incorpo-
rates such a limitation. Raz declines to say whether he thinks legitimate 
authorities are in fact limited by the cond ition that their directives are 
not bind ing if clearly wrong, but he is nonetheless correct to conclud.::: 
that an au thority which was thus li mited would in principle still be able 
to fulfill the mediating role which he assigns to authority in general. This 
is not because it would be unnecessary to go through the underlying rea-
soning at all, but because it would be un necessary to go through it in its 
entirety. The identification of a clear mistake wo uld seem to demand at 
leas t some familiarity with the underlying reasoning, but the fact that an 
agent is not completely ignorant of the relevan t first-order reasons still 
leaves room for the normal justification thesis to operate. 
Mistakes in practical reasoning can be clear mistakes to a greater or 
Jesser degree, and there can be variations in degree with respect to each 
of the two features of a clear mistake mentioned above. Thus the possi-
bility of a mistake might be relatively easy to detect, but one might still 
be rather uncertain about whether a mistake had in fact been committed. 
Conversely, the possibility of a mistake might be very hard to detect, but 
one might be absolutely certain, once that possibility had come to light, 
that a mistake had indeed been made. Epistemic limitations are defined 
solely in terms of the relative degree of certainty that a mistake has been 
made, and hence without reference to the relative ease of detecting the 
possibility of a mistake. 
Conceivably, there could be situations where someone who was less 
familiar with the underlying reasoning than an alleged authority could 
find it relatively easy to discover the possibiiity of a mistake without in 
the majority of cases necessarily being convinced to any strong degree 
that a mistake had in fact been committed. Given that the person is 
assumed to be less familiar with the underlying reasoning than the 
authority, there is room for the normal justification thesis to operate. 
But there is no a priori reason to th ink that such a person wil l necessarily 
do better, in the sense of complying with right reason to the greatest 
possib le extent, by ceasing to defer at a relatively high rather than at a 
relatively low epistemic threshold. It is theoretically possible that one 
might maximize compliance with right reason if one were to cease to 
defer to the judgment of the authority at the point at which one was, say, 
fairly sure that a mistake had been made, rather than at the point of 
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complete certainty. This might be true, for example, if one had reason to 
think that the authority was only moderately better than oneself at 
assessing the objective balance of reasons and if it sometimes displayed a 
certain erratic quality in its pract ical determinations. Raz' s anaiysis of 
legitimate authority is thus compatible with the idea that the normal jus-
tifi caticm thesis itself could place variable limits (in addi tion to the limits 
of jurisdiction and scope) on the degre.:: to which deference should be 
shown to the practical judgment of authorities. Kt cmdd justify the 
acceptance of epistemic thresholds that differed from person to person, 
si tuation to situation, and authority to authority . 
5. Epistemic Limitations and Jurisdiction: The Example of 
Administrative Law 
As mentioned, epistemic limitations can apply to jurisdictional as 
well as to substantive mistakes . Reliance on an epistemic limitation can 
in fact tend to blur the distinction between these types of errors, or at 
least make it unnecessary to draw a sharp line between them. This fact 
could strengthen the case for using epistemic limitations if there are 
independent difficulties with drawing the substantive/jurisdictional dis-
tinction in a clear and nonarbitrary way. Courts have encountered such 
difficulties in the area of judicial review of administrative action, and it 
will be argued that the result has been a trend towards adopting episte-
mic limitations to define the character and extent of the deference which 
courts should show to the decisions of public tribunals. In considering 
this example, it will help to shed some light on the modifications to Raz's 
account of authority which the recognition of epistemic limitations 
requires if one bears in mind his claim that the cogency of that account 
depends on the existence of a relatively clear distinction between jurisdic-
tional and nonjurisdictional errors. 60 As we shall see, the introduction of 
epistemic limitations calls that claim into question. 
In the area of administrative law the basic justification which is usu-
ally given for setting up a specialized public tribunal is the opportunity 
this creates for the members of the tribunal to draw upon or to develop 
an expertise in a relatively limited field. 61 The existence of such expertise 
will make it more likely that the tribunal can be shown, in accordance 
with Raz's normal justification thesis, to have legitimate authority over 
the individuals who appear before it. If the tribunal's expertise is greater 
than that of the court in certain matters, then that will be a reason for the 
60. !d. 
61. P. CRAIG, ADMlNlSTRATIVE LAW 337, 339, 343 (1983). 
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court to defer to the tribunal's judgment, at least where those mat ters are 
concerned, when the court is asked by an aggrieved individ uai to engage 
in judicial revie'N. (Efficiency concerns might be a re lated, reinforcing 
consideration if the tribunal were able to render decisions more expedi-
tiously than the court.) T he question then is whether and how that def-
erence should be limited. One plausible-sounding answer is to sr;, y that 
th-:: court should not defer to the tribunal's judgment where the error is 
jurisd:ic tional but should defer where the error is nonjmisdictional (i.e. , 
sLJostantive) . 
As students of administrati ve law are avv are, drawing a d istinction 
th:tvveen those errors of a public tribunal which go to jurisdiction and 
those which go to the meri ts of matters falling wi thin the tribunal's 
authority is no easy matter . Indeed it is a task that it may not even make 
a great deal of sense to undertake. Paul Craig has pointed out that grants 
of authority to tribunals can always be expressed as follows: if X exists 
then the tribunal may or shall do Y, where X can consist of a combina-
tion of legal, factual, or discretionary elements. 6 2 T he determination of 
whether or not X exists, which may well be the most important question 
faci ng the tribunal, has never been held by the courts to be entirely a 
matter of jurisdiction. 63 T he collateral fact doctrine is one well-known 
effort to keep judicial review of administrative action from simply col-
lapsing into appeal on the merits by attempting to distinguish between 
those elements within the X factor which condition jurisdiction and 
those which do not. It is an effort that has generally been d iscredited 
precisely because of the apparent impossibility of d rawing this kind of 
distinction in a nonarbitrary way. 64 As Craig observes, the critical ques-
tion in this area of administrative law, an answer to which will underlie 
any theory of jurisdictional limits, " is whose relat ive opinion on which 
matters should be held to be authoritative. " 6 5 The collateral fact doc-
trine t ries to answer this question in a way that will steer a middle course 
between overly broad and overly narrow review, but " [t] he median is 
attained by total control over some topics and no con trol over others, 
\V ith an a rbitrary line betwixt the two. " 66 
A n alternative theory of judicial review that tries to steer a different 
kind of m iddle course has been gaining widespread acceptance in the 
62. Jd at 299. 
63. ld at 302. 
64. !d . a t 301-04. 
65. !d . a t 315. 
66. !d. a t 33 5. 
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United States, 67 Canada, 6 8 and elsewhere, namely the reasonableness o r 
rational basi s test. 69 It rejects the attempt of the collateral fact doctrine 
to distinguish between jurisdictional and nonjuri sdictional elements 
within the X factor. At the same time it also rejects that doctrine's a ll -
or-noth ing approach, according to wh ich a perceived jurisd ictional error 
a:J tomatically renders the tribunal 's decision a nullity w hereas, so long 2.s 
th ,~re has been no breach of natural justice or other procedural mistake, a 
perceived nonjurisdictional error is nonreviewable. O n the rational basis 
a pproach the reviewing court will defer to the tribunal's judgment ·.vith 
respect to matters within the X factor , even if it thin ks that the trib;;nal 
decided wrongly, so long as its decision was reasonable . The range of 
\Vhat counts as reasonable will be determined by the court and wi ll vary 
depending on the nature of the tribunal and the content of the enabling 
legislation. 70 Sometimes the court will apply a correctness test to a par-
ticu lar question and simply substitute its own view for that of the tribu-
nal/1 but ordinarily it will only do this where it h as concluded that the 
court is in a better position than the tribunal to deal with questions of 
that ki nd. 72 
The experience of courts in this area of the law thus illustrates that 
it can be very difficult to distinguish in a clear and nonarbitrary way 
between jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional errors. Moreover, the alter-
nat ive approach which has been widely advocated as a means of address-
ing this difficulty, namely the rational basis or reasonableness test, is 
most plausibly viewed as involving an epistemic limitation on the defer-
ence which one person should show to the practical judgment of another. 
A judge who allows the decision of a tribunal which she thinks was mis-
taken to stand so long as she is able to regard the decision as reasonable 
is deferri ng to the practical judgment of the tribunal , but only up to a 
point. That point is determined mainly by reference to the strength of 
the judge's conviction that the tribunal has erred. After all, what else 
67. N LRB v. Hearst Publi ca tions, Inc. , 322 U.S. Ill (1944). 
68. Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 963 v. New Brunswick Liqu or Corp., [ 1979] 2 
S.C.R 227. 
69. P. CRA IG, supra note 61 , a t 338-43. 
70. Jd . at 338. 
7 i. A correctness test is simply one extreme of a continuum of possibili t ies perm itted by a 
rat ional basis test. Cf id. at 343. According to Craig, 
[ w]ht:ther the diversity [which is possible in the ex tent of review] is reflec ted in the presence 
of two tests, rat ional basis a nd rightness , or wheth er we should simply wor k thro ugh the 
fo rmer is a mat ter o f semantics . . . If we work through the fo rm er a lo ne t he range of 
cho ice or the breadth of the spectrum wil l va ry from a rea to area. Not o nl y will it a lter but 
the spectrum might be reduced to one . 
7 2. !d. at 343. 
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could it mean to say that a person regards a decision as wrong but rea-
sonable than that she believes the decision is mistaken but recognizes 
that there is at least a nonneg1igible possibility that she might be wrong 
and the tribunal right? An unreasonable decision, on the other hand, is 
one which she is convinced to some relatively strong degree of certainty 
could not be right. There may also be a social element involved in the 
designation of a mistake as an unreasonable one, in the sense that the 
judge may have to think that most other people (or most other people 
with a certain level of expertise) ·would agree with her judgment. Ho\v-
ever, this would be a condition that was ancillary to the basic require-
ment that she herself be fairly strongly convinced that an error had been 
committed . As a result, the rational basis or reasonableness test is clearly 
best characterized as an approach to judicial review whose effect is to 
place an epistemic limitation on the deference which a reviewing court 
should show to the decisions of public tribunals. 
We have already seen that there is no unique epistemic threshold 
that is automatically determined by the character of a "clear mistake." 
Varying the threshold from situation to situation is compatible, more-
over, with the normal justification thesis because such variation could 
help to maximize overall compliance with right reason (i.e., compliance 
with the requirements of the objective balance of reasons). As the above 
discussion of the reasonableness test has shown, the range of decisions of 
a given tribunal which are to count as reasonable with respect to a given 
type of subject matter is itself subject to variation by the courts. In the-
ory, the possibilities range from complete deference to complete lack of 
deference (application of a correctness test), and while reviewing courts 
seldom adopt the former of these extreme approaches, they do sometimes 
adopt the latter. In light of the conclusion that the reasonableness test 
has the effect of placing an epistemic limitation on the deference which 
courts should show to tribunals, it seems clear that the best interpreta-
tion of the judicial practice of varying the range of what is to count as 
reasonable is that the courts are applying different epistemic thresholds 
to different situations. 
The basic standards for determining the existence of a jurisdictional 
or substantive error will ordinarily be foun d, of course, in the tribunal's 
enabling legislation. Since those standards (and the moral standards 
needed to supplement them) can be controversial, the basic question 
becomes, to quote Craig once again, "whose relative opinion on which 
matters should be held to be authoritative." 73 Using a reasonableness 
73. ld.at315. 
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approach, the most important aspect of any answer to that question will 
be the point at which the epistemic threshold is set. T here are a number 
of different factors that could influence this decision, including most 
obviously the desire to maximize compliance with right reason. Taking 
this factor into account would require an assessment of the relative 
degree of expertise in the relevant subject matter possessed by the court 
and the tribunal respectively, and it is clear enough that courts often do 
engage in such assessments. But other considerations could also en ter 
into the court's calculations, such as the need for a certain degree of 
efficiency in decisionmaking or the fact that the tribunal might not be 
able to function as a legitimate and independent body if its decisions were 
quashed too frequently. These last two factors also demonstrate that the 
answer to the question of how much one person should defer to the prac-
tical judgment of another person is not necessarily determined by the 
normal justification thesis alone, even where the latter is a legitimate 
authority, in Raz's sense, for the former. 
It is worth emphasizing that the use of epistemic limitations in insti-
tu tional contexts is by no means limited to the judicial review of adminis-
trative action; it is in fact a common phenomenon. Thus an approach 
similar to the rational basis test is often used in many areas of the law 
besides administrative law to determine the boundaries between the 
authority of one person or body to make a decision and that of another 
person or body either to quash the decision of the first or to make the 
decision itself. It is, for example, a similar kind of reasonableness test, 
and one which is also best understood as giving effect to an epistemic 
limitation, that courts apply to determine which fin dings of fact are 
reviewable on appeal. R eliance on an epistemic limitation also seems to 
fo rm part of the English doctrine that a court will not treat as conclusive 
a Minister of the Crown's objection to producing a document as evidence 
in civi l litigation, but instead will balance the public interest in withhold-
ing the document against the public interest in ensuring the proper 
administration of justice. 74 On one understanding of this doctrine the 
court will defer, but only up to a point which is best regarded as being 
defined by an epistemic limitation, to the Minister's assessment of the 
strength of the case that can be made for withholding the document. 75 
Finally, it is worth noting that an approach to jurisdictional questions 
74. See, e.g., Conway v. Rimmer, [1 968) A.C. 910. 
75. !d. at 984. Lord Pearce stated : 
It is difficult to lay down with precision how far the court should accept the view of the 
executive on what should be privileged while re tainin g its inheren t power to rejec t it ; and 
how fa r it should inspect a nd form its own views, while giving due weight to the Mi ni ster's 
objection. 
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which is best understood in terms of an epistemic limitation is often 
adopted in institutional contexts outside the law. For example, univer-
sity tenure appeal committees sometimes consider whether the decision 
of an original tenure committee was one that could have been arrived at 
by reasonable and fair-mi nded people or whether it reflects some mani-
fest error of judgment. If the appeal committee concludes th2.t the origi-
nal decision was wrong but not manifestly wrong, then it must allow the 
decision to stand. 76 
6. The Natu re of Epistemic Limitations 
What effect does the recognition that a legitimate authority might be 
const rained by an epistemic limitation and, more particularly, that the 
epistemic threshold is not uniquely fixed , have on Raz's analysis of 
authority? Beyond the effect on his analysis of authority, how does the 
notion of an epistemic limitation fit into Raz's more general account of 
practical reasoning? The answer to the first of these questions is: very 
little. Even a relatively low epistemic threshold might theoretically be 
called for by the normal justification thesis itself, since it is at least con-
ceivable that an agent might maximize compliance with right reason by 
not deferring to the authority's judgment past that particular point. In 
practice, though, it might be rational for an agent in this situation to 
comply with a somewhat higher threshold simply to avoid expending the 
increased costs in time and effort which, due to the need to scrutinize the 
underlying reasoning more often and more carefull y, are likely to be the 
result of acting in accordance with a lower threshold. 77 Efficiency con-
cerns, which might lead to a tradeoff with the goal of maximizing com-
pliance with right reason, provide an example of a kind of reason that 
can play a part in justifying deference to the practical judgment of 
another while also remaining, at least to some extent , independent of the 
normal justification thesis. (Raz states that following authority on effi-
ciency grounds " is a borderline case between normal and deviant 
justification. " 78) 
As wil l be d iscussed below, speaking in terms of "giving weight " to the practical judgment of 
another is a natural idiom to employ in referring to epistemic limitations. 
76. I owe this example to Thomas Hurka. 
77. Cf J. RAZ, supra note 6, at 73 ("One also has to take notice of the disadvantages to one's 
life o f too obsessive a preoccupation with quest ions of the prec ise limits of authority."). Raz is 
ta lking here of scope limitat ions, but the same is true of epistemic limitations as well. 
78. !d. a t 75. 
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The second and more important of the two questions posed above is 
how exactly does the notion of an epistemic limitation fit into Raz's gen-
eral account of practical reasoning? Up to this point it has implicitly 
been assumed that such limitations are really just constraints on the 
applicability of exclusionary reasons. 'While this is one possible way to 
conceptualize epistemic limitat ions, it vvill be argued that the better 
approach is to regard them as giving rise to a special category of subjec-
tive second-order reasons which is to be contrasted with, not included 
within, the category of exclusionary reasons. A subjective second- order 
reason which always (within appropriate scope and jurisdictional limita-
tions) requires deference to the practical judgment of another person, 
even when the agent is convinced beyond doubt that the other has made 
a mistake, may be termed a pure (subjective) exclusionary reason. A sub-
jective second- order reason which requires a person to defer to another's 
practical judgment only up to some specified epistemic threshold may 
then be referred to as an epistemically-bounded reason. 79 The question 
which must now be addressed is whether pure exclusionary reasons and 
epistemically-bounded reasons should be regarded as two species of the 
single genus "exclusionary reason," or whether the concept of an exclu-
sionary reason should be limited to pure exclusionary reasons. In the 
latter case, exclusionary and epistemically-bounded reasons would be 
mutually exclusive categories. 
While Raz concedes that a "clear mistake" -type of limitation on 
authoritative directives is possible in principle, it is evident that he con-
ceives of exclusionary reasons as pure exclusionary reasons only. The 
possibility nonetheless exists of extending the category of exclusionary 
reasons thus understood to include epistemically-bounded reasons. The 
notion of an exclusionary reason is technical in character, in the sense 
that it does not have any precise analogue in popular usage, so any 
answer to the question of whether such an extension should be effected 
will to some extent be a matter of linguistic stipulation. But it is sensible 
in such cases to let stipulation be guided by the most important or signifi-
cant aspects of the technical notion in question. Epistemically-bounded 
reasons are similar to pure exclusionary reasons in that the agent's judg-
ment is, on any one occasion, either completely preempted by the author-
ity's judgment or it is not. In this respect they both differ from 
79. The no tion of an epistemicall y-bounded reason, like that of a reweighting reason, onl y 
makes sense if it is regarded as a n insta nce of the subjec tive conception of an exclusio nary reason. It 
operates at the level of an agen t' s subj ecti ve determinations of what to do as part of a st rategy to deal 
with practical unce rtainty. The idea of a n epistemically- bounded objective exclusionary reason is 
incoherent. 
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reweighting reasons. But this feature of pure exclusionary reasons is not 
particularly significant. To discover what is fundamental about pure 
exclusionary reasons it is necessary to focus on their purpose. 
In Practical Reason and Norms Raz argues that all mandatory 
norms, which is a category that is clearly to be understood as including 
rules a:nd authoritative directives, are exclusionary reasons . He then pro-
ceed::-. to describe the purpose of such norms: 
The presence of a norm does no t autom at ically settle prac tical 
problems. There may be other conflicting reasons not excluded by the 
norm T here may be scope-affec ting considerations, etc. But it must 
be admitted that for the most part the presence of a norm is decisive. 
T he complicating factors apply only in a minority of cases. The whole 
purpose of having norms is to achieve this sim pl ification. The fact that 
norms are exclusionary reasons enables them to achieve this purpose 
. . . . [N ]orms have a relative independence from the reasons which 
justify them. In order to know that the norm is vaiid we must know 
that there are reasons which justify it. But we need not know what 
these reasons are in order to apply the norm correctly to the majority 
of cases. 80 
The whole point of mandatory norms and exclusionary reasons generally 
is, therefore , to simplify practical reasoning by isolating the norm or rea-
son from its justifying first- order reasons. Exclusionary reasoning 
enables agents to act without the necessity of going through the underly-
ing reasoning themselves, or at least without having to go through it on 
each occasion that they act. 
Raz recognizes that reliance on exclusionary reasons may occasion-
ally require some familiarity with the underly ing reasoning. T his will be 
the case, for example, with respect to some applications of the scope dis-
tinction. Nevertheless, this kind of complication is supposed to be kept 
to a minimum. Perhaps Raz might want to say that a "clear mistake" 
limitation is a similar kind of minimal complication that does not call for 
recognition of a new category of second-order reasons, but there are at 
least two difficulties with this idea. The first is that there exists a range of 
epistemically-bounded reasons, not just a single kind of minimal limita-
tion which, if applicable at all, applies in all circumstances in the same 
way. T he second, related difficulty is that reliance on such reasons 
always requires at least some familiarity with the underlying reasoning 
80. J. RA Z, supra note 1, at 79; see also id. at 80 ("It is on ly in exceptional circumstances that I 
must know the precise reasons for the rule in order to know wh at to do."); cf J. RA Z, supra note 6, 
at 58 ( rules media te be tween deeper level considera ti ons and concrete decisions). 
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and will often be compatible with, or even demand, a very extensive 
familiarity . 
W hen a person defers to the practical judgrnent of another on the 
basis of the normal justification thesis, the extent of familia rity vvith the 
underlying reasoning which that person requires so as to be able to rdy 
on an epistemic !imitation will presumably be lower than the degree of 
fami liarit y possessed by the person being treated as an authority. Tl1is is, 
nonetheless, q uite compatible with the former possessing a significe<.nt 
level of expert ise in the relevant area himself. More importantly, defer-
ence to the judgrnent of another person can be justified on grounds other 
than the normal justification thesis, and, where this is so, a fairly exten-
sive familiarity with the underlying reasoning may be crucial if the strat·· 
egy calling for reliance on an epistemically-bounded reason is to be 
successful. It will be argued below that this is the case with respect to 
legal reasoning. Epistemically-bounded reasons as a class thus call for a 
familiarity with the underlying first-order reasoning which, because it 
can be quite extensive, is fundamentally at odds with what Raz views as 
the purpose of exclusionary reasons. T hat purpose is, to repeat, the isola-
tion of the underlying reasoning from the agent 's own practical delibera-
tions. I t is therefore preferable that epistemically--bounded reasons not 
be defined as a sub-class of exclusionary reasons, and henceforth the term 
"exclusionary reason " will be used to refer to pure exclusionary reasons 
only. (As has already been made clear, the exclusionary reasons in ques-
tion here wi ll always be subjective exclusionary reasons .) 
Reweighting reasons and epistemically-bounded reasons are both 
categories of subjective second- order reasons which place limits on the 
deference that one person should show to the practical judgment of 
another. There are, however, several respects in which they differ. A 
reweighting reason introduces a systematic bias in favor of another per-
son's judgment into the agent's own subjective practical determinations, 
and, in particular, into the agent's deliberations about how first-order 
reasons should be weighted. Although the bias is always operative, it 
sti ll acts as a limitation on deference because the agent's judgment is 
never completely preempted by the judgment of the other person (except, 
of course, in the extreme case of an exclusionary reason, which can be 
regarded as a special case of a reweighting reason) . By contrast, episte-
mically-bounded reasons constrain deference by limiting the occasions on 
which deference should be shown. W hen the agent does defer, however, 
his or her judgment wi ll be preempted completely. Furthermore, reli-
ance on epistemically-bounded reasons is at least sometimes compatible 
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with an authority 's being legitimate in Raz's sense, I.e. , ·with its being 
justified by the normal justification thesis, but, as was noted earlier, the 
same may not be true of reliance on reweighting reasons. 
Although there are notable differences between reweighting reasons 
and epistemically-bounded reasons, there are also important similarities. 
BcJth can naturally be spoken of as giving iise to a "presumption" in 
favor of the practical solution that is being advanced by another person. 
Both types of reasons also seem capable of giving a more precise content, 
alb-'::i'' in different ways, to the idiom of "attributing weight" to the practi-
cal judgment of another. Since the notions of "presumptiveness" and 
"attributing weight" often figure prominently in discussions of the legal 
doctrine of precedent, it is natural to ask whether either or both of these 
t\VO types of second- order reasons have a part to play in the elucidation 
of that doctrine. Following a brief exposition of Raz's own positivist the-
ory of law, which is itself built around the idea of a subjective exclusion-
ary reason, it will be argued below that the answer to this question is 
"yes." The point of the discussion of reweighting reasons and epistemi-
cally-bounded reasons in this and preceding sections has essentially been 
just to clarify Raz's conception of a second-order reason and to propose 
several relatively minor refinements to his analysis of legitimate au thor-
ity. But the suggestion that the doctrine of precedent should be under-
stood in terms of such reasons amounts to more than an analogous 
recommendation that Raz's version of positivism be amended in one or 
t'NO small respects. It is, rather, one aspect of a comprehensive concep-
tion of law and legal practice which offers an alternative to, and in many 
respects is incompatible vvith, the theory of law defended by Raz. 
II . PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 
A. RAz's DEFENSE OF LEGAL POSITIVISM 
1. Two Theses 
"Legal philosophy is nothing but practical philosophy applied to 
one social institution." 81 In this sentence Raz makes explicit two of the 
most im portant general theses which underlie and inform his approach 
to the philosophy of law. The first is that law gives rise in a systematic 
way to reasons for action, so that legal philosophy must be regarded as a 
branch of the philosophy of practical reason. T he second is that legal 
phi losophy involves the study of a particular kind of social institution. 
In a sense both of these theses are obvious truisms, but because both have 
81. j. RAZ, supra note 1, at 149. 
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sometimes been ignored by legal philosophers the prominence which R az 
gives to them in his writings is salutary. Beyond that, it is by means of a 
particular viev.; about the function of law, a view which ultimately 
derives from the second of the two theses and which gives a more con--
crete cast to the first, that Raz constructs his very powerfu l defense of 
legal positivism. The two theses thus play a more significant role in 
R az's legal theory than mereiy drawing attention to a couple of vagu e 
and uncontroversial platitudes. The second is the co rnerstone of his 
basic methodoiogy in legal philosophy, and it will be discussed in suffi .. 
cien t detail in the follow·ing section to enable us to understand whether 
and how Raz's approac h differs from the '·Nell known methodology of 
Ronald Dworkin. This will facilitat e a critical comparison of Raz's ver-
sion of positivism with what is essentially a Dworkinian theory of law. 
The first of the two theses, on the other hand, is a kind of highly abstract 
summary of the importance within Raz's legal theory of his analysis of 
authority and of his conception of an exclusionary reason. This thesis 
will be discussed later, when Raz's conception of the function of law is 
considered. 
2. lvfethodology: The Institutional Approach 
In insisting that legal philosophy must begin with what he calls the 
institutional approach Raz explicitly rejects two other possible starting 
points, which he terms the linguistic approach and the lawyers' perspec-
tive. 82 The second of these builds upon the idea that "[t]he law has to do 
with those considerations that it is appropriate for courts to rely upon in 
justifying their decisions. " 83 This is clearly just a specific instance of the 
institutional approach, one which concentrates on a part icular type of 
legal institution (i.e ., courts) . The other possibility Raz considers, 
namely the linguistic approach, holds that legal philosophy should con-
centrate on explicating the meaning of the word "law. " 84 Raz is clearly 
correct to reject this approach, and in doing so he makes common cause 
wi th Ronald Dworkin in repudiating what the latter calls "semantic" 
theories of law. 85 Dworkin's own methodology begins with the premise 
that legal theorists (and judges) should offer interpretations of legal prac-
tice as a whole that best justify the practice, which is to say, show it in its 
82. See Raz, The Problem about the Nature of Law, 21 U.W. 01'<'TARIO L REV. 203. 204-i2 
(1983) . 
83. !d. at 207. 
84. Jd. at 204 -07; see also J. RAZ, supra note 3, at 41 ("[W]e do not want to be slaves of 
words. "); J. RAZ, T HE CONCEPT OF A L EGA L SYSTEM 209-10 (2d ed. 1980). 
85. R . DwoRKIN, LAw's E:YlPIRE 31-33 (19 86). 
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best light from the perspective of political moral ity. 86 This methodology 
has a dimension of fit, which is shaped by legal practice itself, and a 
normative or evaluative dimension, which is shaped by the theorist's 
understanding of political morality. 87 It is worth emphasizing that Raz's 
methodology bears a dist inct resemblance to Dworkin's, since in taking 
up the institutional approach he is, li ke Dworkin, concentrating on the 
understanding of certain kinds of existing "social practices" (to use 
Dvvorkin's term). 88 Raz also a.c knmvledges that legal theories, including 
his own, will involve evaluative judgments , although he denies that such 
judgments are necessarily moral in nature. 89 
This is not to suggest that Raz and Dworkin have any thing like 
identical approaches to doing philosophy of law, but their respective 
methodologies are at least sufficiently similar to permit a true joining of 
issue between them. Failure to appreciate how and why this is so has led 
to some confusion, however, and there are certain misconceptions which 
should be corrected. To begin, Dworkin seems to conflate two different 
ways in which Raz says that moral considerations do not enter into legal 
theory. 90 The first is Raz's claim, discussed above, that legal theory does 
not involve moral judgments at a methodological level. The second con-
cerns what Raz calls the sources thesis, which says that individual laws 
must be identifiable on the basis of social facts alone and hence in value-
neutral terms. 91 Dworkin says that the sources thesis must be argued 
for , and that "any plausible argument must be an argument of political 
morality or wisdom."92 The clear implication is that Raz has not offered 
such an argument. 
The sources thesis, which represents an important step in Raz 's 
defense of positivism, will be discussed below. For present purposes it 
will suffice to point out that Raz does present an argument in support of 
the thesis, and that he frames this argument in terms of a conception of 
the "function" of law. The function he identifies is intended to make 
sense of the institutional aspects of law, and as such would seem to 
86. See, e.g., id . a t 90. 
87. See, e.g., id. at 228-3 8. 
88. ! d . a t 50 and passim. 
89. Raz. supra no te 17, at 320 -22 : Raz. supra no te 82, at 217- 18. It should be noted, however, 
that in The Concepl of a Legal Syslem, J. RAZ, supra note 84, at 221, Raz refers to his conception of 
law as '"po litical." It is also worth ment ioning tha t in The Morality of Freedom, J. RAZ, supra no te 
6, a t 135-3 6, he gives the word '"moral" " a ··very wide sense in which it is roughly equiva lent to 
4 Cva luati ve. ' " 
90. R. DwORKIN, supra note 85, at 429-30 n. 3. 
91. See. e.g., J. RAZ, supra nol e .3. a t 39 -40. 
92. R. DwORKIN, supra no te 85, at 430. 
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involve essentially the same idea that Dworkin has in mind when the 
latter says that any interpretation of a social practice must attribute some 
point or purpose to it. 93 Moreover, Raz acknovvledges that the argument 
fo r the sources thesis involves evaluative judgments, denying only that 
those judgments are moral. In other words, Raz does have an argument 
of very much the sort which Dworkin says he must produce; it is just 
that Raz refuses to apply the label "moral" to it. The result is a theory of 
law which holds that the identification of individual lavvs must be value-
free, but the theory itself is admittedly defended in evaluative terms. 94 
Both Raz and Dworkin thus share the idea that legal theory involves an 
attempt to understand the point or funct ion of certain kinds of social 
institutions (Raz's term) or social practices (Dworkin's), where the 
at tempt will necessari ly involve adopting an evaluative viewpoint. The 
substantive di fferences between their respective theories result from the 
fact that they view the function of legal institutions in very different 
ways. Their major methodological difference, which concerns whether 
or not the inevitable evaluative judgments can, as Dworkin claims, be 
further characterized as being drawn from political morality, is not a 
particularly important matter for present purposes. 95 
A misconception which looks in the opposite direction is pro-
pounded by certain critics of Law's Empire, fo r example Steven Burton, 
who think that Dworkin's interpretive approach to legal theory may well 
presuppose something like Hart's or Raz's version of positivism. 96 Bur-
ton, after first pointing out that Dworkin 's methodology requires a 
preinterpretive stage at which legal practice is identified, states that 
93. !d. at 58-59. See also R . D wORK IN, A MATITR OF PRI NC IPL E 160-62 (19 85) (hereinafter 
R. DWORKIN, PRINCIPLE]. In Taking Righ1s Seriously Dworkin speaks express ly of the "function ·· 
of law , and contrasts his view of what tha t function is with what he takes to be the positivist vi ew. 
R. DWOR KIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERI OUSLY 347-48 ( rev. ed. 1978) (hereinafter R. DWORK IN, 
R IGHTS](discussed in Raz, supra note 17, a t 320). O n the disagreement between Raz and Dwo rkin 
over what the function of law should be understood to be, see infra note 108 . 
94. Cf G. POSTEMA, BENTHAM ANO THE COMM ON L AW T RADITION 328-32 ( 198 6) (there is 
no internal inconsistency in Bentham's insis tence, o n normative grounds, t ha t crite ria of lega l va lid· 
ity be res tric ted to a canonical li st o f mora ll y neutra l socia l fac ts). 
95. A lthough I shall not try to argue the point here. I think that Dworki n has th e better of this 
dispute. Gerald Postema has recently offered an appea ling acco unt of methodology in legal philoso· 
phy wh ich is consistent with this concl usion. See id. a t 328-36. For an inte res ting c ritique of Dwor-
kin 's account of the interpretat ion of social practices see Pos tema, "Proleswnr" In rerprerarion and 
Social Pracrices, 7 LAw & PHI L. 283 (1 98 7). For an excellen t discussion of t he genera l thesis that an 
adequate theory of the nature of law presupposes some po lit ica l theory and hence ca nnot be va lue-
neutra l see Green, The Political Content of Legal Theory, 17 PHIL. Soc. Sc i. I ( 1987). 
96. Burton, Ronald Dworkin and Legal Positivism , 73 IOWA L. R EV. 109 (19 87); see also Hart, 
Comm en t, in ISSU ES IN CONTEMPORAR Y L EGAL PHILOSOPHY 34 (R. Gavison ed. 1987) (replying to 
Dworkin' s summa ry of the a rgument of Law's Empire, supra no te 85) . 
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"Dworkin 's brief description of the preinterpreti ve stage seems to presup-
pose a positivist criterion of identity .... " 97 In making thi s claim Bur-
ton depends heavily on the fact that at one point D workin speaks of the 
preinterpretive stage in terms of the identification of " social ru les, " 98 and 
indeed Dworkin does som etimes seem to suggest that ident ifying the con-
tent of legal practice is a matter of discovering various " rules and stan-
dards. "99 But the better interpretation of La w's Empz't-c requin::s us to 
take seriously D -.,vorkin 's statement that theories of la '>v "try to sho\v 
legal practice as a whole in its best light," 100 a thesis which he proceeds to 
am plify by explaining that legal practices in our own culture include leg-
islatures, courts, and administrative agencies . 10 1 D worki n is thus really 
saying no more and no less than R az when the latter suggests that legal 
theory is a matter of trying to understand the nature of certain kinds of 
social institutions, where it is clear that what R az has in mind are pri-
marily legislative and adjudicative institutions. 10 2 Whatever problems 
that the identification of such institutions presents for Dworkin, how-
ever, and it is certainly not being argued here that there a re no such 
problems, exist for Raz as well. 103 Dworkin's interpretive approach to 
legal theory does not presuppose a theory such as Raz's. Rather they 
both present competing interpretations of roughly the same social 
phenomena. 104 
97. Burton, supra note 96, at 11 8. 
98. R. DWORKIN, supra note 85, at 66. 
99. !d. at 65-66. 
100. !d. at 90 (emphasis add ed). 
10 1. Jd . a t 9 1. That Dwo rkin equivocates about the nature of pre interpreti ve da ta is no t iced in 
Kress, The l flle rprelive Tu m (Book Review), 97 ETHICS 834, 855 ( 1987). 
102. J. R AZ, supra note I, a t 123f passim ; J. RAZ, supra no te 3, at 43, 87-88. 
103. Cf G reen, supra note 95, at 10 (the determination within Raz's theo ry of which institu-
tions are to be regarded as "courts" is a complex question, the answer to which depends on the 
mo ral status of the instituti ons and / or their explan a tory role in und erstandin g political beha vior) . 
104. Steven Burton says tha t R az and H a rt are engaged in gene ra l jurisprudence, which he ta kes 
to be "the phi losophical effo rt to unders!and law and legal sys tems as abstract conce pts transce ndin g 
any one contingent, culturally situated, practice.' ' Burton, supra no te 96, at 11 0. This "transcul-
tural" approach is contrasted with Dworkin's "intracultural" approach to doing juri sprudence. See 
id. a t 110-13. Cf Kress, supra no te 101, at 841-42. It is true tha t Ra z says that ''it is a criterion of 
adequacy of a legal theory tha t it is t rue of all the intuiti vely c lea r ins tances o f municipa l legal 
sys tems," J. R AZ, supra note 3, a t 104, whereas Dwo rkin conce ntra tes a lmos t exclusive ly on Anglo-
American legal institutions. This is not, however, indicative o f a fund amental me thodological di ffe r-
ence of the sort described by Burton. While Ra z is undoubtedly of the opinion tha t a legal theo ry 
sho uld apply to a broader range of legal systems than those to be found in Brit a in a nd the United 
Sta tes , it is nonetheless clear tha t he thinks of his own theory, a t leas t, as bein g fo rmulated in cul-
ture- spec ific te rms and as focusing in the first instance on our own culture 's legal institutions. See 
id . at 50; supra no te 17, at 321. (In speaking of "our" culture, Raz probably has in mind western 
soc ieties genera lly rather than just those of Britain and the United States, but this hardly constitut es 
a major point of disagreement with Dworkin.) Cf G. POSTEMA , supra note 94, at 335 n.49 ("genera l 
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3. The Function of Law: The Guidance of Conduct 
Let us turn, then, to a consideration of the central element in Raz's 
defense of legal positivism, namely his conception of the point or func-
tion of law. Raz maintains that law's function, or at least its main func -
tion, is to provide "publicly ascertainable ways of guiding behaviour." 105 
As he says at one point, "[i]t is of the essence of law to guide behaviour 
through rules and courts in charge of their application." 106 For }laz, this 
view of the function of law derives from a particular understanding of the 
role of legal institutions in social life. This becomes clear from such 
statements as the following: "[The] institutionalized aspects of law iden-
tify its character as a social type, as a kind of social institution. Put in a 
nutshell, it is a system of guidance and adjudication claiming supreme 
authority within a certain society .... " 107 As has already been sug-
gested, Raz can fairly be regarded as putting forward here a particular 
interpretation, in Dworkin's sense of that term, of 'Nhat the latter calls 
legal practice. 108 
As the last two quotes in the preceding paragraph illustrate, Raz 
thinks that adjudicative institutions are a necessary feature of law, and 
indeed he maintains that they are a more fundamental aspect of legal 
systems than are legislative institutions. 109 But it is important to bear in 
mind that the main role that Raz's theory ascribes to what he calls norm-
Jurisprudential theory is inevitably local, at least in first approximation"). Postema goes on to say 
that "local" "may be understood to embrace an entire legal culture, not just a :,ingle Jurisdiction." 
See also R. DwORKIN, supra note 85, at 102-03. It is difficult to see how legal theory could proceed 
in any other way than by focusing, at least initially, on a particular legal culture. Attempting to lay 
down necessary and sufficient conditions for what is to count as a legal system in a '"transcultural" 
sense will inevitably be nothing more than an exercise in definitional stipulation. This is because 
there is no way of making a pretheoretical determination of which practices belonging to different 
cultures are to count as "legal"' practices in any theoretically interesting sense of ""legal." 
105. J. RAZ, supra note 3, at 50-51. 
106. !d. at 225 (emphasis added). 
!07. !d. at 43. 
108. Notice, however, that the point or function which Raz attributes to law is quite different 
from that which is ascribed to it by conventionalism, Dworkin's reconstructed version of positivism. 
According to Dworkin the point of law is, from the conventionalist perspective, to give the citizen 
fair warning of when the state will apply coercion; he thus takes the heart of the conception to be 
"'the ideal of protected expectations.·· R. DwoRKIN, supra note 85, at 117. But Raz takes the point 
or function of law to be the exclusionary guidance of conduct, not the giving of fair warning. The 
goal of not taking people by surprise, which is one aspect of Raz's positivist conception of the rule of 
law, is not so much regarded as an end in itself-although Raz does acknowledge its value with 
respect to the protection of personal autonomy-as it is a means to ensure that conduct is guided 
efficiently. J. RAZ, supra note 3, at 210-29. This misconstrual of positivism on Dworkin"s part is a 
consequence of his insisting on looking at all theories of law, and not just his own, through the lens 
of adjudication. R. DwoRKIN, supra note 85, at 93, 400-01. 
109. J. RAZ, supra note 1, at 129-31; J. RAZ, supra note 3, at 87-88, 105-1 1. 
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applying institutions is the application of pre-existing (i.e., previously-
adopted) norms whose purpose is to guide conduct. Adjudicative institu-
tions simply evaluate behavior in accordance wi th the standards v1hich 
were supposed to have antecedently guided it: "[Institutionalized sys-
tems] contain norms guiding behavior and institutions for evaluating and 
judging behaviour. The evaluation is based on the very same norms 
which guide behaviour." 1 10 Raz is somewhat ambivalent about whether 
a legal system must necess::uily make provision for the settlement of dis-
putes that are not regulated by preexisting law, 111 but this issue need not 
concern us here. T he point to be emphasized for presen t purposes is that 
the idea that the fanction of law is to guide conduct is a fundamental 
elemen t in Raz' s legal theory; to a large extent it determines the shape of 
the theo ry's other elements, including, most importantly, the role that 
the theory assigns to adjudicative institutions like courts. 
The idea that the function of law is to guide behavior is a conse-
quence of Raz's understand ing of the institutionalized nature of law. It 
thus serves as a kind of bridge between the two general theses which were 
identified earlier as underlying Raz's approach to legal theory, namely, 
(1) that law gives rise in a systematic way to reasons for action, and (2) 
that legal philosophy involves the study of a particular kind of social 
institution. It is time now to focus more closely on the first of these two 
theses by examining in greater detail the way in which the law is said to 
provide guidance for conduct. Raz quite plausibly maintains that iaw 
guides conduct not simply by providing information about what is sepa-
rately required by the balance of reasons, 112 but by giving rise to new 
reasons for action. 113 What we must inquire into, then, is the nature of 
these new reasons which the law brings into being. 
Since all legal systems impose sanctions for the breach of at least 
some legal rules, it is in a sense obvious that law gives rise to new reasons 
for act ion. But affecting a person's motivations through the provision of 
sanctions is not, according to Raz, the way that the law primarily intends 
110. J. R.-\Z , supra note 1, at 139; see also id. at 142 (official evaluation of behavior must coin-
c ide with the guid anc•: which the system gives to ordina ry individua ls); J. RAZ, supra no te 3, at 108 
("Primary [n o rm -applying] organs [i.e., courts] are concerned with the authoritative dete rmination 
of normative si tua tion s in accorda nce with pre-existing norms."); cf id. at 112 . 
lll. Compare J. RAZ, supra note 3, a t 113, 172-75 (a// lega l sys tems make provision for the 
sett lement of un regulated d isputes) with id. at 96 (most do); see also Perry, supra note 56, a t 231 n. 56 
(Raz does no t relate hi s c laim that the se ttlement of unregula ted disputes is a p rim arv function of 
law to his most central thes is tha t the essence of law is to guide behavior). 
112. Raz calls this the recognitiona! concept of authority. See J. RAZ , supra not e 6, at 28- 3 1. 
11 3. See Raz, supra note 17, at 305 ("[T]he fact that an authority issued a directive changes the 
subjects' reasons."). 
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to guide behavior; it is only a reinforcing consideration. 114 The fact that 
law is backed by a sanction is a first- order reason for action only, 1 15 
whereas the law intends to guide behavior by creating new exclusionary 
reasons for action. 11 6 Through its organs such as the courts the lavv nec-
essarily claims legitimate c: uthority for itself, 11 7 and according to Raz's 
service conception of authority this means that (the most i:rnportant 01 
basic) laws must be in tended to be peremptory or excl usionary reasons 
for action which (all or some) ordinary citizens are intended to follow . 
In light of earlier discussion it is clearly subjective exclusionary reasons 
which are at issue here , since the essence of Raz's analysis of a.uthority is 
that one should act on the authority's rather than on one's ownjudgment 
of what the objective balance of reasons requires. The most fundamental 
characteristic of the ne;v reasons for action to which law gives rise is 
therefore that they stand in for, not that they modify, the objective bal-
ance of reasons (although it must be emphasized that in certain circum-
stances they can and indeed should do both). 118 Laws are thus subjective 
second- order reasons on Raz's account, but it is clear enough that he 
does not allow for the possibility that they could be epistemically-
bounded reasons . 1 19 Raz regards laws as being what were earlier labelled 
pure exclusionary reasons, and it will be recalled that the use of the term 
"exclusionary reason" has been restricted here to pure exclusionary 
reasons. 
4. The Sources Thesis 
The sources thesis provides the core content of Raz's positivism. He 
characteri zes the thesis in the fo llowing terms: "A jurisprudential theory 
is acceptable only if its tests for identifying the content of the la'N and 
determining its existence depend exclusively on fac ts of human behaviour 
114. J. RA Z, supra note 84. at 232. 
115. J. RAZ, supra note I. at 16 1. 
116. J. RAZ, supra note 3, at 30. Note that for Raz what the law "intends"' is a mat ter of what 
th e organs of governmen t. and in partic ula r the co urts, intend. See id. ; J . RAz. supra note 84, a t 230-
32; J. RAZ. supra note 6. at 70; Raz, Harl on !'.fora/ Rigl11s and Duries, 4 OXFORD J. L EGM. ST UD. 
123, 131 ( 1984). 
11 7. J. R AZ, supra no te 3, at 30 ('"(I ]t is an essenti a l feature o f law that it claims iegitimate 
authori ty for itself."). See also id. at 237 . 
11 8. See supra no te 51 and accompa nying text. 
11 9. In Th e Moraliry of Freedom Raz says that a "clear mistake" -type of limi tation wou ld be 
consisrent with his account of au thority, but he does not concede th at legitimate authoriti es are ever 
in fac t so limited. J. RA Z, supra note 6, a t 62. In The Aurhoriry of L a w he s ta tes tha t, apart from 
scope and jurisdictional li mitations, one who accepts the legitimacy of an authority is comm itted to 
foll owing it "blindly." J. RAZ. supra note 3, at 24-2 5. This is an implicit denial of the poss ibility of 
an epistemic limi tation. 
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capable of being described in value-neutral terms, and applied without 
resort to moral argument." 120 The idea that the law claims legitimate 
authority for itself, and therefore intends to guide behavior in an exclu-
sionary sense, is the ultimate basis of Raz's most important argument for 
the sources thesis. (He deploys other arguments as well, but they all 
either reduce to the upcoming argument or else can be dismissed as 
unpersuasive. 121 ) The immediate premise of this argument is the claim of 
the service conception of authority that an authority should base its 
action-guiding directives on dependent reasons, i.e., on reasons which 
"apply to the subjects of those directives and which bear on the circum-
stances covered by the directives." 122 It is then concluded that the 
sources thesis is justified because the subjects of an authority "can benefit 
by its decisions only if they can establish their existence and content in 
ways which do not depend on raising the very same issues which the 
authority is there to settle." 123 
It is worth drawing attention to the connection which exists between 
this argument for the sources thesis and the purpose which Raz attrib-
utes to exclusionary norms generally. As was mentioned earlier, Raz's 
view is that the purpose of such norms is to simplify practical reasoning. 
This is achieved through the provision of an intermediate level of reasons 
on which agents will in the ordinary run of cases be able to act without 
having to refer to ultimate values or other justifying reasons. The 
sources thesis simply indicates the manner in which authoritative legal 
directives in particular are to be identified if this isolation from ultimate 
justifying reasons is to be successfully achieved . The rationale, so far as 
the law is concerned, for regarding such isolation as desirable is that the 
law claims legitimate authority for itself and therefore presupposes, for 
reasons we have already examined, that at least some of its subjects are to 
a greater or lesser degree uncertain about what the objective balance of 
reasons requires (i.e., they are uncertain about what action is demanded 
by the ultimate justifying reasons). The sources thesis is thus an impor-
tant element in a strategy for dealing with practical uncertainty. This 
does not mean, as Raz himself has emphasized several times, that laws 
themselves cannot be uncertain or controversial. What it does mean is 
that "the law fails in [its mediating] role if it is not, in general, easier to 
establish and less controversial than the underlying considerations it 
120. J. RAZ, supra note 3, at 39-40. For additional discussion of the sources thesis see J. RAZ. 
supra note 84, at 212-16; Raz, supra note 17. at 300-05. 315-20. 
121. See Perry, supra note 56. at 227-30. 
122. Raz, supra note 17, at 299. 
123. !d. at 304. 
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reflects ." 124 
R az states that the sources thesis is the most fundamental of the 
various theses which have historically been associated with positivism, 125 
and there is good reason to think that he is righ t about this. The sources 
thesis high lights the traditional positivist idea that law is something 
·which has been posited or created by human beings. Furthermore, its 
j ust ifica tion is grounded in a view of the poin t or function of law which 
has figured at least implicitly, and usually explicitly, in. the work of all 
the great positivist thinkers, including Hobbes, Bentham, Austin, 
Holmes, K elsen, and Hart . T hat view is that the primary point or func-
tion of law is to guide the conduct of ordinary citizens. In formul ating 
the sources thesis and defending it in terms of this conception of the 
function of law, Raz has captured the essence of the positivist position, 
framed it in precise terms, and developed a powerful argument in its 
favor. 
It is worth remarking that Raz's version of positivism is not com-
mitted to the truth of the historical positivist thesis that law and morals 
are separable. He takes the sources thesis, not the separability thesis, to 
be the essence of positivism, and then defines the latter in such a way that 
it does not simply follow from the former. 126 His definition of the sepa-
rabi lity thesis differs from that of many writers, since he maintains the 
following: "A necessary connection between law and morality does not 
require that truth as a moral principle be a condition of legal validity. 
A ll it requi res is that the social features which identify something as a 
legal system entail that it possesses moral value." 127 Raz thinks that the 
version of the separability thesis which is associated with the second of 
these two views on what constitutes a necessary connection between law 
and morality could well be false: 
The claim that what is law and what is not is purely a matter of social 
fac t stiil leaves it an open question whether or not those social facts by 
which we identify the law or determine its existence do or do not 
endow it with moral merit. If they do, it has of necessity a moral 
character. 128 
124 . !d. at 319; see also Raz, The Inn er Logic of the Law, 10 R EC HTSTHEORI E 10 1, 112-13 
( 1986) . 
125. J. RAZ. supra no te 3, a t 38. 
126. id. at 38-39. 
127. Raz, supra note 17, at 3 1!. 
128. J. R.-'>Z, supra note 3, a t 38-39; see also J. RAZ, supra note 1, a t 165 -70; Raz, supra note 17. 
a t 311-1 2, 319-20. 
l 
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Raz's version of positivism is thus compatible with at least certain types 
of natural law theory. 129 
Raz is only able to define the separability thesis in the way that he 
does because he accepts the sources thesis, which not a ll contemporary 
legal theorists who call themselves posi tiv is ts d o. Legal theorists 'Nho do 
not accept it tend to defend a version of the sepa ra bility thesis that is 
associ.:Hed with the first of the two vievvs des'.~ribed by R az of wha t con -
sti tutes c. necessa ry connection between la•;v and morality . There is none-
theless a. sense in which Raz's vers ion of positivism is stronger in its 
insistence on the separation of law and m orals tha n the theories of those 
same writers, since the sources thesis ru les out the possibility that tb e 
ident iftc ation of individual laws can even sometirnes turn on mora1 a rgu·· 
men ts. David Lyons, Philip Soper , and J ul es Coleman have all defended 
the view that this possibility is compatible with positivism. 130 Since the 
concept ion of law which results from thi s view ultimately seems to be 
more D workinian in character than anything else, 13 1 there are strong 
grounds for concluding that Raz's approach and not theirs comes closer 
to capturing the essence of positivism. 
5. Legal R easoning and Precedent 
In addition to playing an important role in the justification of the 
sources thesis, the idea that the basic function of iaw is to guide conduct 
a lso serves as the foundation of a distinctive positivist conception of legal 
reasoning and judicial lawmaking. The most fundamental type of law, 
according to Raz, is a duty-imposing rule which provides exclusionary 
guidance for the population at large, or at leas t for a ~.egment of the 
population. T he significance of other types of laws, for exampie, power-
con ferring laws, is explained by their logical relations to duty- imposing 
la.ws. 132 T he basic obligation of a court is to evaluate the behavior of 
citizens by means of the same pre-existing legal rules which are supposed 
--- - - ------
129. Cf J. RAZ, supra note 3, at 39, 44-45, 157-59. 
130. S r>e Coleman, Nega tive and Positive Posiiivism, 11 j. LEGAL STUD. 139, i 48 (1982) ; Lyons, 
Pnnciples. Posiu vism. and Legal Theory, 87 YALE LJ. 4! 5, 425-2 6 ( 1977); Soper, L egal Th eory und 
!he Obligation of a Judge: The H art/Dworkin Dispute, 75 MICH. L. REv. 473, 511-12 (1 977) . R az 
cr itici zes the Soper-Lyons-Coleman pos ition in R az, supra no te 17, at 311 -1 5; see also I. R AZ, supra 
note 3, a t 47 n. 8. 
131. R. D WOR KI N, RIGHTS, supra note 93 , a t 345-50; R. DWO!'.Kli'i , supra note 85, at 124-29. 
Dwo rkin calls the Soper-Lyons-Coleman position "soft conven tiona lism ." 
132. J. RAZ, supra note 3, at 176; J. RAZ, supra no te 6, at 44. Raz does say, howeve r, th at 
power-conferring rules also guide behavior (namely the behavior of the power-holder), although the 
na ture of the guidance which they provide is "indeterminate·· rath er t han exclusiona ry. See J. R.o.z, 
supra note 84, a t 228-29 . 
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to have antecedently guided their conduct. In most legal systems courts 
also have the authority to settle disputes to which the positive law does 
not provide a clear solution. 133 Courts which have assumed this role 
resemble legislatures, since they are acting at what Raz calls the delibera-
tive rather than the executive stage of public decisionmaking. 134 Courts 
acting at this stage look to sourceless considerations such as moral prin-
ciples and values, and when they do so "they em:: not relying on legally 
binding considerations but exercising their o~;vn clisc:retion." 135 Such dis-
cretion can be limited by source-based principles which themselves have 
legal status, but discretion-guiding principles "wi ll not eliminate the ele-
ment of personal judgment of the merits ." 136 
In some legal systems, for example those of common law jurisdic-
tions, courts do not simply settle unregulated disputes but treat their own 
decisions as giving rise to new law. Raz states that within the practical 
limits on such courts' lawmaking powers which inevitably result frorn 
their being able to revise the law only incrementally, "[they] act and 
should act just as legislators do, namely, they should adopt those rules 
which they judge best." 137 Precedent-based legal rules are, like the rules 
which derive from other social sources such as legislation, exclusionary 
in character. Raz recognizes that the common law in particular pos-
sesses what he calls a "special revisability" in the hands of judges, but he 
nonetheless insists that while judge-made law can be said to be "meta-
phorically" less binding than enacted law, "[s]trictly speaking judge-
made law is binding and valid, just as much as enacted la\v." 138 Com-
mon law rules "are binding in their essential rationale and as applied to 
their context." 139 Since the common law binds courts as well as citizens, 
a court cannot "repeal" a common law rule by overruling a previous 
decision simply because it considers that that would be the best thing to 
do on the balance of reasons; courts can only reject binding common law 
rules for certain reasons, among which are included injustice, iniquitous 
discrimination, and being out of touch with the court's conception of the 
133. Sec supra note Ill. 
134. J. RAZ, supra note 84, at 213-14; Raz. supra note 82. at 214-16. 
135. J. RAZ, supra note 3, at 59. Raz sometimes suggests that courts have a legal duty not to 
make decisions arbitrarily, but in the light of his own positivist understanding of legal reasoning and 
adjudication this seems to be an unwarranted conclusion. See Perry, supra note 56, at 230 n.54, 231 
n.56 & 233 n.65. 
136. J. RAZ, supra note 3, at 113. On discretion-guiding principles generaliy, see id. at 96-97, 
and Raz, Legal Principles and the Limits of Law, 81 YALE L.J. 823 ( 1972). 
137. J. RAZ, supra note 3, at 197. 
138. !d. at 195. 
139. !d. at 189. 
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relevant area of law. 140 The doctrine of precedent itself is regarded by 
Raz as a Hartian customary rule of recognition. 141 Like all rules of rec-
ognition it is duty-imposing. 142 This means that the doctrine of prece-
dent is, for Raz, an exclusionary rule that requires courts to treat 
precedents as giving rise to exclusionary rules. The list of reasons just 
enumerated on which courts are permitted to rely in rejecting a common 
hnv rule is therefore the category of nonexcluded reasons which fall 
outs ide scope of the exclusionary rule that constitutes the doctrine of 
precedent. 
B. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY 
Raz's positivist conception of both law and legal reasoning IS 
founded on the idea that the basic function of law is to provide guidance 
for the conduct of ordinary citizens, where "guidance" is to be under-
stood as exclusionary guidance. The focus of the theory is thus upon the 
reasons for action that the law provides for the population as a whole; 
those reasons, which Raz maintains are (subjective) exclusionary rea-
sons, then define the basic legal obligations of the courts in evaluating 
citizens' actual conduct. One can summarize Raz's positivism, and 
indeed much of the positivist tradition, in an overly crude and somewhat 
inaccurate way by saying that it begins with a theory of legislation, where 
legislated enactments are understood as being, for the most part, directed 
to the general population, and then uses that theory as the basis of an 
account of adjudication. 143 This is somewhat inaccurate so far as Raz's 
version of positivism is concerned because, like Hart, he emphasizes the 
theoret ical priority of norm-applying over norm- creating institutions, 
and in fact does not even insist that a legal system must contain a distinct 
norm-creating institution like a legislature. 144 The reasons that he gives 
to justify this priority are not a matter of present concern. 145 The impor-
tant point for our purposes is that Raz takes the central case of a law to 
140. !d. at 114-15, 189-90; J. RAZ, supra note I, at 140-41. 
141. J. RAZ, supra note 3, at 95-96, 184 n.8. 
142. !d. at 92-93, 179. 
143. Ernest Weinrib discusses the general theoretical emphasis which positivism places on legis-
lation in Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949, 955-56 
(1988). He notes that "[p]ositivists consider even adjudication to be a species of legislative activity." 
!d. at 956. 
144. J. RAZ, supra note I, at 129-31. 
145. See supra note 109. Essentially, Raz regards norm-applying institutions as theoretically 
important because of their role in the identification of laws. Laws of a particular legal system are 
identified, according to Raz, by Hartian rules of recognition, i.e., by customary judicial rules. See 
generally J. RAZ, supra note 3, at 90-97. Raz accepts, to begin with, the Hartian thesis that "the test 
by which we determine whether a norm belongs to the system is, roughly speaking, that it is a norm 
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be an exclusionary rule which has been deliberately adopted by a political 
authority, that is to say, a rule which has been created by a deliberate 
legislctive act. 146 I t is in this sense that Raz's version of positivism 
begins with a theory of legislation. That theory is then used to offer a 
:Jartial account of adjudication by means of a rela ted thesis which states 
that courts have a lega l obligation to evaluate the behavior of citizens in 
accordance \Vith the same exclusionary rules that were supposed to have 
guiclecl their conduct beforehand. A, theory of adj udication that tells 
courts to decide unregulated cs.ses-these being cases in wh ich 
law does not provide a clear answer or where the courts have a pmver to 
chaLge the rules 147-is a moral theory only, not a theory of law. 148 
There is, however, an alternative conception of law and legal reason-
mg, -which v.;ill be referred to here as adjudicativism. 149 It begins with 
the premise that the basic function of law is not the guidance of citizens' 
conduct as such but rather the institutionalized adjudication and social 
resolution of disputes in accordance with appropriate principles of per~ 
sonal and political morality. These latter principles could be principles 
of indiv id ual justice, or they could be standards that promote a particular 
conception of the public good, or they could be a combination of both. 
They could in fact be constitutive of any tenable moral vision of personal 
interaction and/ or social life that a particular theorist or judge regarded 
as an appropriate basis for adjudication: different moral visions will sim-
ply produce different versions of adjudicativism. The general point to be 
emphasized is that adjudicativist theories, like positivist theories, begin 
·with a theory of reasons for action. The difference between the two 
approaches is that for an adjudicativist the reasons for action that are 
theoretically most significant are those which are and should be acted 
upon by courts. Adjudicativism is by no means necessarily committed to 
the position that courts should be concerned solely with the rights and 
interests of the parties before them and so should ignore the more general 
which the [courts] ought to apply .... " J. RAz. supra note l, at 139; see also J. RAZ, supra note 3. at 
90-91. In light of Raz•s own conclusive criticisms of Hart's theory of social rules, J. RAZ, supra note 
1, at 53-53, and hence of Hart's claim that that theory can explain the normativity of law, it is 
somewhat puzzling that Raz would continue to accept the further Hartian thesis that the norms 
which courts oughl to apply are determined by a customary judicial rule. This issue cannot be 
considered here. 
146. See. e.g.. Raz, supra note 17. at 303 ("a directive can be authoritatively binding only if it is, 
or at least is presented as, someone·s view of how its subjects ought to behave"). This does not mean 
that Raz is committed to the view that every law has a single author. See id. at 318. 
147. J. RAZ, s11pra note 3, at 96. 
148. Cf. Raz, supra note 82. at 217. 
149. See Perry. supra note 56. at 215-18. In my earlier paper I referred to adjudicativism as the 
"adjudJCiitivc .. approach to legal theory. 
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social impact of their decisions. But it nonetheless remains true that 
adjudicativists, unlike positivists such as Raz, take the essence of a the-
ory of law to be, not a theory of legislation, but a theory of adjudication 
(although it is of course also true that an adjudicativist theory must spec-
ify how legislation is to figure in the disposition of cases). The starting 
point of adjudicativism is thus very similar to what R az refers to as the 
lawyers' perspective. In commenting on the lawyers' perspective, Raz 
states that it is " arbitrary as an ultimate starting point. " 150 In fact it 
simply adopts a different evaluative understanding from positivism of the 
essential function of legal institutions. 
An adjudicativist conception of law and legal reasoning has ahvays 
underlain Professor Dworkin's approach to legal theory, as evidenced by 
the following passage from Lm·v's Empire: "Our concept of law ties law 
to the present justification of coercive force and so ties law to adjudica-
tion; law is a matter of rights tenable in court." 151 Dworkin in fact main-
tains that the view expressed in this quotation applies not just to his own 
conception of law but to the general concept of law, which means that he 
looks at all possible theories of law and not just his own from an adjudi-
cativist perspective. This is a mistake, and when Dworkin attempts to 
reshape positivism in particular so that it will fit into an adjudicativist 
mold-the reformed version is referred to as conventionalism-positiv-
ism emerges severely distorted. 152 There is no denying, however, that in 
Dworkin's own theory of law, which he calls "law as integrity," he 
makes use of the adjudicativist conception to fashion a very compelling 
interpretation of modern legal institutions. 153 Michael Moore 154 and 
Ernest \Veinrib 155 are two other outstanding examples of contemporary 
150. Raz, supra note 82, at 212. 
151. R. DWORKIN. supra note 85. at 400-01; see also R. DWORK1N, RIGHTS, supra note 93. at 
338, 347-48 (function of law is principl ed adjudication, not the provision of standards for private and 
official conduct). An early indication that Dworkin was adopting an adjudicativist approach can be 
found in Dworkin, Does Law Have a Function? A Comment on the Two-Level Theory of Decision, 74 
YALE L.J. 640, 640 ( 1965) ('"What, in general, is a good reason for decision by a court of law? This 
is the question of jurisprudence; it has been asked in an amazing number of forms, of which the 
classic 'What is Law?" is only the briefest."). 
152. See supra note 108. 
153. R. DwoRK1N, supra note 85, especially chs. 6, 7. 
154. Set> Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277 (1985) [here-
inafter Moore, Natural Law]; Moore. Precedent, Induction, and Ethical Generalization, in PRECE-
DENT 1N LAw 183 (L. Golds rein ed . 1987) [hereinafter Moore, Precedent]; Moore, The Semamics of 
Judging, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 151 (1981). 
155. See Weinrib, The Insurance Justification and Private Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 681 (198 5) 
[hereinafter Weinrib, Insurance Justification]; Weinrib, The Inielligibi!ity of the Rule of Law, in THE 
RULE OF LAW: IDEAL OR IDEOLOGY 59 (A. Hutchinson & P. Monahan eds. 1987) [hereinafter 
Weinrib, Inielligibi!iiy]; Weinrib. Law as a Kantian Idea of Reason, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 472 (1987); 
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legal theorists who are probably best regarded as having adopted an 
adjudicativist approach. The respective theories of Dworkin, Moore, and 
Weinrib are very differen t from one another in many respects, but there 
is a fundamental similarity in that all three can be understood as taking 
the essence of a theory of law to be a theory of adjudication. A theory of 
adjudication, as well as being a theory of reasons for action , is also of 
course a moral theory. There is, therefore, a sense in which the adjudica-
ti vist approach discerns a necessary connection between law and moral-
ity. It is thus unsurprising that Moore and Weinrib both ·~x pli citly 
identify themselves as natural Jaw theorists, and that Dworkin has from 
time to time flirted with this label as well. 156 
It might seem that the difference between the positivist and the 
adjudicativist approaches to legal theory is not a fundamental one but 
ultimately comes down to nothing more than slight nuances in perspec-
tive, or even to semantics. Positivism, or at least the kind of positivism 
defended by Raz, begins with a theory of legislation, i.e. , with a theory of 
reasons for action that apply to the population at large, and then charac-
terizes adjudication as the activity of evaluating citizens' conduct on the 
basis of whether or not they have complied with those reasons. It is 
obvious, the argument will then go, that an adjudicativist theory must 
specify how legislation is to be taken into consideration by courts in 
deciding cases. The most defensible such account will run something 
along these lines: a well- ordered society requires some person or body to 
provide (exclusionary) guidance for citizens with respect to at least cer-
tain matters, and a democratically- elected legislature that enjoys effective 
de facto authority is, morally speaking, the most appropriate such body. 
A court will then have good moral reasons to evaluate the conduct of 
citizens in accordance with whatever legislated rules apply to their act ivi-
ties, so that where legislation is concerned there will be no practical dif-
ferences between the positivist and the adjudicativist approaches. As for 
unregulated disputes, the argument will conclude, the adjudicativist is 
free to apply the label "law" to the sorts of moral considerations that 
everyone will agree should be relied upon by courts in deciding such 
Weinrib, Liberty, Communi1y and Correcuve Juslice, 1 CAN. J. L. & J URIS. 3 (1988); Weinrib, 
Toward a Moral Th eory of Negligence Law, 2 LAW & PHIL. 37 (1983) [hereinafter Weinrib, Moral 
Th eory]; Weinrib, supra note 143. 
156. Dworkin, 'Wa1ural" Law R evisi1ed , 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 165 ( 1982) . Adjudicativist na tura l 
law theor ies must be distinguished from what might be ca lled trad itiona l natura l law theories, which 
cla im that there is a systematic connection of some sort between valid positive la w and m oral va lue. 
For a recent example of the latter sort of theory see J. FlNNlS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURA L 
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cases, but this will simply lead to a difference of semantics, not substance, 
and one that is again of no practical significance. 
There is a grain of good sense to this argument , but it goes too far in 
downplaying the possible differences between positivis t and adjudicativist 
theories. To begin with , there are other possible accounts, not all of 
them cornpletely implausible, of the ways in which courts should take 
legislation into consideration in deciding cases. The adjudicativist theory 
which Dwork in refers to in Law's Empire as pragmatism, and vvhich he 
acknmvledges to be in some respects a very powerful conception of law, 
proposes that judges should adopt what amounts to a ra ther cavalier atti-
tude towards statu tory enactments. 15 7 In Dworkin's own early writings 
he himself seemed inclined to say no more than that courts should "pay a 
qualified deference to the acts of the legislature. " 1 5R Such views are not 
common, however, since most adjudicativist theorists seem to regard leg-
islation in very much the same way that Raz conceives of law generally. 
They thus look upon courts as being bound, in a sense which it would not 
be unfair to characterize as exclusionary, to apply statutes according to 
their terms. This would seem to be true of Moore, 159 for example, and, 
since "Hard Cases," of Dworkin as well. 160 Important differences 
remain, of course. For instance, Moore and Dworkin both view rules of 
statutory construction in a very different way from Raz. 161 Still, on the 
whole it can be said that so far as the treatment and understanding of 
legislation is concerned, the similarities among the approaches taken by 
these three theorists far outweigh the differences. The argument under 
consideration is therefore correct in its conclusion that adj udicativist and 
positivist theories can and often do converge upon interpretations of the 
judicial practice of applying statutes which are, for the most part, mutu-
ally compatible. Each looks at the phenomenon from a slightly different 
157. R. DWORKIN, supra no te 85, at 147, 154, 158. 
158. R. DWORK IN, RIGHTS, supra note 93, a t 37. 
159 . Moore describes reasoning from statutes as a "text bound ent erprise. " Moore, Natural 
Law, supra nole 154, at 282-83 . This he contrasts with common law reasoning, which does not 
depend on the int erpretation of a tex t. Moore, Precedent, supra no te 154, at 184. I am assuming 
tha t the constraints imposed by a text are anal yzable in exclusionary terms. 
160. See, e.g. , R. DwoRKIN , RIGHTS, supra note 93, at 107-1 0. Dworkin does not specifically 
desc ribe statutes as exclu sionarily binding, but this would seem to be implicit in the idea that Hercu-
les, Dworki n's idea l judge, must take statutes as a given part of the settled law for which he has to 
co nst ruct the bes t justification. See also R. DWOR KIN, supra note 85, at 401 (if a judge is satisfied 
that a statute admits of only one interpretation then he must enforce this as law). 
161. For both Moore and Dworkin the interpreta ti on of a sta tute necessarily involves moral 
arg ument. See R. DWORK IN, supra no te 85, at 337-43 and passim; Moore, Natural Law, supra note 
154, a t 381 -9 3. For Raz, on the other hand, rules of sta tutory interpretati on invo lve the imputation 
of ac tual intentions to law-makers, so that their charact er "'is a ma tter of fact and not a moral issue." 
Raz, supra not e 17, a t 3 1 8. 
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perspective, but the pictures they draw of it are generally consistent with 
one another. 
The argument nonetheless goes too far in its claim that there are no 
substan tial differences between adjudicativist and positi vist theories of 
law. It com pletel y overlooks another dimension of the legal world which 
any adeq uate theory of iaw will satisfacto rily have to account for , 
namely, judicial dec isionmaking of the sort associated wi th the common 
l c:<.\V. I t is in fact on the common law, and on private common law in 
particular, that adjud icativist theorists tend to focus thei r atten tion: 
Dworkin acknowledges that " ordinary civi l cases at law" are the princi-
pal subject of his famous essay "Hard Cases," 162 and Weinrib's theory of 
corrective justice is precisely a theory of private common law. 163 Raz 
offers an interpretation of the common law process according to which 
the standards of the common law are exclusionary rules, binding for citi-
zens and courts alike, that in all essential respects are no different from 
legislated enactments. Adjudicativist theorists tend to reject any such 
interpretation of judicial lawmaking, 164 however, which suggests that the 
common law m ight prove to be fruitful territory for discovering signifi-
cant substantive differences between the adjudicativist and the positivist 
approaches to legal theory. The remainder of this Paper will consist of a 
preliminary scouting of this territory with a view to showing that Raz's 
positivist conception of the common law is an inadequate one, and that 
what is called for instead is an adjudicativist interpretation. The ultimate 
conclusion will be that Raz's positivism does not provide a satisfactory 
account of the foundations of law, or at least that it does not provide a 
complete account. 
Raz's interpretation of the common law, like the general theory of 
law of which it forms a part, is based on his analysis of legitimate author-
ity and his conception of a subjective exclusionary reason. His interpre-
tat ion iS thus grounded in a clear and rigorously developed account of 
162. R . DWORKIN, R IGHTS, supra note 93, at 94 n.l; see also id. a t 84, 100; cf. R. DWORK IN, 
supra note 85, at !43 (Law's Empire is to a large extent concerned with private law). 
163. See supra note I 55. 
164. See R. DWO RK IN , supra no te 85, at 24-25 ("relaxed" doctrine o f precedent d em ands onl y 
that a judge give some weight to past decis io ns on the sa me issue, where the initial pres umption in 
their favor can be ou tweighed if they a re thought suffic ien tly wrong); R. DwORK IN, RI GHTS, supra 
note 93, a t 38 (doctrine of precedent is not a rule but a principle and can therefo re be outweighed by 
other principles); MOORE, Precedenl , supra note 154, at 184 (common law reasoning, not being 
text bou nd, resembles ethical reasonin g); id . at 187 (courts a re to decide disputes, not issue ca nonical 
s ta tements o r edic ts li ke a little legis lature); id. at 202 (doctrine o f precedent does no t g ive ri se to 
prac tice rules in R awls' sense); Weinrib, M oral Theory , supra note ! 55, a t 42 (common law of torts is 
con stituted almost en tirely by its spec ifi c instances of dispute resolution, wh ich assume a systematic 
aspec t only because like cases ought to be decided alike) . 
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practical reasoning which permits law to be explicated within the context 
of a strategy for dealing 'Nith uncertainty about what the objective bal-
ance of reasons requires. One problematic aspect of adjudicativist theo-
ries of law is that while they reject anything resembli ng a Razian 
understanding of the common law, they do not offer an al ternat ive 
understanding in which the character and role of the re levaEt processes 
of practical reasoning are worked out in similarly cl ear ond precise 
te rms. It will be argued in v,;hat fo llows that the notions of a reweighti ng 
reason and an epistemically-bounded reason that were ddined earlier 
provide the basis for such an understanding. These types of reasons are 
simply va riations on Raz's general theme of a second-order reason for 
action. Their recognition as distinct types of reasons does not, therefore, 
lead to any radical modifications of Raz's analysis either of practical rea-
soning generally or of legitimate authority in particular. H o\vever, their 
utilization within an adjudicativist theory of law facilitates the formula-
tion of an interpretation of t he common law which is descriptively and 
evaluatively superior to Raz's positivist interpretation. There is thus a 
sense in which Raz himself provides the means, in the form of his not ion 
of a second- order reason, for demonstrating that his own positivist the-
ory of Jaw is in certain respects deficient. 
C. THE COMMON LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 
The inquiry into the proper theoretical understanding of the com-
mon law will begin by showing how the officials of a certain kind of 
instit utionalized normative system that could only be adequately 
desc ribed in adjudicativist terms might introduce a doctrine of precedent 
into the system without thereby depriving it of its adjudicat ivist charac-
ter. A brief summary will then be offered of arguments presented else-
where which support the conclusion that the picture of judicia l 
lawmaking that emerges from this thought- experiment better captures 
the essence of the common law than does the positivis t conception 
defended by Raz. Finally, certain objections which R az might make to 
the conclusion that an adjudicativist interpretation of the comn10n :law is 
superior to his own positivist interpretation will be considered . 
1. Systems of Absolu te Discretion 
Raz describes a certain kind of normative system \Vhich he says 
must be distinguished from a legal system. 165 A system of absolute dis-
cretion, as he calls it, consists of one or more tribunals to which members 
165. J. RAZ, supra not e 1, at 137-41; J. RAZ, supra note 3, at! 11-14, 173 -75. 
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of the relevant society can refer their disputes for resolu tion. Tribunals 
have the au thority to settle disputes and determine the rights and duties 
of individuals conclusively, but there are no legislated or customary stan·· 
dards which they have to apply, nor are they obligated to fo l1ovv their 
own precedents. Yet they cannot decide cases arbitrarily: " they are 
always w make that decision which they think to be best Oil t'ne b\sis of 
all the valid reasons." 1 oii A tribunal must have reasons for i<: s actions, 
but the determination of which reasons are applicable iE a part i '.~~d::<r case 
and of \Vhc.t decision they support is always a matter tha.t is within its 
absolute discretion. Raz says that some regularity in the c:kcisions of 
these tr ibunc.ls could be expected, but because individmd judges vv ill 
sometimes change their minds from one case to another, 0.nd because 
they wiii in any event differ among themselves about what right reason 
requires, the degree of regularity is not li kely to be very high. The sys-
tem will not provide individuals with very much guidance concerning 
how they ought to conduct themselves so as to be entitled to a decision in 
their favor should they ever become involved in a dispute. But legal sys-
tems do provide such guidance, and that is why Raz says that systems of 
absolute discretion are not legal systems. 
The system of absolute discretion described by Raz is an institution-
alized regime of adjudication that clearly falls within the purview of an 
adjudicativist understanding of law. The reasons in accordance with 
which the judges of the system are expected to settle disputes will always 
be moral reasons . (Morality is to be understood here in a broad sense, so 
that it could include such matters as a concern for economic efficiency .) 
The questions that judges will sometimes disagree or change their minds 
about are questions pertaining to the determination of what decision is 
called for in particular cases by the objective balance of morally relevant 
reasons. It is only because there is to some degree or another a general 
lack of certainty (or at least consensus) about what the objec tive balance 
of reasons requires that the system will fail to produce the regularity in 
decisionmaking that could guide individuals' conduct. If j udges (and 
people generally) were all so strongly convinced that they knew what 
right reason required that they seldom changed their minds, and if every-
one shared the same convictions (say because each person generally got 
the answer right), then regularity in decisionmaking would be quite high. 
But the system would sti li not be a legal system in R az's sense, since 
neither judges nor citizens would be relying on subjective exclusionary 
reasons tha t had issued from an authoritative< source. 
166. J. R.-\Z. supra note I , at 138. 
'i O~C;'l 
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In fact, of course, there is very often individual uncertainty or a lack 
of consensus (i.e. , general uncertainty) among human beings about vvhat 
the objective balance of reasons requires. Neither judges nor anyone else 
possess a formal decision procedure which will permit a mechanical and 
error free determination of vvhich reasons are morally relevant to \Vh ich 
sorts of disputes &.nd of v;hat results they entail in the aggregate. Let us 
refer to the awareness that human agents sometimes possess of the possi-
bili ty that they :might not know what morality requi res in a partic ul;;-:r 
type or situat ion as moral uncertainty . (T his is just a special instance of 
the practical unc-ert ai nty that was defin ed earlier.) Given the existence of 
individual moral u.ncertainty and/or lack of consensus about moral :rn at -
ters, Raz is undoubtedly correct to predict that in a system of absolu te 
discretion the degree of regularity in decisionmaking will be relatively 
low. If the decis ions of tribunals were too unpredictable then the result 
might be a serious interference with individual autonomy, since a lack of 
stability in the '' legal" environment could impair a person's ability to 
plan hi s or her life on anything other than a short-term basis. Let us 
suppose that the system of absolute discretion contains only one judge. 
She is aware of the potential problem of interference with individual 
autonomy and has to decide what, if anything, should be done about it. 
2. Dealing with J!/loral Uncertainty: The Development of 
a Doctrine of Precedent 
One possible strategy which might occur to the judge would be to 
take directly into account in the balance of reasons the actual expecta-
tions about the manner in v~hich particular kinds of disputes were likely 
to be resolved that had been held, either by litigants themselves or by a 
majority of comrnunity members, during the time before a given dispute 
actually arose . But this wo uld be problematic for a number of reasons . 
F irst, while there would always be an abstract expectation that the judge 
would settle the dispute in accordance with her best present understand-
ing of what righ t reason required, there might not be any concrete expec-
tations about what she would do in a particular type of case. T his 
situat ion would be especially li kely to occur if the judge had not previ-
ously exh ibited any marked regularity in decisionmaking. Second, it 
might be very diffi cult to ascertain what people's con crete expectations 
had been, supposing that they existed. T he litigants themselves might be 
something less than truthful after the event , and determining community 
opinic n is never an easy matter. F inally, the moral status of such expec-
tations would itself be problematic . Since the judge has not committed 
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herself in any way to following her own precedents, those concrete expec-
tations that did exist would be mere pred ictions, not expectations that 
vvere legitimate or justified in a normative sense. It is very far from clear, 
however, that r.'lere predictions about ho\v a j udge would be likely to 
resolve a dispute are m general morally relevant to its actual 
resolution. t 67 
Seeing that following the avenue of actual expectations held little 
prospect of success, the judge might try a d ifferent route. She might 
think that she should introduce some stability into the legal environment 
by comrnitting herself to follow ing her mvn precedents . She would then 
be inducing expectations , which vvould in consequence become justified 
expectations. The question that then arises is this: what kind of expecta-
tions should she induce? This is the same as asking what kind of doctrine 
of precedent should be adopted . Since the judge would be proposing, in 
effect , to defer to her own previous practical judgments, the issue can be 
more accurately described in the following way: what kind of subjective 
second- order reason should she act upon? She might consider, for exam-
ple, that she should defer completely to her own previous opinions, 
which would amount to a decision to treat them as exclusionarily bind-
ing. W hile this approach would undoubtedly solve the predictability 
problem, the judge would likely consider that it went too far in the oppo-
site direction. It would sometimes require her to settle disputes in ways 
-v hich she was quite certain were wrong, since she would on at least some 
occaswns be quite strongly convinced that she had previously made a 
mistake. 
The obvious alternative is that the judge should defer to her own 
previous practical judgments by regarding them as giving rise to 
reweighting reasons, epistemically-bounded reasons, or both. Suppose 
she adopted the former approach. She would first decide whether the 
facts of the present case feli within the scope of the reasoning that she 
had enunciated in some earlier case. If so, she could only rely on a modi-
fied (or completely different) formulation of reasons, representing her 
current opinion on the issue in question, if their aggregate weight 
appeared to her to exceed a threshold of strength which was higher to 
some specified degree than what she would ordinarily look upon as suffi-
cient to tip the balance of reasons . Otherwise she would regard herself as 
bound to make the decision that was indicated by the reasoning of the 
167. Sec. e.g., Postema, Coordinalion and Com·enlion a1 !he Faunda!ians of Law, II J. LEGAL 
STUD. 165, 180 (19 82); R. DwoRKIN, supra note 85 , at 14 1. Bu1 see infra note 174. 
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precedent. In this way she would be introd ucing a deliberate and system-
ati c bias into her practical reasoning in favor of her ov.;n previous opin -
ions about what the objective balance of reasons requires. Suppose, on 
the other hand, that the judge opted for the epistemical ly-bounded 
approach. Then, if the facts of the present case fell within the scope of 
her reasoning in an earlier case, she wo uld be bound to decide in the way 
indicated by her prior reasoning unless her conviction that she had been 
wrong rose above a certain epistemic threshold. Jn that event she would 
be free and indeed obligated to decide in accordance wi th her present 
assessment of what the objective balance of reasons requires. In the case 
of both ty pes of reasons the point would be to introduce a certain stabil-
ity into the general legal environment without at the same ti me sacrific-
ing completely the judge's ability to decide cases according to her own 
best present judgment. 
The effect of raising either the threshold that will tip one's subjective 
assessment of the balance of reasons (on the reweighting approach) or 
the epistemic threshold (on the epistemically-bounded approach) will in 
each case be roughly the same. The probability will be increased that a 
decision made on the basis of the raised threshold wi ll be correct (i.e. , 
will comply with the objective balance of reasons). In the former case 
this is because the stronger that the substantive arguments in favor of a 
particular result appear to be, the more likely it is that that result is the 
correct one. Similarly, in the case of epistemically-bounded reasons, the 
more strongly one is convinced that a particular decision is right, the 
greater the likelihood that it is right. (These are empirical generaliza-
tions, not conceptual truths.) The two approaches are in fact very closely 
related to one another, and it might in practice be very difficuit to draw a 
clear distinction between them. As has just been indicated, both function 
in roughly the same way. Each also gives rise to a variable th reshold 
which can naturally be spoken of as att ributing a certain weight to the 
practical judgment of another person, or, as in our present example, to 
the practical judgment of oneself at an earlier time. Each can be said to 
give rise to a presumption of varying st rength in favor of the practical 
judgment of another. In the context of a doctrine of precedent both sorts 
of reasons would probably be found together, and, because they both 
operate in essentially the same way, there would ordinaril y be no particu-
lar point in distinguishing between them. I shall therefore speak from 
now on of the "non- exclusionary" conception of precedent (to be con-
trasted with Raz's exclusionary conception) without generally bothering 
to specify whether epistemically-bounded reasons, reweighting reasons, 
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or both are involved. 168 The threshold associated with each type of rea-
son wi ll also be referred to indifferently as the weighting threshold. 
3. The !Von-Exclusionary Conception of Precedent: 
Justifica tion and R efinement 
In adopting a non- exclusionary conception of preceden i: the judge in 
the single ·j udge system would be trying to ac hi ev~ an acc::pt2ble degre;:: 
of predictability in her decisions while at the same time t ryin g to ensure 
that the overall level of correctness in her deci sionmaking did not suffer 
too much as a result. T here is no reason to th ink that any one weighting 
th reshold would provide the optimal solution to this p:coblern for ali 
times, places, and types of dispute. A certain amount of t rial and error 
on the part of the judge, and some give and take between judge and popu-
lation over time, would probably be required in order to find an effective 
working solution or set of solutions. 169 This flexibility in fact seems to 
guarantee the superiority of the non-exclusionary over the exclusionary 
conception of precedent, since the latter is really just a special case of the 
former: if for some reason an exclusionary approach turned out to be the 
preferable solution in a given set of circumstances, then it would presum-
ably be adopted. 170 
D uring this trial and error period people could legitirnately expect 
that some weight, although not necessarily a very clearly specified degree 
of weight, would be attributed to the reasoning in previous cases. As 
long as this was done they could not claim that their legitimate : xpecta-
tions had been defeated just because a previous decision vvas not fol-
lowed. Over time, however, a number of more precisely delineated 
168. In Judicial Obl(gation, Precedent, and rhe Common L aw 1 referred to the non-exc lusionary 
conception of precedent as the strong Burkean conception. Perry, supra no te 56, at 239. I d id no t, 
however, expressly d is tinguish in tha t paper between epistemica ll y- bounded reasons and reweight ing 
reasons. having wrongly made the implicit assumption that th e fo rmer were just a sub· ca tegory of 
the latt er. This was not, in li ght of the similar role th a t th e two types of reasons p lay in lega l 
reasoning, a se rio us e rro r. It did not in any way undermine th e main argumen ts of the paper. 
169. Cf R. DwoRKIN, supra note 85 , at 148-50 (di scussing th e concept ion of law th a t he c~ ll s 
pragmatism). The int erpretation of legal reasoning which I defend in this Paper bears some resem-
blance to the pragma ti st approach to common law decisionmaki ng. (Bur see infra no te 176.) Noth-
ing l have to say suppo rts the pragmatist understand ing of sta tuto ry inte rpre ta tion , however. 
170. Cf R. Dwo RKIN, supra note 85, a t 149-50. No tice that, in the cont ext of the d isc ussion in 
th e text. th e exclusionary specia l case of a reweighting reason i:; a reason fo r the judge to give no 
weight to her present judgment of what the objective ba la nce of reasons requires, and hence to g ive 
100% we ight to he r ea rlier judgment. The exclusionary speci a l case of an epis temi cal ly- bounded 
reason is a reason fo r the judge a lways to defer completely to her earlier judgment n o matter how 
st rongly she is con vin ced that on the previous occasion she was wrong. T hese two sort s o f spec ia l 
cases are CO · extensive. 
1 
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weighting thresholds, each applicable to a differen t situation, ·would no 
doubt begin to crystallize. For example, the judge might conclude that 
predictability o,vas m ote important, and hence that a higher th reshold 
was calied for, where a line of reasoning was represented by a series of 
cases that had endured unchallenged for some time than v;here the rea-
. . ' . . 1 . .1.- , . 1 ' 171 ..., . . ., , sorm1g u1 quesnon 'Nas assoc1atea vn tn a smg e recem case.· · ,)lm:i any, 
she ;-nighi conclude: that the threshold should va ry depending c'n the 
natu te of the d ispute. T he re lat ive importance of predictabili ty v;ou!d 
seem to be much greater fo r voluntary interactions of the sort exernplifiecl 
by contractual relat ions, for exam ple, than for involuntary interactions of 
the sort exemplified by negligently caused accidents. I 72 As the degree of 
weight t ha'L 'vvould be attributed under various circumstances w the rea-
soning in previous decisions became clea rer, the legitimate expecta tions 
of the population concerning the manner in which cases wou id be 
decided would become more focu sed . I 7 3 But such expectation:; vvou ld 
continue to be concerned with the process of decisionmaking as such, so 
that, as before, the m ere fact that the judge decided a current case differ-
ently from how she had decided an earlier similar one would not neces-
sari ly mean that anyone's legitimate expectations had been fru strated . I 74 
T he judge in our exam ple, in constructing a doctrine of precedent 
along the lines sketched above, would be responding to certain difficulties 
created by the fact that she was morally fallible. She would be develop-
ing a strategy to deal with her own moral uncertainty that called for her 
to defer, at least up to a point, to those of her previous practical judg-
ments that she had made in her official capacity as a judge. There is thus 
a fo rmal similarity to R az 's analysis of authority, which outlines a 
l 7 i. Cf Jones v. Sec retary o f Stat e for Social Servs., (1972] A.C. 944 , 993 (it is eJs icr to con -
clude that a recently decided case should no t be foll owed than a lo ng standing case). 
172. Cf B rit ish T ra nsp. Comm'n v. Go urley [1956] A.C. 185, 2 11-1 2. 
173. As this occ urred it would become co rrespondingly harder to modi fy the weig ht in g thresh-
olds th at had been :;e lec ted. In o rde r not to upset legitimate expectations change might have to be 
accom plishd outside the cont ext of parti cul a r liti gat io n, for example, by iss uing a pr:.~ct ice ,;tate-
ment. Th is is what was done by the English House of Lo rds when it decided that it sho uld no lo nge r 
be absolute ly bound by its previous decisio ns. See P ractice St atemen t [19 66] 3 All E.R. 77 . 
174. T here are o f course situations wh ere it is more impo rt an t that there be a wa y of do in g 
things. whatever it is, tha n that things be done in a particular way. In such circumstances. the fac t 
that the re existed general expectat ions in the co mmunity about ho w things would bo:: done could 
afrect the objec ti ve ba ia nce of reasons itself. T his would be true whether th ese expectations had been 
ind uced by the legal syst em or had come abo ut in some ot her way. In such cases it is th e co ntext in 
which the expectations a rise, ra ther than the fac t that they ha ve been delibera tel y ind uced and so a re 
in that sense legi t imate, that is important. T he anal ys is o f convent io ns as so lu tions to coord inati o n 
problems sheds much light on this issue. S ee generally D. LEWI S, CONV ENTIOt'." : A P HI LOSOPHI-
CAL STu DY ( 1969). Fo r relevant discussion s in th e legal and pol iti cal contexts, see Green. Auilwriry 
and Com·e111ion , 35 PH IL. Q. 329 ( 1985), a nd Postema, supra no te 167, a t 172-86. 
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rational strategy instructing agents faced with practical uncertai nty to 
dder under certain circumstances to the practical judgments of another 
person . (The fact that in the former case one defers to the judgme11tS of' 
oneself at an earlier time while in the latter case one defers to the judg .. 
ments of someone else is not a sign ificant difference.) The justifica tior1 
fo r deference is quite di fferent in the two situations, however. In the case 
of legitimate authority , an agent should defer because it is reasonabl~ for 
him to think that this \Vill increase the extent to which he com plies '>Vi th 
right reason. But in the case of precedent the judge presumably r1as no 
particular grounds for believing that she will do better by d efer ring to her 
own prior opinions. Her justification for deference is that her moral falli-
b ili ty and the concomitant poten ti al for unpredictability in her decision-
making might create certain difficulties for other persons, in the form of 
uncertainty about how they should plan their lives, that can be at least 
partially rectified by instituting a practice of following precedent. 
The judge's general strategy is not just to achieve a degree of pre-
d ictabi lity in her decisionmaking but also to ensure that the overall level 
of correctness of her decisions does not suffer, or at least does not suffer 
too much. She is most likely to make a success of this second aspect of 
her strategy if on every occasion of dispute settlement, and hence in cases 
falling within the scope of a precedent as well as in cases of first instance, 
she is as familiar with the relevant first- order reasoning as possible. In 
giving effect to a non- exclusionary doctrine of precedent she is simply 
attributing, in the ways that have been explained, a certain presumpti ve 
weight to the reasoning of her own prior decisions. In order to imple-
ment this doctr ine effectively she must still reassess the first- order argu-
ments themselves, and the better she is at doing this the more successful 
her overall strategy is likely to be. This is an instance in which reliance 
on subjective second- order reasons, and on epistemically-bounded rea-
sons in particular, seems to call for as extensive a familiari ty vvith the 
underlying first- order reasoning as possible. 
4. lvfuiti-Tribuna! Systems 
So far this discussion has assumed that the normative system under 
consideration has never contained more than one judge . Suppose now 
that the original judge retires and another one takes her place. It should 
be apparent that this makes no difference to the analysis; the new judge 
has exactly the same reasons for deferring (up to a point) to previous 
judgments, whoever rendered them, as did the retired judge. The on ly 
difference is that the implementation of a non- exclusionary conception of 
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precedent must now be regarded as a strategy for dealing with moral 
uncertainty on the part of two persons and not just one. 
Suppose next that the simplifying assumption that there is only one 
judge in the system at any one time is dropped. The introduction of a 
non-exclusionary doctrine of precedent into a system of absolute discre-
tion that consists of several tribunals can still be justified in the way ind i-
cated above, but oniy if ce rtain furth er conditions are met. If each 
tribunal simply treated the previous judgments of both itself a nd all the 
other tribunals as giving rise to reweighting or epistemically-bounded 
reasons, then there would obviously be a possibility that lack of general 
moral consensus could lead to inconsistent decisions. This would not 
only pose a potential th reat to predictability; it would also be a bad thing 
in itself. If Dworkin is correct in his contention that the state is under a 
special obligation to act towards its citizens in conformity with a princi-
ple of consistency or integrity, 175 then it cannot permit different tribunals 
within a single system of di spute settlement to decide similar cases in 
normatively inconsistent ways. It is therefore incumbent upon the vari-
ous tribunals to be prepared at any given time to apply impartially a 
single, comprehensive, and normatively consistent moral scheme to 
whatever disputes might arise in the community. (This does not mean 
that the scheme cannot change over time; government must speak with 
one voice, but there is nothing objectionable in principle if it changes its 
mind about what it is saying.) 176 
The best method for achieving the goal of systemic normative con-
sistency would be the creation of a judicial hierarchy. A single highest 
tribunal would conform to a non- exclusionary conception of precedent 
in very much the same way that the single judge did in the hypothetical 
adjudicative regime described earlier. Lower tribunals would generally 
follow a non-exclusionary doctrine as well , but one that was increasingly 
more restrictive as one moved down the hierarchy: the lower the tribu-
nal, the higher the we ighting thresholds that would apply to it. (It would 
i 75 . S ee R . DWORKI N, supra no te 85, especiall y chs. 6, 7. F o r a succ in ct statement o f the 
integrity princ iple, see id. a t !65-66. 
176. In supra no te 169, I draw attentio n to th e fact tha t the interpretati on of common la w 
reasoning th a t is defended in th is Paper is sim ila r in certain respects to the conception o f la w which 
Dwo rkin labels pragmatism. The recognitio n of a princ iple of co nsistency or integrity di stinguishes 
m y ve rsion of adjud icativisrn from prag mati sm, however. Th e interpretation of the common la w 
which I ad va nce in this Pa per is, l be lie ve, consona nt in all essentia l respec ts with the theore tica l 
charac terizatio n that the common law should receive under Dwo rkin' s preferred conception of la w, 
which he call s law as integrit y. But I shall not arg ue in suppo rt of that con clusion here, sin ce it 
would 1·equire a rath er in volved d iscuss io n o f th e impo rt a nce whic h Dwo rkin asc ribes to consistency 
with the pasr, as opposed to consistency of the sort described in the tex t. 
972 S OUTHERN CALIFOR N IA LAW REVJEJ/V [Vol. 62:9 13 
also be true, however, that the less drastic the proposed changes, the 
lower the relative threshold.) Lower tribunals would be bound in an 
exclusionary sense not to int rod uce normative inconsistencies in to the 
general moral scheme, and they would be sim ilarly bound not to overrule 
the decisions of tribunals higher than themselves in the h ierarchy. (An 
overruling is sim ply a restatement of the moral principles applicable to a 
particular type of d ispute which is sufficient ly d rastic as necessa rily to 
1mply that an earlier case would now be decided different ly.) In cer tain 
very limited respects, therefore, the doctrine of precedent would, for rea-
sons of systemic consistency, place exclusionary constraints on lower 
courts. There would always be a standing possibility, however, that any 
given case could go on appeal, so it is the character of the judicial reason-
ing in the highest court, where the non- exclusionary doctrine of prece-
dent would have unfettered effect, that is of greatest significance in 
assessing the theoretical nature of the system . 
5. The Nature of Non-Exclusionary Systems 
T he hierarchical system of tribunals that was described in the previ-
ous section will be referred to as a non- exclusionary system, and the 
tr ibunals themselves will henceforth be called courts. Does a non-exclu-
sionary system retain the adjudicativist character of a system of absolute 
discretion? There are a number of reasons for concluding that the 
answer to this question is yes. 
F irst, the system continues to settle dispu tes on the basis of exactly 
the same sorts of moral considerations as before: 177 it simply gives a 
certain presumptive weight to the reasoning of previous decisions. Sec-
ond, the courts constantly stay in touch , so to speak, wi th the ultimate 
fi rst-order reasoning which is the subject of the presumptive weighting 
process. In the single-j udge system discussed above it was a distinct 
advantage that the judge possess as thorough an understanding of the 
first - order considerations as possible, and the same is obviously true of 
the highest court in the non- exclusionary system . But even those courts 
which are exclusionarily bound in certain respects by the decisions of 
courts h igher than themselves in the judicial hierarchy will constantly be 
engaged in qualifying and modifying the reasoning that was relied upon 
in previous similar cases, although their room for maneuver is much less 
than that of the highest court. H ere too the system as a whole will bene-
fit if the lower court judges are as fam iliar as possible with the lines of 
first- order reasoning that have been relied upon as rationales for previous 
177. More will be said about thi s poi nt infra , in the text accom panyi ng no tes 201-35. 
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decisions (as wel l as with those, it should be added, which they think 
should have been relied upon but were not). 
A third point, which is related to the first two , is that it is possible to 
maintain a degree of overall predictability in the decisionmaking of the 
non· exclusionary system, as well as to achieve general no:c::nat ive consis-
tency a.rnong the d ispute sett ling standards that the couns are prepared 
to apply at any gi ven tin;e, without insisting that there must be a clear 
distinction between the iden tification and the assessment of the reasoning 
in earlier cases . The non- exclusionary conception of precedent a ttributes 
a certain presumptive ;,veight to the reasoning of previous decisions, but 
it does not presuppose that the identification of that reason ing will itself 
be value free. O ften it will be necessary to reconstruct the argum ents of a 
previous decision, relying unavoidably on one's own moral sensibilities in 
the process, in order just to arrive at a clear understanding of them. 
Thus even though it is true that the rendering of a judicial decision and 
the giving of reasons in support of it are social facts, there is no warrant 
for the assumption that the courts of the non-exclusionary system must 
comply with anything like the sources thesis when they identify the rea-
soning of earlier similar cases. 
T he above considerations provide strong support for the conclusion 
that the non-exclusionary system is best understood in adjudicativist 
rather than in positivist terms. Perhaps it might be objected, however, 
that the concern for stability or predictability that would justify the 
adoption of a non- exclusionary doctrine of precedent is a for ward look-
ing consideration that has no moral bearing on the resolution of any dis-
pute arising prior to the doctrine's implementation. While the general 
need for predictabi lity would obviously have antedated th is event, there 
would have been no mechanism for legitimizing and focusing expecta-
tions in a way that would make them morally relevant to the resolution 
of existing disputes. T he point of introducing a doctrine of precedent is 
to provide some kind of future guidance for ordinary citizens, and that 
seems to be more of a positivist than an adjudicativist notion. 
This objection is really two related objections that have been rolled 
into one. T he first is that the introduction of any doctrine of precedent, 
even a non- exclusionary one, is inconsistent with adjudicativism. T he 
second is that the introduction of even a non- exclusionary doctrine of 
precedent can only be explained in positivist terms. T hese will be consid-
ered in turn . 
The basic premise of the first of the two sub- objections is that the 
justification for complying with a doctrine of precedent does not itself 
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figure among the reasons that are morally relevant to the resolution of 
existing disputes. It is then inferred that the courts, in implementin g a 
doctrine of precedent in a system of absolute discretion, would at least 
initially-and perhaps subsequently-be deciding cases inconsistently 
with adjudicativism . This argument's premise is true, but the argumr::nt 
itse lf is unsound . Consider again the system \vith a single judge. In 
choosing to treat her eariier opinions as giving rise to reweighting or epi-
stem ically-bounded reasons, the judge is not deciding against resolving 
the present case in accordance with an assessment of what is req uired by 
the objective balance of reasons; she is simply deciding to resolve it on 
the basis of her previous assessment rather than her present one. By the 
ve ry nature of epistemically-bounded and reweighting reasons, however, 
the judge is not strongly convinced that her present opinion is correct, or 
at least she does not feel that the substantive arguments as she now per-
ceives them amount to an overwhelming case. 17 8 When moral disagree-
ment either with oneself at an earlier time or with another person is of 
this relatively mild sort, however, there does not seem to be any good 
reason for thinking that one will do particularly better overall (i.e. , make 
more correct judgments) by always acting on one's present opinion . 179 
Hence there is no tension between the function of the judge as under-
stood in adjudicativist terms and the implementation of a non- exclusion-
ary doctrine of precedent. Since taking the latter step would bring 
significant moral benefits of its own, that is what the judges of a system of 
absolute discretion should do. 
178 . Cf F itzl ee t Esta tes Ltd . v. Ch erry, [ 1977] 3 All E . R. 99 6, 999 (accordin g to Lo rd W il ber-
fo rce, the majority and min orit y opinion in a previous case represented "two emin ently poss ib le 
vi ews," ' and it required ··mu ch more than doubts" about the co rrectness of the earlier decision to 
justify departing from it). 
179. If there are a nu mber of previous judicial opinio ns which a! I come to a conclusion di fferent 
from the one that the present judge is inclined to favor, th en an ana logy with a result in the th eo ry o f 
mJjo rit y rule will sup port a strengthened version of this point. This is so, at least , if the ea rl ier 
o pini ons were arri ved a t independentl y of one another , and if the indi vidua l judges arc in genera l 
more likely to be right th an wrong about a given issue. A s Arthur K ufiik points o u t, p robabilit y 
theory yie lds the foll owing resul t : 
If a randomly selected vo ter is more likel y to be right than wrong in his judgment about a 
matter which is up fo r a vo te, then the probability that a judgment whi ch is independ ently 
a rr ived at by a majo ri ty o f such voters is the correc t judgment is greater th an the 
probability that th e judgment of a randomly selected voter is co rrect. Thus voters wh o fi nd 
themselves in the min o rity in such circumstances have, in virtue of that , some reason to 
regard their own opinion as less probably correct than the majority opinion. 
K uflik. J'v!ajorily Rule Procedure, in DuE PROCESS (NOMOS XVIII) 296, 305 (J.R. Pennoc k & J .W. 
C hap man eds. 1977). By way of illustration Kuflik states tha t if an ave rage voter is only sli ghtl y 
more li kely to be correc t th an no t, say 51 percent like ly, then the probability th a t a 5 1 percent 
major ity is correct in its judgment is 51.99 percent when 100 persons a re vo ting, 59.8 percen t when 
500 pe rso ns are voting, a nd 69 pe rcent when 1.000 persons a re votin g. 
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The second sub- objection is that the introduction of even a non-
exclusionary doctrine of precedent provides guidance for the general 
popul<:nion, and this is a phenomenon that can only be u nderstood in 
positivist terms. If, however, the guidance provided were only of an 
indeterminate, non-exclusionary sort-if, in other words, the system 
only gave citizens fi rst- order reasons for action-then the objection 
seems to corne to nothing, especially in light of the considerat ions dis·· 
cussed in the preceding paragraph. A positivism that tried to build upon 
such a found ation would be appropriating the label without the sub-
stance; certainly it would bear no resemblance to Raz's version of positiv-
ism. But perhaps Raz might wish to argue that even if an adjudicativist 
interpretation of the non-exclusionary system is preferable as far as the 
courts' own internal reasoning processes are concerned, the system must 
nonetheless be understood as generating standards which are exclusion-
arily binding on citizens if not on courts. This is a more robust version of 
the second objection, and the response to it will be deferred until later. 
6. The Nature of the Common Law 
I have presented arguments elsewhere which show that Raz's posi-
tivist interpretation of the common law is an inadequate one and that the 
best theoretical understanding of modern common law systems regards 
them as being, in effect, non-exclusionary systems of the sort described 
above. 180 T hese arguments will not be repeated here. Instead, four 
related conclusions concerning the common law doctrine of precedent 
which are supported by those arguments will be set out, together with a 
few further observations about the theoretical character of the common 
law. 
First, the non-exclusionary conception of precedent i·s better able to 
explain the nature and extent of what Raz calls the special revisability of 
the common law than is the exclusionary conception; Raz's idea that 
common la\v precedents give rise to rules which are exclusionarily bind-
ing " in their essential rationale" 181 fails to correspond very closely to the 
facts. Second, R az' s explanation of the practice in common law courts 
concerning overruling is also descriptively inaccurate. Raz says that 
there is a "permissible list" of reasons to overrule which fall outside the 
scope of an exclusionary rule requiring courts to treat preceden ts as 
180. See Perry, supra note 56. at 239-55; see also supra note 168 concerning a slight difference 
between the understanding of the non-exclusionary conception of precedent that I advanced in the 
earlier paper and the one that I am putting forward here. 
181. J. R.·\Z. supra note 3, at 189. 
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exclusionarily binding. 1 ~c But the English House of Lords, for example, 
tends to require that a decision being reconsidered be "clearly wrong" 183 
before it can be overruled, or that there be "a very good reason" 1 " 4 to 
overrule, rather than that the reasons which led to the reconsideration be 
of one or another sort. 185 The first of these phrases suggests an episterni-
11 ' . 1 ' . , - • . h . ca1 y-ooundeu re2.son. , \Vmle the second suggests a revvelg_ tmg reaso0.; 
neither is very plausibly understood as presupposing the existence of c\i1 
exclusionary reason. 
The third point lS that the non- exclusionary conception of prece .. 
dent, because it allows for c. r:'nge of possible weighting thresholds, is 
able to account for the fact that common law "rules" are generally spo-
ken of as being settled or established to a greater or lesser degree: rz;ther 
than as being valid or invalid in the ali-or-nothing, positivist sense. Sirni-
larly, the non-exclusionary conception can make sense of the \vay in 
which judges and lawyers refer to precedents as possessing "weight" or 
" authority," these being, again, varia.ble rather than all- or-nothing con-
cepts. The exclusionary interpretation of precedent is incapable of 
accounting for either of these facts. The fourth point is that the non-
exclusionary approach, unlike the exclusionary understanding, can offer 
a unified theory of the general common law practice of following prece-
dent. At the same time it can explain why some jurisdictions, for exam-
ple England, are said to have a relatively "strict" doctrine of precedent 
while others, such as those in the United States, are said to have less 
strict versions. 186 As before, these differences are explained by the fact 
182. !d. at 114. 
183. Firzleer, (1977] 3 All E.R. at 1000: O'Brien v. Robinson, [1973] A.C. 912,930: Jones·;. 
Secretary of State for Social Sen·s, [1972] A. C. 944, 993. 
184. Knuller Ltd. v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [ 1973] A.C. 435, 455. 
185. In Judicial Ob!igarion, Precedcnl, and rhe Common Law l discuss the official position of the 
House of Lords, during the period 1898-1966, that it could not overrule its own previous decisions. 
Perry, supra note 56, at 244-~'7. As is made clear in A. PATERSON, THE LAW LORDS 122-53 (!982), 
the members of the House of Lords eventually came to think :hat this practice was a mistaken one. 
In Devlin, Judges and Lawmakers, 39 lliloD. L. REV. 1, 13 (1976), Lord Devlin wrote that the rule 
was "utterly antagonistic to the spirit of the common law." In its 1966 Practice Statement, supra 
note 173, the court gave notice that henceforth it would "depart from a former decision when it 
appears right to do so." For a good discussion of the nineteenth century transition in the English 
judicial system from what was clearly a non- exclusionary conception of precedent (according to 
which, in the words of one judge writing in 1833, earlier decisions need not be followed "if plainly 
unreasonable and inconvenient") to a much stricter and more rigid conception, see Evans, Change in 
rhe DoCirine of Precedenl During rhe Nineleenrh Cenrury, in PRECEDENT IN LAW 35 (L Goldstein 
ed. 1987). 
186. See, e.g., P.S. ATIYAH & R.S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERiCA c; 
LAw ch. 5 (1987), especially at 119 (the version of srare decisis which prevails in England today is 
very strict by modern American standards), and 126-27 (the overall authoritative force or weight of 
a precedent is generally not so great in America as in England); Goodhart, Case Law in England and 
1989] SECOND-ORDER REASONS 977 
that the non- exclusionary conception allows for a range of possible 
weighting thresholds. 
A couple of further observations are in order here. F irst, it is not 
open to Raz to say that the " clearly wrong" language \vhich common 
law courts sometimes employ to describe their criterion for overruling 
simply represents a minimal epistemic limitation which i~; consistent with 
even the highest courts being exclusionarily bound by their own previous 
decisions. It is true that common law courts, especially in England, often 
apply a relatively high weighting threshold to overruling, but this is 
because overruling ordinarily involves a fairly dras tic restatement of 
common law principles. The higher courts are constantly engaged in 
modifying and restating the common law in ways that are much more 
modest in effect, however, and th is practice is best understood by refer-
ence to the idea of lower weighting thresholds that have been adopted 
within the framework of a non- exclusionary conception of precedent. 
The activities of lower courts must often be understood in similar terms. 
A non- exclusionary conception of precedent can provide a unified 
account of all the various ways in \vhich the common law is judicially 
revised and qualified. As a result, there is little to be said for isolating the 
practice of overruling in particular and then trying to reconcile it with an 
exclusionary conception of precedent. 
A second observation is related to the first. Common law courts 
describe their main criterion for overruling in language which sometimes 
suggests an epistemically-bounded reason, sometimes a reweighting rea-
son, and sometimes both. Examples of the first t\vo categories of expres-
sions have already been given from the House of Lords. An example of 
the third category from the same court is this: a long established line of 
decisions will be overruled "only in plain cases where serious inconven-
ience or injustice would follow" from not overruling. 187 This apparent 
indifference on the part of the courts to which of the two types of reasons 
is in play is at one level undoubtedly due to their not being aware that 
there is a technical distinction to be drawn here. But in light of our 
Amenca, 15 CORNELL L.Q. 173, 179-86 (1930); Hardisty. The Effecl of Fulure Orientation on the 
American Reformulation of English Judicial Method. 30 HASTINGS L.J. 523. 532 ( 1979) (American 
courts give less weight to precedent than English courts). It should be noted that Atiyah and Sum-
mers argue that the different judicial treatment accorded to precedents in England and the United 
States is illustrative of a more general thesis according to which '"form::ll'" reasoning is relied upon 
more widely than ··substantive" reasoning in the English legal system, whereas in the American 
system the reverse is true. P.S. ATIYAH & R.S. SUMMERS, supra. at 1, 32. The distinction which 
Atiyah and Summers draw between substantive and formal reasons is very similar to Raz's distinc-
tion between first- order and exclusionary reasons. !d. at l-2. 
187. Admiralty Comm'rs v. Valverda, [1938] A.C. 173. 194 (emphasis added). 
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earlier conciusion that each of these types of reason serves roughly the 
same purpose and functions in much the same way, the judicial practice 
of relying on both of them and sometimes combining the t 1.vo is in any 
event an understandable and probably a sensible one. If common law 
courts employ re\veighting as well as epistemically~bounded reasons, 
however, then that further weakens any case there might b::: for explicat-
ing overruling from the perspective of an exclusionary conception of pre-
cedent. Reweighting reasons, unlike epistemically -bounded reasons, 
cannot be understood as a special case of exclusionary reasons: rather 
the reverse is the case. 
If modern common law regimes are best understood as non-exclu-
sionary systems, then in light of the comments about such systems that 
were made in the preceding section the best theoretical interpretation of 
the common law is an adjudicativist one. Common law judges do not 
decide cases on the basis of-or at least are not themselves bound by-
positive, pre- existing exclusionary rules, but rather look to whatever 
moral principles are properly applicable to resolve disputes of the kind in 
question. Deciding cases in accordance with such principles is their most 
fundamental obligation. In order to ensure a certain measure of predict-
ability in the legal environment courts attribute a varying presumptive 
weight to the reasoning of past decisions, thereby maintaining a kind of 
systematic continuity with the past, but not in such a way that they ever 
lose touch with the relevant first- order reasons. 
It is true that at any given time there is associated with the common 
law process a relatively stable body of dispute settling standards or 
"rules." (The term "rules" is here to be understood in a broad, generic 
sense that includes, but is not limited to, Raz's notion of an exclusionary 
rule.) If the adjudicativist interpretation of the common law process is 
correct, however, then these standards are not exclusionary rules, as Raz 
maintains; rather they are presumptions about how particular types of 
disputes should be settled, where the notion of a "presumption" is to be 
explained in terms of reweighting and/or epistemically-bounded reasons. 
The term " common law" is sometimes used to refer to this body of stan-
dards as it exists at any particular moment, but in a more fundamental 
sense it is understood as denoting the dynamic, institutionalized process 
of rational dispute settlement itself. The adjudicativist interpretation of 
the common law, which takes its basic point or function to be the settle-
ment of disputes in accordance with appropriate requirements of moral-
ity, is simpiy an attempt to capture this general understanding within a 
theoretical framework. 
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I have argued elsewhere that an adjudicativist interpretation of the 
common law which incorporates the non-exclusionary conception of pre-
cedent both clarifies and partially vindicates the theory of law that 
underlay Dworkin's early papers "The Model of Rules I" and "The 
Model of Rules II. " 188 It not only permits a more precise formulation of 
Dworkin's notion of institutional support, but also clarifies his rejection 
of a picture of "existing law" according to which " the law of a comrnu-
nity is a distinct collection of particular rules and principles ... such that 
it is a sensible question to ask whether, at any given moment, a particular 
rule or principle belongs to that collection." 189 I shall not further elabo-
rate on these claims here. 190 Instead, I shall briefly dra\.v attention to the 
fact that th,~ modern debate over the nature of the common law between 
positivist and adjudicativist theorists is no more than the contemporary 
version of a much older controversy. 
Gerald Postema has shown in an important recent book that the 
common law tradition which flourished in the late sixteenth and early 
seventeenth centuries constituted a theory of law which was, in the ter-
minology of this Paper, essentially adjudicativist in nature. 191 Coke, for 
example, wrote that "Reason is the life of the law, nay the Common Law 
itself is nothing else but Reason," 192 and Hale said that judicial decisions 
" do not make a Law properly so called ... yet they have a great Weight 
and Authority in Expounding, Declaring, and Publishing what the Law 
of this Kingdom is .... " 193 Hobbes, writing in the positivist tradition, 
replied to Coke that the common law was not law at all because " [i]t is 
not Wisdom, but Authority that makes a Law," 194 adding that "Statutes 
are not philosophy as is Common Law and other disputable Arts, but are 
Commands or Prohibitions .... " 195 Bentham later followed Hobbes in 
188, R, DwORKIN. RIGHTS, supra note 93, at 14-80; see Perry, supra note 56, at 223-26, 254-55, 
189. K D\VORK!N, RIGHTS, supra note 93, at 343; see also id, at 76. 292 (criticizing the charac-
terization of law as a set of fixed standards), 
190, I shall simply note that Dworkin's essay Hard Cases, in R, DwoRKIN, RIGHTS. supra note 
93, at 81-130, represents something of an aberration in his work, since he seems to accept there an 
exclusiom~ry conception of precedent. See Perry, supra note 56, at 255 n, 133, 
19 L G, PosTEMA, supra note 94, 
192, E, COKE,! It-iST!TUTES, § 21, quoted in G, POSTEMA, supra note 94, at 7, "Reason'• here 
does not mean individual reason, since the early common law tradition largely accepted what Pos-
tema calls ••the tradition- shaped sense of reasonableness." ld, at 10, This is a distinctive element in 
what is nonetheless a recognizably adjudicativist approach, 
193, M , HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 45 (CM, Gray 3rd ed, 
1971), q!wied in G, PosTD,JA, supra note 94, at 9, 
194, T. HOBBES, A DIALOGUE BETWEEN A PHILOSOPHER AND A STUDENT OF THE COMMON 
LAWS 55 (l Cropsey ed, 1971), quoted in G. PoSTEMA, supra note 94, at 47. 
195, T HoBBES. supra note 194, at 69, 
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refusing to accord the status of law to the common law. 196 As Postema 
and H.L.A. Hart have both recently pointed out , the guiding thought 
behind Hobbes' claim that all laws are commands is the notion of "an 
authoritative, peremptory directive to action." 19 7 One of the great merits 
of Raz's conception of a second-order exclusionary reason is that it 
makes it pos:;ible to analyze in clear and precise term:; the related con-
cepts of authority and of a peremptory directive, both of which have fig·· 
ured so prominently in the positivist tradit ion . 1n 
Raz, li ke Hart, represents something of a break with the older posi-
tivist tradition in that both he and Hart try to make sense of the common 
law in positivist terms rather than simply rejecting it, as H obbes and 
Bentham did , as not being law at all. Raz's attempt in th is regard is 
unsuccessful , and a similar conclusion would apply to Hart's more abbre-
viated discussion of the common law. 199 It is, moreover, Raz's own con-
ception of a (subjective) second- order reason, once it has been refined to 
yield the categories of reweighting and epistemically-bounded reasons, 
that makes it possible to offer a similarly precise analysis of the idea that 
previous judicial decisions "carry weight and authority" and that they 
give rise to " presumptions" rather than to strict rules. These notions, 
which figured prominently in the older common law tradition and which 
are still frequently relied upon in expositions of the doctrine of prece-
dent ,200 can be explicated within the non-exclusionary conception of pre-
cedent in such a way as to make an adjudicativist interpretation of the 
common law quite plausible. 
196. See. e.g., J. BENTHAM, Papers Rela1ive 10 Codificalion and Public l miruClion, in 4 THE 
WORKS OF JEREMY BENTH.-\M 451 (J. Bowring ed . 1843). Bentham's cla im tha t the common law is 
not law is discussed in G. POSTE MA, supra note 94, at 286-30 1, and in Simpson, The Common L aw 
and Legal Theory , in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 77, 88 -9 1 (A. Simpson ed. 1973). 
197. Postema, Som e Roo1s of our Notion of Precedent, in PRECE DENT IN L Aw 9, 13 (L. Go ld · 
stein ed . 1987) (emphasis deleted); see also H. HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM 253-54 ( 19 82) (exp la in -
ing Hobbes' view o f the peremptory character of commands). 
198. Bentham would seem to be the great exception to tht genera l posi t ivist tradi ti on o f plac in g 
peremptory d irec ti ves at the heart of the concept of law. According to Postema, Bentham wished to 
subject practical reasoning to a rational reconstruction which wo uld purge it of all excl usio nary o r 
peremptory "d isconti nui ti es," so that o ffi c ia ls and individua ls a like would engage in direc t-utilitarian 
reasoning o nly (and the refore, in Razian terms, in fir st- o rder reasoni ng o nl y) . S ee G. POSTEMA, 
supra note 94, at 319; see generally id. at 317-28 . Postema states tha t Bentham was thus led "to 
adop t a conception of legal rules quite different from what we have come to expect from positi vist 
legal theory.·· !d. at 3 18. H e goes on to say that "Bentham might be sa id to have erected a concep-
tion of law which rejects the notion o f authority .... " l d. at 327. 
199 . See H. HART, THE Co:-JCEPT OF LAW 131-32 ( 1961) (common law rul es are essentia lly 
similar in nature to ot her kinds o f !ega! rules) . 
200. See, e.g. , supra note 186. See also R. D woRKIN, supra note 85, at 24-2 6; Moore, Precedent, 
supra note 154, at 189-90. Afte r fir st developing a holisti c account of the com mon law, Moore 
makes 1he intriguing cla im th a t ultima tely it is o nl y in a psychological sense tha t precedents can be 
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7. Morally R elevant Reasons and Forward-Looking Exclusionary 
Rules 
981 
It was mentioned earlier that Raz might argue that even if the 
judges v;ho make and apply the common law are not themselves exclu-
sionarily bound by it, common law standards nonetheless provide exclu-
sionary guidance for citizens. The result would simply be an asymmetry 
between the: manner in which the common law binds citizens and the 
manner in which it binds courts. On this view judges, or at least the 
judges of the highest courts of appeal, have powers to modify the stan-
dards of the common law which are sufficiently broad that they cannot 
be said to be exclusionarily bound by those standards, while citizens are 
so bound until such time as the standards are judicially modified. The 
response to this objection will concentrate on the example of private 
common law, which is not only the heart of the common law but also the 
subject matter upon \vhich most adjudicativist theories focus. This sec-
tion is concerned with certain conceptual preliminaries, and it is only in 
the following section that the objection proper will be considered. 
It was assumed earlier that in the transformation of a system of 
absolute discretion into a non-exclusionary system the courts would con-
tinue to settle disputes on the basis of exactly the same sorts of moral 
considerations as before. These considerations, which will henceforth be 
referred to as morally relevant reasons, are supposed to be the reasons 
that would figure in the objective balance of reasons so as to yield the 
correct moral solution to the dispute before the court. Opinions as to 
what these considerations are wi il of course differ, but plausible candi-
dates include any relevant moral rights and duties of the litigants, for 
example, rights of reparation in tort cases, and perhaps the moral rights 
and duties of certain third parties as well. But morally relevant reasons 
need not in theory be limited to what Dworkin calls arguments of princi-
ple (although particular versions of adjudicativism, such as Dworkin's 
said to have a holding to which a certain weight is attached. !d. at 211-12. It will not be possible to 
discuss that claim here. It should be noted that it is not just adjudicativists who conceive of prece-
dents in terms of weight and/or presumptions. Neil MacCormick, for example, who identifies him-
self as a positivist, nonetheless says that "precedents are best treated as more or less highly 
persuasive rather than absolutely binding," by which he means that they should be regarded as 
giving rise to strong presumptions in favor of what has already been decided. See MacCormick, Why 
Cases Have Rationes and What These Arc, in PRECEDENT IN LAw, supra note 197, at !55, I 58, 167. 
This view of precedent undermines MacCormick's claim to be a positivist, however, at least so far as 
the common law is concerned, and, together with his emphasis on the role of courts as dispute-
resolving agencies, see id. at 167-69, brings him perilously close to an adjudicativist conception of 
law. 
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rights thesis, will make this claim). 201 At least certain sorts of policy 
arguments, such as loss-spreading and deep-pocket arguments in tort 
cases, could be regarded, depending on the moral and political theory 
which one held, as morally relevant reasons as well: action on the basis 
of such reasons is an attempt to make a moral difference for the better, in 
consequentialist terms, with respect to the facts of the very case before 
the court. 202 
Morally relevant reasons can be "forward-looking" as well as "back-
ward-looking." A court might have reason to conclude, for example, 
that deciding a certain case in a certain way would lead people to expect 
similar decisions in the future; if such expectations could foreseeably lead 
to undesirable behavior, then the court would have a reason (although 
not necessarily a conclusive one) to decide the case the other way. This 
could be true even in a system of absolute discretion/03 and the effect 
would be amplified where a doctrine of precedent had been adopted. 
Even if an exclusionary doctrine of precedent were in place the court 
would not, if it decided the case with a view to discouraging the undesir-
able behavior, be laying down an exclusionary rule to be followed by the 
persons whose possible future conduct was giving rise to concern. It 
would simply be taking account of the possible harmful consequences of 
deciding the present case one way rather than another, where the exist-
ence or extent of those consequences could be affected by the general 
knowledge that subsequent similar cases would probably be decided in a 
similar way. It is quite conceivable that those persons whose potentially 
objectionable conduct posed concern in the first place might not even be 
the subjects of whatever exclusionary rule was to emerge from the court's 
decision. 204 
Contrast the kind of forward-looking consideration just discussed 
•.vith the laying down of what will be referred to asfont>ard-looking exciu-
sionary rules. A forward-looking exclusionary rule is a standard 
201. R. DWORKIN, RIGHTS, supra note 93, at 82-84. 
202. See G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 39-45 (1970). 
203. Taking account of such arguments in a system of absolute discretion would not amount to 
treating bare expectations themselves as being morally relevant to the resolution of the dispute, in 
the way I said supra in the text accompanying note 167 would be problematic. It would be a case of 
taking account of the morally undesirable consequences which would be likely to flow from people 
having the bare expectations that they did. 
204. See. e.g., Ronde] v. Worsley, [ 1969] 1 A.C 191, in which the House of Lords held that a 
barrister could not be held liable to his client in negligence, primarily on the ground that allowing 
such actions against barristers might have the effect of inhibiting them in the performance of their 
duties to the court. Even if one thinks that House of Lords cases give rise to exclusionary rules, the 
only possible subjects of such a rule here are the clients of barristers, not the barristers themselves. 
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intended to provide exclusionary guidance fo r citizens bu t wh ich at the 
same time does not bear in any direct way on the moral resolution of 
existing d isputes. T he primary justification fo r its adoption lies, rather, 
in th.:: fact that it creates a new exclusionary reason for action which , 
while it reflects what Raz calls dependent reasons, does so because people 
wou ld not otherwise be in a position to act on those reasons in the 
absenc -e; of a publicly-adopted rule. 205 
Fen· example, suppose that people's morol rights in cases of acciden-
tally c::wsed loss are determined by a standard of care that defines unac--
ceptable risks without reference to the cost of avoiding the risk, so that 
where harm is reasonably foreseeable a substantial risk sim ply ought not 
to be irnposed on another person. Thi s understanding of the negligence 
standard was advanced by Lord R eid in the E nglish case of Bolton v. 
S tone.20 6 A n alternative formulation of the standard of care is based on 
the Learned Hand test, which balances the expected risks to the plaintiff 
agains t the cost to the defendant of taking precautions to avoid the 
risk. 207 Suppose it is true, as Richard Posner has argued, 208 that the 
Hand test would, if complied with by the bulk of the population, lead to 
the socially optimal level of accident occurrence, i.e. , to an optimal bal-
ance between accident costs and costs of accident avoidance. A court 
which applied the Lord Reid formulation of the standard of care in a 
case of first instance would be basing its decision on morally relevant 
reasons, since it would be deciding the case on the basis of the moral 
rights and duties of the litigants . But a court which accepted the 
Learned H and test in a case of first instance, saying that people would be 
held liable in negligence if and only if they failed to take the economically 
desira ble precautions,209 would be adopting a forward- looking exclusion-
ary ru le. T he rule would reflect reasons which people already had , 
narneiy reasons to make society economically effic ient, but prior to its 
adopt ion they would not have been in a pos ition, due either to ignorance 
or to the pointlessness of action by one individual alone, to act upon 
205. fo rwa rd-looking exclusionary rules will often affect the objective balance of reasons itself. 
S ee supra no te 5 1 an d acco mpanying text. 
206. B olion [ 1951] A.C. 850, 867. This is the understanding of the standard of care in negli -
gence law wh ic h is genera ll y accepted in England and the Commonwealth. 
207. In U.S. v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 f.2d 169 (1 947) Judge H and held tha t a person is 
neg ligen t if the cost o f tak ing adeq uate preca utions is less than wha t the cost of the injury would be. 
were it to occ ur, d iscount ed by the pro bability of its occ urrence . I d iscuss the Lord R eid and 
Learned H and formu lations of the standard of ca re in Perry . Th e l mpossibili1y of General SlnCI 
Liabifily , 1 C.\ N . J. L. & J U RIS. 147, 169-71 (1 988). 
208. See, e.g., Posner, A Th eory Negligence, i J. LEGAL ST U D. 29 ( 1972). 
209. For si mp lici ty' s sake I am igno ring the complicat ions that a re c rea ted by contributory 
!lcglige ncc, since these a re not relevant to the exam ple. 
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those reasons .210 
I t is the contention of this Paper that private law cases characteristi-
cally are and should be decided by common lav.; courts on rhe basis of 
morally relev<mt reasons alone. T his is , in a sense, a generalization of 
Dworkin 's rights thesis. 211 R az, on the other hand , is committed by his 
positivist interpretation of the common law to the position that common 
la.w courts and should decide at least some casss adopting fo rward-· 
looking exclusionary rules . T his follows from his clairn that courts con-
fronted unregu lated cases "act and should act j ust as legislators do, 
namely, they should adopt those rules which the;· jud ge best, " 212 since it 
is obviously within the prerogative of a legislature to enact forward-look-
ing exclusionary rules. This dispute is in part an empirical one, but it 
will not be possible to resolve satisfactorily that aspect of the issue here. 
The following section will therefore come to grips -with the question of 
whether the common law gives rise to exclusionary rules for citizens by 
considering, in turn, first the possibility that the contention advanced 
above is correct, and then the possibility that Raz's position is correct. 
Before these two possibilities are examined, however, there is one 
dimension of the empirical question which deserves to be briefly d is-
cussed. Behavior-guiding considerations are very strongly emphasized in 
modern American tort law and tort scholarship, especially in the area of 
product liability. 213 Tort law in the United States is very different in this 
respect from tort law in the rest of the common law world, which places 
much greater emphasis on fairness considerations . 214 It was mentioned 
above that morally relevant reasons can sometimes be forward-looking in 
nature, but American courts deciding product liability cases are often 
concerned with more than just the future ramifications of present deci-
sions. Sometimes the main intention of a decision appears to be to pro-
duce an effect on the future conduct of potential defendants. Perhaps it 
is possible, therefore, that modern American tort la\v, or at least product 
liability lo.w, constitutes an exception to the general contention that com-
mon law courts do and should decide cases on the basis of morally rele-
vant reasons alone. If so, then the fact that retroactive overruling 
continues to represent the general practice in tort cases in the U nited 
210. Cf J. RAZ, supra note 3, at 247-48. 
211. R. DWORKIN, RIGHTS, supra note 93, at 82-84. 
212. J. RA Z, supra note 3, at 197. 
213. See. e.g., Schwartz, New Products, Old Products, Evolving Law. Retroaclive Law, 58 
N .Y.U.L REV. 796, 823 (1983). 
214. See, e.g., \Veinrib, Insurance Justification, supra note 155. 
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States215 seems problematic. It is pointed out below that the chief diffi-
culty with the view that common law courts sometimes decide cases in 
accordance with forward-looking exclusionary rules is that the courts 
would have to be regarded as applying those rules retroactively. As Gary 
Schwartz says, "when the goal of tort law is to influence defendant 
b·~havior, it is a dubious practice to apply a novel rule retroactively; the 
foreseeable the rule at the time the defendant acted, the more dubi -
, ·, 1--- P ·o,..·~~tt.0e ,216 ou::; ~-.d·,_, .~. .t a.~,...,_ \._., ..... 
There is, however, another interpretation of the behavior-guiding 
asoect of modern American tort law which is consistent with the general 
contention stated above. Schwartz points out that if there is a foreseeab le 
continuity in the way that the settled law is judicially modified over time, 
then the conduct of potential defendants can at least sometimes be influ-
enced in a desirable way through the knowledge that any new doctrine 
will be applied retroactively. 217 This observation is interesting because it 
suggests that in a behavior-oriented regime of tort law it is the overall 
process of common law adjudication which does and should guide con-
duct, not the individual "rules" as they happen to be formulated at any 
one time. This suggests in turn that even where the common law empha-
sizes behavior-guiding considerations, the reasons for action to which the 
lav.r gives rise are first- order rather than exclusionary in nature. Existing 
common law doctine gives citizens some idea of the antecedent likelihood 
that particular kinds of disputes will be settled in particular ways, and 
citizens can also be expected to try to anticipate possible changes in the 
settled law which could affect their present assessment of how future liti-
gation is li kely to turn out. 218 This does not involve exclusionary gui-
dance because at issue is an assessment of probabilities rather than 
compliance vvith previously promulgated norms. If this is how modern 
tort law in the United States should be understood, then a novel judicial 
decision which relies primarily on behavior-guiding considerations will 
nonetheless be based on morally relevant reasons: it is necessary to apply 
the new doctrine retroactively in order to maintain the general incentives 
in the system which encourage people to anticipate future doctrinal 
changes. Of course if such a system is to work it will also be necessary to 
ensure that the general direction of the law is more or less foreseeable. 
215. Schwartz, supra note 213, at 816. 
216. !d. at 828. Schwartz goes on to say that "[b]y contrast, retroactive application is quite 
coherent when the new rule originates in notions of fairness .... " !d. This is consistent with what is 
said infra about retroactivity and the common law in the text accompanying notes 236-39. 
217. I d. at 826-27. 
218. This is consistent with what is said infra in the text accompanying notes 240-43 about the 
nature of the reasons to which the common law gives rise. 
QQt..:.. 
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T he degree of foreseeability that would be optimal is an open question , 
bm there is no reason to think that people vvould need to have anything 
li ke certain foreknowledge of how the law will change. 
8. Does the Comrnon Law Provide Exclusionary Guidance for 
Citizens? 
Suppose that common law courts characteristically decide private 
L::c \V cases on the basis of morally relevant reasons alone. A1so assume, o:n. 
the basis of previous arguments, that they adhere to a non-exclusionary 
conception of precedent. G iven these assumptions, can the claim that 
the courts are lay ing down exclusionary rules for the general populat ion 
be defended? Since by hypothesis the courts are not deciding cases by 
adop ting forward-looking exclusionary rules, it is impossible to maintain 
that they are providing exclusionary guidance for citizens with respect to 
behavior that occurs before a dispute takes place. 21 9 M ight it then be 
argued that the legal system gives rise to exclusionary rules which take 
hold after a dispute has arisen and which state, for example, that A must 
pay B damages where the facts are such and such? T his claim is also 
problematic, for two reasons. First, the common law does not force dis-
putants to accept its solutions; not only do they not have to take their 
dispute to court if neither insists on doing so, but the law condones and 
even encourages settlement, which is generally recognized to involve 
extra-legal, strategic considerations such as the relative bargaining power 
of the parties. The second and more important point is that the currently 
accepted di spute settling standards of the common law are always subject 
to i:etroacti ve modification which could possibly be, and sometimes is, 
quite rad ical in character. 
Raz says that the action-guiding nature of legal standards is deter-
mined by the intentions of the courtsY0 But in light of the two points 
just mentioned, it does not seem sensible to suppose that courts regard 
the sett led law as consisting of exclusionary rules which are intended to 
govern post-dispute conduct. The better view is that the system of courts 
which exercises jurisdiction over private law matters constitutes a kind of 
public resource of which citizens may avail themselves in order to have 
their disputes resolved if at least one of the parties requests this . T he 
sett led law consists of presumptions about how particular kinds of dis-
putes will be deal t v.;ith should they ever reach court. While the court 
2 i 9. Many standards of the com mon law co uld no t in any event be construed as providing pre-
dispute exc lusionary guidance. Consider, fm exampl e, doctrines of stric t liability. 
220. J. RAZ. supra note 84, at 228-32 . 
. , 
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will by means of such presumptions give weight to the reasoning of prior 
similar cases, it is possible that a given dispute will in the end be resolved 
in some other way. So far as citizens are concerned, the fact that these 
presumptions exist gives rise to first-order reasons which they can take 
into account in determining whm they ought to do, both before and after 
a dispute arises; they are not, however, bound by those presun-1ptions in 
an exclusionary sense. 
Assume nmv that Raz is correct in maintaining that comlT;on lav; 
courts decide at least son1e unregulated disputes by adopting forward-
looking exclusionary rules for citizens. Continue to assume as well that 
the courts adhere to a non-exclusionary conception of precedentY 1 If 
the first of these assumptions is true, then Raz is immediately in trouble 
on the normative side of his thesis that "courts act and should act just as 
legislators do .... " 222 The difficulty is that the forward-looking rules, 
which by hypothesis reflect reasons that people were not in a position to 
act upon before the ru le was adopted, will be applied retroactively to the 
case at hand. 223 They will be applied, that is to say, to evaluate the con-
duct of individuals who at the time that they acted did not have reason to 
behave or refrain from behaving in the way indicated by the rule. 224 Raz 
is aware of this implication of his theory and gives the impression of 
being uncomfortable about it, but at the same time he also downplays the 
unpalatable aspects of retroactive judicial lawmaking. He states that the 
only objection to retroactivity in this context "is based on the frustration 
of justified expectations," and that this is an objection that "has no force 
at all when unregulated disputes or any hard or controversial legal case is 
221. This means that from the point of view of the courts almost every dispute is unregulated in 
Raz's sense. It follows that the number of potential cases in which forward-looking exclusionary 
rules can be adopted is very large. 
222. J. RAZ, supra note 3, at 197. 
223. I am using the term "'retroactive"' to describe the settlement of disputes arising out of past 
conduct in which the court relies on considerations that had not, at the time that the conduct took 
place, received explicit judicial recognition as standards appropriate for resolving di:;putes of the 
kind in question. This characterization of retroactivity is different from, but compatible with, that of 
Stephen Munzer, who says that a law is retroactive '"if it alters the legal status of acts that were 
performed before it came into existence.'" Munzer, Retroactive Law, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 373, 373 
(1977). It should be noted that Munzer further develops this idea within the framework of an essen-
tially positivist theory of validity. 
224. It is true that in some American jurisdictions prospective law-making is an accepted judi-
cial technique. This is not neccss:1rily incompatible with adjudicativism, although l shall not try to 
argue in support of that conclusion here. The points that I wish to press for present purposes are 
twofold. First, retroacti vc decis10nmaking is still the norm in most common law jurisdictions, and 
so it is on that practice that a theory of the common law must concentrate. Second, as I shall argue 
below, retroactivity is not necessarily a bad thing when it is viewed from an adjudicati•;ist rather 
than a positivist perspective. 
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concerned since no justifiable expectations can arise in such cases. " 225 
Raz concedes that justified expectations will be frustrated in clear 
instances of distinguishing and in cases of overruling, but asserts that the 
objection to retroactivity extends no further. 226 
Even apart from the serious nature of the unfairness which 
acknowledges to occur when justified expectations are frus t rated, it is 
wrong to say that this is the only objection to ret roactive judicial lavv-
making of the sort which his positivist interpretation of the common 1avi 
countenances. Consider that it would ordinari ly be pointless to apply a 
forward-looking exclusionary ru.le retroactively, since the purpose of the 
rule is precisely to guide people's future conduct and in the circum-
stances we are speaking about this would not be possible. 227 Consider 
also that a forward-looking exclusionary rule is capable of displacing 
people's moral rights, and while it might be perfectly acceptable for a 
legislature to do this on a prospective basis, at a time when the expected 
benefits of doing so were sufficiently great that it would be in everyone's 
antecedent interest to have their rights so superseded, matters stand dif-
ferently when the rule is introduced retroactively. Suppose that the 
assumptions made earlier about the Learned Hand and Lord R eid for-
mulations of the negligence standard are true, and that in a case of first 
instance, where there are no general expectations (justified or otherwise) 
about what the court might do, it decides the case on the basis of the 
Learned Hand test. On an appropriate set of facts this could mean that a 
moral right of reparation on the part of the plaintiff was overridden. 
Even though this might be perfectly acceptable if done on a prospective 
basis, it seems completely unjustified to take such action in a particular 
225. J. RAZ, supra note 3, at 198. 
226. Jd. 
227. If there were a point to the retroactive application of a novel doctrine, then it is not likely 
that that doctrine would be embodied in a forward-looking exclusionary rule. Recall that the pri-
mary justification for adopting such a rule is that, while it reflects reasons that people independently 
have, it does so in circumstances where they would not be in a position to act on those reasons in the 
absence of a publicly-adopted rule. See supra text accompanying note 205. If the new doctrine was 
justified primarily by behavior-guiding considerations, then the legal system would presumably take 
the form described supra in the text accompanying notes 217-18. The reasons for action that would 
be generated for ordinary citizens would be first- order and not exclusionary reasons. The pragmatist 
legal system which is described by Dworkin in Law's Empire and which, according to him, would 
embrace retroactivity, is probably best understood in these terms. SeeR. DWORKIN, supra note 85, 
at 155-57. Dworkin does mention one argument in favor of retroactivity, based upon the incentives 
it creates for people to bring novel actions to court, which is admittedly compatible with the retroac-
tive application of forward-looking exclusionary rules. !d. at 56. But this argument is almost cer-
tainly outweighed by the various disadvantages of applying such rules retroactively that are 
described in the text. 
1989] SECOND-ORDER R EASONS 989 
person's case after the fact, at a time when it is clearly not in that per-
son's interest that this be doneY8 
T he most serious objection to the retroactive judicial application of 
forward-looking exclusionary rules arises from the fact that it contra-
venes Raz's own positivist conception of the rule of law. According to 
this conception, the rule of law is an instrumental virtue that a legal sys-
tem possesses in proportion to its degree of efficiency in performing its 
function , where that function is taken to be the exclusionary gu idance of 
conduct : " [I]n the final analysis the doctrine rests on its basic idea that 
the law should be capable of providing efrective guidance. " 229 Retroac-
tive lawmaking will general ly amount to a violation of this conception of 
the rule of law because, as Raz himself notes, "[o]ne cannot be guided by 
a retroactive law." 230 (Retroactivity is , of course, only one of the ways in 
which the rule of law as thus conceived can be violated.) Raz states that 
the rule of law is a "morally neutral" virtue in the sense that it is "neutral 
as to the end to which the instrument [i.e., law] is put. " 23 I He nonethe-
less acknowledges that its violation can "insult human dignity, give free 
rein to arbitrary power, frustrate one's expectations, and undermine 
one's ability to plan." 232 
Raz says that not every violation of the rule of law will give rise to 
all of these evils. Yet there is no reason to think that in the context of 
retroactive lawmaking by courts the only one that will be manifested is 
the frustration of justified expectations. It should be clear that any of the 
other evils Raz enumerates could appear here as well. Retroactive judi-
cial lawmaking of the sort permitted by Raz's positivist theory of law 
would not only defeat the expectations of particular individuals but could 
al so lead to a general uncertainty among people who were afraid that the 
same thing might happen to them. 233 This would interfere with their 
autonomy by impeding their ability to plan for the future. The retroac-
tive implementation by judges of forward-looking exclusionary rules 
would also seem to entail a lack of respect for people's autonomy, in that 
the individuals directly affected would not be treated "as persons capable 
of planning and plotting their future. " 234 
228. C/ R . DWORKI N , PRI NC IPL E, supra note 93 , at 283-89 (unfairness of adj udicating existing 
cases by applying novel principl es the adoption of which on a forward-looking basis would be in 
everyone"s antecedent interest). 
229 . J. RAZ, supra note 3, at 218. 
230. !d. at 214. 
231. !d . a t 226. 
232. Jd. at 222. 
233. C/ id. 
234. !d. at 221. 
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Retroacti ve judicial lawmaking of the sort under scrutiny is thus a 
much more serious matter, from the perspective of Raz's own conception 
of the rule of law, than he acknowledges. T here are also implications for 
his general theory of law because the conceptual connection tha t he per-
ceives betvveen the function of law, which is to guide behavior by means 
of exclusionary rules, and the role of the courts, which is to evaluate 
conduct on the basis of those san1e rules, is sev red if the courts fail to 
t~pply exisTing la·w; given our ear lier conclusion that the court:; adhere to 
a ncn-exclusionary conception of precedent, retroactivit y -.;.;ill often 
::ntail just such fa ilure. As Raz himself says, " it is obvious that it is futile 
w guide one's action on the basis of the law if when the maHer comes to 
adjud ication the courts will not apply the law and will ac t for some oth er 
reasons." 235 It has already been contended that, as an empirical matter, 
common law courts do not decide cases by implementing forward-look-
ing exclusionary rules and then applying them retroactively. If this is 
wrong, and courts often do adopt such rules while at the same time 
reserving the ability to reject or revise them in accordance with a non-
exclusionary conception of precedent, then Raz would be correct to con-
clude that the common law process generates standards that are 
(intended to be) exclusionarily binding for citizens but not for judges. 
This would be J. hollow victory, however, since by his own lights there 
would be something very wrong with the common law. 
9. The Adjudicativist Conception of the Com mon La ¥v: Final 
Observarions 
There is clearly a great deal more to be said about both adjudicativ-
ism genera lly and about the adjudicativis t conception of the common law 
in particular. It will only be possible here to consider very briefly some 
of the more obvious objections that might be made to that conception, 
;md to add a few final observations about its theoretical character. 
F irst, could R az claim that the adjudicativist conception of the com-
mon law is in no better state than the positivist conception because it too 
condones retroactive lawmaking? So long as it is true that common law 
courts characteristically decide private law cases on the basis of morally 
relevant reasons, the answer to thi s question is no. If that contention 
holds then courts settle d isputes on the basis of moral considerations that 
are appl icable to those very disputes, even if the j udicial art iculation of 
those considerations sometim es necessaril y takes place after the events in 
2.\5 . !d. at 2!7. 
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question occurred. 23 "' The positivist conception of the rule of law 1s not 
generally applicable, moreover, to civil disputes, at least so far as retroac-
tivity is concerned. 237 The most important domain in which the positiv-
ist conception holds sway (and, it should be emphasized, qu ite properly 
holds S\vay) is the criminal law. In a criminal case the only " d ispute" is 
about whether or not the accused really did fall below some specified 
standard of conduct at a time when he possessed the requi site mental 
state; if it cannot be shown beyond a reasonable dou bt that he is gu ilty, 
then neither he nor anyone else will be punished . Under these circum -
stances a general requirement of fair notice seems cornple!ely 
unproblematic. Compare this with the usual torts case, in \Vhich there 
already exists a loss that cannot be made to disappear and which must be 
absorbed by someone. Government decisions are inevitable in civil dis-
putes, even if they are made only by default; accident losses must be 
allocated, and determinations must be made about who is entitled to own 
or possess disputed property. In light of these facts the position that the 
defendant is always entitled to fair notice, so that the plaintiff has a right 
to win only if there is a clear legal rule which demands that result but 
236. One of Dworkin's prima facie arguments in favor of the rights thesis was that o bjections to 
judicial or iginalit y based on the retroactivity of judicial decisions had less force against arguments of 
principle than arguments of policy. See R. DwORKIN, supra note 85, at 84 -86. lt is a som ewha t 
similar argument that I am making here, except that I regard the point as extending beyond argu-
ments of principle to morally relevant reasons generally. The claim thus covers some arguments of 
policy. though by no means all. There is also one o ther significant difference between my argument 
and Dworkin's. The law, as Dworkin describes it in "Hard Cases," consists of settl ed institutional 
history, including common law decisions, together with the propositions which are entailed by the 
sou ndest rights-based moral justification o f that history. !d. at 105-23. He suggests that where the 
law is thus understood judicial decisions will not be retroactive at ail, since the coun wi il always b.: 
enforcing a pre-exist ing right or duty. !d. at 84-86. This claim presupposes a different understand-
ing of retroactivity from that out lined supra in note 223. More importantly , Ken Kress has shown 
that even given this definition of law retroactivity can not be avoided, since the rights that exist at the 
time of the events in question can, due to subsequent developments in the se ttled law , differ from 
those that exist at the time of adjudication. See Kress, Legal Reasoning and Coh erence Th eories: 
Dworkin's Rights Th esis. Retroaclivity, and the Lin ear Order of Decisions, 72 CAL. L. REv. 369 , 3 77-
88 ( 1984). Kress ca lls this the '"ripple effect" argument. The formal precondit ions of Kress"s argu-
ment do not seem to apply to the version of adjudicat ivism put forward in this Paper, since the 
settled law is not rega rded as an unalterable given but only as a set of presumptions. Nonetheless. as 
a practica l matter, the ripple effect will almost certainly occur here as well. The d ifference between 
my argument from retroactiv it y and Dworkin's derives from the fac t that for the reasons g iven in the 
text I rega rd retroac tivity in the sense defined supra iri note 223 as unavoidable in civil disputes. The 
argument then sim ply is that retroactive judicial decisions made on the basis of morally relevant 
reasons a re justifiable. whereas the retroactive judicial application of forward-lookin g exclusionary 
rules is not. 
237. It is not su rprising that adjudica tivists often reject the positivist conception of the rule of 
law in favo r of a more substantively-oriented conception. SeeR. DwoRKIN, PRINCIPL E, supra note 
93, at 9-32; Weinrib, Intelligibility, supra note 155. 
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that otherwise the defendant must win, 238 is a manifestly unsatisfactory 
one. 239 There is no morally acceptable analogue in civil law of the crimi-
nal law principle nulla poena sine lege. 
It should also be recalled that where a non-exclusionary doctrine of 
precedent has been implemented it does not necessarily follo v.; that some-
one's legitimate expectations have been defeated simply because a prior 
case is overruled or distinguished. Legitimate expectations focus on the 
process, not on individual standards of the common law . 2-w It would of 
course be preferable if the legal system always gave fair notice and never 
took anyone by surprise in any way, but in a world of moral uncertainty 
that is impossible. Sometimes considerations of justice which favor one 
of the parties to a dispute must outweigh those in terests of the other 
party which depend on his having relied on the probability that the pro-
cess of dispute resolution would have a different outcome. 
What then is the nature of the dispute settling standards of the com-
mon law, so far as ordinary citizens are concerned? They are, essentially, 
first-order reasons which are capable of guiding citizens' conduct in an 
indeterminate rather than in an exclusionary sense by giving them some 
idea of the anteceden t likelihood that a certain kind of dispute will be 
settled one way rather than another. Such standards introduce a degree 
of stability into the dispute settling process. Unlike exclusionary rules 
they do not restrict choice but rather enhance it, since this stability cur-
tails the interference with personal autonomy which the process would 
otherwise create. It is of course true that some standards of the common 
law, such as those involving intentional torts like battery, are capable of 
guiding behavior in a way not dissimilar to the criminal law. But that is 
simply a consequence of the nature of the moral wrongs with which those 
particular standards are concerned and of the fact that moral duties 
23 8. Dworkin labels this position "unilateral conventionalism" or "unilateralism." See R. 
DwORKIN, supra note 85, at 142-43. 
239. Cf Schwartz, supra note 213 , at 822: 
[I]f a new cause of ac tion (in tort] is derived by the judicia ry from the criterion of fairness. 
then the defendant 's opportunity for fair notice comes into conflic t with the plaintiff 's 
opportunity to receive fair trea tment as fa irness is understood a t the time o f his trial; and it 
is hardly clear why the defendant 's opportunity should be granted priority over the 
plaintiff's . 
240. Cf id. at 8 17 : "As long as the general rules of the game make clear in advance tha t the 
specific rules of the game are subjec t to change, the player cannot com plain about per se un fa irn ess 
merely because such a change is in fact effected." Schwartz goes on to say that " obviously an 
emphasis on continuity lies near the core of the common law. Firs t- order common law ru les may 
gradually come and go, bu t the second- order rules of the common law process seem (relat ively) 
constant. " I d. at 818. Schwartz does not say what he means by " second-order rules of the com mon 
law process," but I would suggest tha t they are simply the weighting principles of the no n- exclusion -
ary conception of precedent. 
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themselves are, if R az is right, objective exclusionary reasons; 241 it is not 
a characteristic shared by standards of the common law as a class. 242 
Could th is be said to be a return to Holmes' "bad man" theory of 
Lrw, 'Nhich holds that rhe only reasons for action to •;vhich the law gives 
:rise are incentives to avoid unpleasantness?H3 This question must be 
ansv;ered negat ively because there is no general recluctivist claim being 
made about the nature of legal obligation. It is thus not denied that some 
areas of th .;:: are :.:_,es t analyzed in exclusionary terrns. T here is also no 
basis for insisting rhat the firs t - order reasons which the common law 
yields must be regarded with a cynical Holmesian eye. It is completely 
consistent "With the view defended here that cit izens be expected to try to 
anticipate how the common law will change, relying in the process not 
merely on social facts about the judicial system but also on their own 
judgments and opinions about the moral questions in issue. This leads to 
the further conclusion, it should be noted, that the sources thesis has no 
more application to ordinary citizens, so far as their interaction with the 
common law is concerned, than it does to judges. 
One final observation is in order, and that is that the interpretation 
of the common law process that has been outlined in this Paper is per-
fectly compatible with the conclusion that courts are legitimate authori-
ties in Raz's sense. Courts issue what amount to exclusionary directives 
to the immediate parties to an action, and so can be regarded as claiming 
authority over persons to that extent. This is in no way inconsistent with 
the idea that they neither issue nor intend to issue general exclusionary 
directives to the population as a whole. 
CONCLUSION 
Joseph Raz is one of our most important contemporary philoso-
phers and legal theorists. H e has written with great insight about the 
241. See supra notes 48, 49. 
242. It is not true, for example, of doctrines of strict liability in tort, nor is it true of the standard 
of care in negligence law, which for substantive reasons of fairness is objective in nature and there-
fore incapable of guiding at !east some conduct on the part of at least some persons. See N. MAC-
CmzrviiCK. The Ob/igarion of Repararion. in L EGAL RIGHT AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 212. 218-19 
( 1982); Wcinrib, Moral Theory, supra note l 55, at 51-52. It is of course true that objective standards 
occ0siona lly t!gure in the criminallav> , but I think it is generaily accepted that "a 'subjective test" of 
criminal liability should be adhered to as far as possible . :· H. HART. PUNISHMENT AND 
RE SPONSIBJL!TY 63 (rev. ed. 1970). Such arguments as are made for relying on objective tests in the 
criminal sphere are pragmatic in nature. looking. for example, to difficulties of proof, and hence are 
very different from the arguments put forward in the civil sphere. See id. at 32-33, 152-57. 
243. O.'N. HOLMES, Th~ Parh ofrhe Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL P APERS 167, 170-75 (1920). 
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nature of practical reasoning, and he has clarified much that was previ-
ously obscure about the relationship between legal and political philoso-
phy on the one hand and practical phi iosophy on the other. Throughout 
this Paper I have been building on Raz's fundamental insight that a dis-
tinction must be drawn between first- and second- order reasons fo r 
action, and the discussion of practical reasoning in the first half of the 
Paper is, in essence, little more than a refi nement of Raz's account. Our 
disagreement in the area of legal philosophy clearl y runs deeper, but it is 
worth stressing that I do not maintain that Raz's positivist theory of law 
is completely to be rejected. His analysis is a compelling one so far as 
certain areas of the law are concerned, and this is particularly true of 
criminal law and statu tory law generally. 244 The arguments about the 
common law presented here are, therefore, not so much a call for the 
rejection of positivism as they are a claim that positivism offers an incom-
plete account of the theoretical basis of law and so must be supplemented 
in certain respects by adjudicativism. Moreover it should again be 
emphasized that those arguments have been constructed on the founda-
tion of Raz's notion of a second- order reason for action. It is only by 
relying on Raz's own philosophical insights that I have been able to criti-
cize his theory of law and offer an alternative analysis of certain legal 
phenomena. 
244. See Perry , supra note 56, a t 255-57. 
